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Continuing with the growing trend of language analysis within Economics, this
thesis utilises text analysis tools in a novel evaluation of 3 distinct communication
settings - small talk, climate change communication and political speeches.
The first chapter studies the implications of small talk, the most ubiquitous form
of communication, for strategic decision making and the mechanism driving this.
In a laboratory setting, after only 4-minutes of small talk, subjects developed
impressions or beliefs about their partners’ personalities, particularly extraver-
sion, which affected behaviour in subsequent strategic interactions. Subjects
were more inclined to cooperate in a public goods game when they believed their
partners to be extraverted and found it harder to out-reason partners perceived
as similar in type to themselves in a level-k reasoning task. Analysing the text
used during the small talk chat revealed that talking more is associated with trait
extraversion, which indeed provides an accurate forecast of type.
Next, the second chapter assesses climate change communication strategies to
reduce planned meat intake. A pre-registered online randomised control trial with
1220 subjects, revealed shockingly low awareness about the environmental impact
of meat. An evaluation of 6 information interventions showed that the most
effective messages were based on scientific knowledge and efficacy salience i.e.
concrete information about the consequences of a dietary shift. The study found
support for a targeted messaging approach, by highlighting the health benefits of
a plant-based diet for subjects with health concerns, and evidence of motivated
reasoning related to meat consumption among frequent meat-eaters. Examining
donations to a climate change charity and the text in the information recalled at
the end of the study provided further insight into the interventions.
Lastly, the third chapter analyses U.S. Congressional speeches to build linguistic
measures of the speakers’ attitude towards immigrants. An “immigration corpus”
containing 24,351 immigration policy-related speeches between 1990 and 2015
was compiled. The corpus was used to build two distinct measures of attitude
towards immigrants, sentiment (or valence) and concreteness. The measures,
particularly sentiment, displayed strict partisan polarisation and variation over
time and across states in a manner consistent with the history of immigrant
outcomes. A speaker-specific measure of sentiment was a significant predictor of
voting behaviour on immigration bills. Applying a Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA) topic modelling algorithm displayed trends in the diverse topics discussed
in immigration speeches, such as rise in concern over national security post 9/11.
xiii
Introduction
Language being a key tool for imparting cultural knowledge and gaining in-
sight into others’ minds, can help explain a variety of outcomes including at-
titude change, attribution, social perception, and intergroup bias and stereo-
typing (Krauss and Chiu, 1998). Within Economic research, there has been a
recent increase in the use of natural language processing tools to explain diverse
strategic behaviours and build measures of inherent attitudes or bias. For ex-
ample, language analysis has been used to explain the effect of positive mood
on cooperation (Proto, Sgroi, et al., 2019), build a historical measure of national
subjective wellbeing (Hills et al., 2019), to measure trends in the partisanship
of U.S. Congressional speeches (Gentzkow et al., 2019) and build a measure of
gender attitude of judges based on authored opinions (Ash et al., 2021).
Continuing with the trend of incorporating language analysis within the Eco-
nomics discipline, this thesis employs aspects of text analysis to evaluate be-
haviour in three distinct communications settings - 1. small talk communication
which helps develop personality impressions, which in turn affect strategic be-
haviour 2. climate change communication interventions to encourage a reduced
meat diet and 3. analysis of U.S. Congressional speeches to build measures of
inherent attitude towards immigrants. The list of chapters in the thesis, along
with co-author names and author contributions, are provided in Table 1.
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While the relationship between personality and strategic decision making has
been widely studied in Economics (Proto, Rustichini, and Sofianos, 2019; Proto
and Rustichini, 2014; Rustichini et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 2009; Hirsh and
Peterson, 2009), what remains unexplored is the impact of personality impres-
sions on strategic behaviour. Chapter 1 presents the results from a laboratory
experiment, which paired subjects with a stranger with whom they could engage
in “small talk” (or seemingly non-strategic chatter) for 4 minutes. The chat was
conducted through a chat box on their screens, without knowing the nature of any
future dealings. Following the chat, subjects developed beliefs about each others’
personalities, particularly trait extraversion. These beliefs affected decision mak-
ing in two well-known strategic games - the Public Goods Game, which is a game
of cooperation, and the 11-20 money request game (Arad and Rubinstein, 2012),
which examines level-k reasoning. Note that, extraversion, as a fundamental and
pervasive personality trait (Costa and McCrae, 1980), was the only trait which
could be reasonably detected after a brief bout of communication.
Having engaged in small talk, subjects were observed to cooperate more in the
Public Goods Game when they believed their partner to be extraverted and
found it harder to out-reason opponents who they perceived as similar in type
to themselves. Analysis of the language used during the small talk communica-
tion revealed that the more talkative partners were believed to be extraverted.
However, with regards to personality beliefs, there remained a persistent own-
type bias as extraverts, prone to complementary self projection bias, are likely to
overstate the extravertion in others.
Aside from the novel use of personality beliefs to explain strategic behaviour,
this chapter contributes to the literature exploring accuracy of personality at-
tribution (Eaton and Funder, 2003; Little and Perrett, 2007; Naumann et al.,
2009). This study also contributes to the modest literature on implications of
small talk (Pullin, 2010; Das and Chen, 2007; Ragan, 2014). Lastly, the study
adds to literature on strategic sophistication (Fe et al., 2019; Gill and Prowse,
2016; Georganas et al., 2015) by showing that subjects adjust strategies based
on endogenous belief formation about the opponent’s type.
Next, Chapter 2 addresses climate change communication strategies. Despite
scientific consensus regarding the environmental impact of meat (Schiermeier,
2019; Tilman and Clark, 2015; Stehfest et al., 2009), there is shockingly low
awareness among the general public (Sanchez-Sabate and Sabaté, 2019; de Boer
et al., 2016; Macdiarmid et al., 2016; Vanhonacker et al., 2013). Interventions
aiming to increase public awareness about the environmental benefits of a reduced
2
meat diet have been scattered and inconclusive, with most studies focussing on
a single behavioural barrier (see Harguess et al., 2020 for a systematic literature
review). This study makes a novel attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of 6
information interventions, framed using 6 supporting theories, against a control
group with baseline scientific information, in reducing planned meat intake. The
list of 6 interventions was compiled to address all major barriers to reducing
meat consumption: scientific knowledge gap, perceived inefficacy of action (with
2 different efficacy frames), lack of personal relevance, cognitive dissonance and
social norms.
In an online pre-registered randomised controlled trial, involving 1220 partici-
pants, only 9% reported diet-related actions as effective against climate change.
Compared to the control group, the most effective interventions were based on
additional scientific knowledge and efficacy salience i.e. providing information
about a reduced meat diet in an easily understandable unit. The study also
found support for a targeted messaging approach as providing information about
the health benefits of a plant-based diet proved effective for subjects with health
concerns. Further insight into the information interventions was acquired by eval-
uating donation to a climate change charity and developing a text-based measure
of relative memorability of the interventions. Interestingly, frequent meat eaters
displayed motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990), as they were less inclined to ac-
knowledge the environmental impact of meat and were morally offended at being
informed.
Moreover, the results of this chapter can offer guidance to future researchers and
policy-makers about effective information strategies for large-scale communica-
tion campaigns to promote a reduced meat diet. The study also contributes to
the existing branch of literature designing interventions to promote reduced meat
intake (Bertolotti et al., 2016; Graham and Abrahamse, 2017; Vainio et al., 2018).
More broadly, the study adds to research exploring interventions to ‘nudge’ sus-
tainable behaviour change (Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Allcott, 2011; Cialdini et
al., 1990; Hafner, Elmes, and Read, 2019), specifically information interventions
(Goldstein et al., 2008; Hafner, Elmes, Read, and White, 2019). Lastly, this work
contributes to studies exploring narrative approaches to presenting information
(Shiller, 2017; Slater et al., 2003; McQuiggan et al., 2008).
Finally, Chapter 3 conducts a novel analysis of U.S. Congressional speeches to
develop linguistic measures of attitude towards immigrants. Despite contributing
to the workforce and tax revenue of the host country, immigrants continue to be
subject to constant discrimination, making immigration and attitude towards
3
immigration a critical matter for public policy. In this chapter, an “immigration
corpus” containing 24,351 immigration policy-related speeches, delivered on the
floor of the U.S. Congress between 1990 to 2015, was compiled. This corpus was
used to build two distinct measures of attitude towards immigrants, based on
sentiment (or valence) and concreteness (as a proxy for social proximity). This
approach is inspired from Li and Hills, 2020 who built an immigration corpus
from New York Times articles.
Of the two linguistic measures, sentiment displayed systematic variation over time
and across states in a manner consistent with the history of immigrant outcomes
and political ideology in the U.S. Examination of the voting patterns of the
speakers on seminal immigration bills revealed that a speaker-specific sentiment
measure is a significant positive predictor of pro-immigration voting behaviour,
even after controlling for speaker characteristics and district level socio-economic
variables. Furthermore, applying a Latent Dirichlet Allocation or LDA topic
modelling algorithm (Blei et al., 2003) to the immigration corpus demonstrated
variation in concern over different immigrant-related topics discussed over time,
such as a spike in concern related to national security post the 9/11 attacks.
A study of Congressional speeches related to immigrant issues can provide crucial
information about the intensity of the speaker’s attitude toward immigrants,
which could subsequently have an impact on shaping immigration legislation. The
approach proposed in the paper can be adopted by future researchers to study
politicians’ attitudes towards other key issues such as gender, race and climate
change to predict voting behaviour on relevant bills. This study also contributes
to the modest branch of literature which develops linguistic measures of bias
including prejudice towards immigrants in news coverage (Li and Hills, 2020;
Mastro et al., 2014), and racial (Rice et al., 2019) and gender (Ash et al., 2021)
bias in judges’ authored opinions. Further, the study contributes to past work
examining roll call voting behaviour of U.S. Congress members on immigration
bills (Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011; Milner and Tingley, 2011; Fetzer, 2006;
Gonzalez and Kamdar, 2000) which had till now relied on economic, demographic
and political determinants of voting behaviour. Lastly, this chapter adds to
literature using Natural Language Processing tools to study U.S. Congressional
speeches (Gentzkow et al., 2019; Jensen et al., 2012).
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1 The Role of Personality Beliefs and “Small Talk”
in Strategic Behaviour 1
with Daniel Sgroi
Humans are predisposed to forming “first impressions” about the people we en-
counter including impressions about their personality traits. While the relation-
ship between personality and strategic decision-making has been widely explored,
we examine the role of personality impressions in predicting strategic behaviour
and devising behavioural responses. In a laboratory setting, after only 4-minutes
of “small talk”, subjects developed a sense of the personality of their partners,
particularly extraversion, which consequently changed their behaviour in future
interactions. Subjects cooperated more in public goods games when they believed
their partner to be extraverted and found it more difficult to out-guess opponents
they perceived as similar to themselves in a level-k reasoning task, having engaged
in conversation with them. We trace how language can generate these effects us-
ing text analysis, showing that talking more makes individuals appear extraverted
and pro-social which in turn engenders pro-social behaviour in others.
1.1 Introduction
It is human nature to form “first impressions” or perceptions about the people we
meet based on observable verbal and non-verbal behaviours. Social psychologists
suggest that the central unit used to understand the behaviour of those around
us is closely bound to our perceptions about personality traits (Moskowitz and
Olcaysoy Okten, 2016). Information about others’ traits plays an integral role
when inferring their behaviour in a new setting (Hoffman et al., 1981), which in
turn can help us prepare our own behavioural response when we interact with
them. The implication is that anything that helps us learn about the personality
of others can and will change our behaviour towards them in the future.
1Funding for this project was provided by the ESRC CAGE Centre (Grant Ref RES-626-
28-0001). University of Warwick Departmental IRB approval obtained (12-03-2018). The
experiment for the study is registered at the AEA RCT Registry (RCT ID AEARCTR-0002903)
https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2903. The authors are grateful to Thomas Hills,
Kirill Pogorelskiy, Anu Realo, Gordon Brown and Sharun Mukand from Warwick University for
helpful discussions related to the paper and to John Taylor from Warwick Business School for
help with the experimental sessions. The authors would also like to thank Andis Sofianos for
providing the Raven’s test matrices used in Proto, Rustichini, and Sofianos, 2019. The authors
declare no conflicts of interest.
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Personality impressions can be based on a wide variety of elements, such as
conversations, manner of speaking, non-verbal actions and physical appearance.
Much of the prior literature has focused on personality beliefs formulated from
observed physical appearance (Naumann et al., 2009), recorded expressions or
behaviour (Hall et al., 2008) and face-to-face interactions (Eaton and Funder,
2003). In our experimental study, we focus on personality beliefs formed in a
brief (4-minute) period of “small talk” communication conducted using instant
messaging software, together with the ensuing impact of such beliefs on behaviour
in later strategic interactions in the laboratory. The emphasis on small talk fol-
lows from its ubiquitous role in any social interaction. In a period of negotiation
there is often an initial burst of small talk, during a typical working day office
workers might chat next to the water cooler or in the office corridor, and ap-
pointments with a doctor or financial adviser might begin with pleasantries and
a mention of the weather. Opting for instant messaging in the laboratory allows
us to omit any confounding effects originating from visual and auditory stimuli.
Also, by allowing communication only before the nature of future interactions is
known we avoid discussions about future strategies.
Personality theory has become a useful tool in Economics to explain strategic
behaviour (Proto, Rustichini, and Sofianos, 2019; Proto and Rustichini, 2014;
Rustichini et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 2009; Hirsh and Peterson, 2009). We ex-
pand on this by exploring the impact of impressions about another individual’s
personality on subsequent strategic interactions with them. Given our controlled
laboratory setting and the brevity of the communication, our analysis focuses
on the two broadest and most fundamental personality traits, extraversion and
neuroticism (Costa and McCrae, 1980). Extraversion and neuroticism, which are
associated with positive and negative affect, respectively (Costa and McCrae,
1980; Canli, 2004; Watson, Wiese, et al., 1999; Watson and Clark, 1992) are
most likely to be detected in a short bout of interaction due to their pervasive
nature. Extraverts, characterised by sociability, warmth, gregariousness and pos-
itive emotions (McCrae and Costa, 1999), stand out in most social settings. On
the other hand, the temperamental traits of high emotions, fear, anger and poor
inhibition of impulse, associated with neuroticism (Costa and McCrae, 1980),
could also be distinctive in a brief interaction.2
Our research strategy is to consider free-form communication: subjects in our
laboratory experiment were not aware that they would eventually face each other
2In line with this literature, our results confirm that beliefs about the other three “Big
Five” traits, openness, conscientiousness and agreeableness cannot be accurately detected in
our experiment. In fact our results suggest that, of the two fundamental traits, subjects could
only form reasonably accurate beliefs about extraversion after a short conversation.
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in strategic settings, but even if they realised that it was likely they had no inkling
of the rules of the games to follow. Nevertheless, in the treatment setting they
were given the opportunity to communicate with each other: an opportunity
not made available to those in the control setting, who instead produced text
in an unrelated placebo task. The advantage of this setting is of course that
any variation in behaviour between treatment and control groups must be linked
causally to the treatment.
Subjects were asked to complete both a standard personality test (the Big Five
Inventory3 or BFI (John and Srivastava, 1999)) and attempt to guess how their
partner might have answered the questions in this test. This enabled us to
measure the role of communication in developing a cohesive set of beliefs about
the personality of their partner. Similarly, subjects were asked to take an IQ test
and try to predict how their partners might have performed in the same test.
Subjects were also asked to take the “Eyes Test” (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001),
which served as a measure of the mental modelling of others, otherwise known as
“Theory of Mind” (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009), which could potentially affect the
accuracy of belief formation. The Eyes Test and belief elicitation are incentivised
as there are measurable correct answers.
Following belief elicitation, subjects engaged in two archetypal and well-understood
games: the two-person public goods game and the 11-20 money request game.
The public goods game examines social preferences and free-riding and can also be
seen as the simplest possible setting in which there is tension between team-work
and individual rationality. The 11-20 money request game (Arad and Rubinstein,
2012), on the other hand, is a simple two player game which triggers level-k rea-
soning (Costa-Gomes et al., 2001) and tests cognitive ability in a competitive
environment (Fe et al., 2019). The public goods game requires players to specify
how much they are willing to contribute to a communal pot (Fehr and Gaechter,
2002; Herrmann et al., 2008). While both players benefit from contributions, the
individually rational choice is to contribute nothing, hoping to free-ride on the
other player’s contributions. The 11-20 game grants players payment equal to
their numerical choice but with a high bonus if they pick a number one below
that of their rival. The game is normally modelled using level-k reasoning: if
level 0 (L0) involves the non-strategic choice of 20, then L1 (defined as the best
response to L0) would be to pick 19. More generally LK, best responding to
LK-1 necessitates a choice of 20-K, enabling us to infer the cognitive level of a
player through their numerical choice. To omit learning effects the experiment




is restricted to one-shot games. Just prior to playing these games, players were
asked to predict how their partners might play which was again incentivised:
giving us an insight into belief formation. In this way we form a direct link from
communication to belief formation to behaviour in two distinct settings.
Our results indicate that beliefs about others’ personalities, formed after engaging
in small talk with them, can influence decisions made in outcome interdependent
games4. However, the manner in which personality beliefs influence decision-
making depends on the nature of the game. In the level-k reasoning task, where
the objective is to out-think the partner, what matters is the perceived differ-
ence between the player and their partner’s personalities, which may be due to
the human tendency of anchoring to self-knowledge when inferring the choices of
similar others (Tamir and Mitchell, 2013). In particular, the level chosen in the
11-20 money request game is influenced by the perceived similarity (or difference)
between the player and their partner’s extraversion. The smaller the perceived
difference, the higher the level chosen. This result is consistent with the per-
ceived similarity hypothesis (Thomas et al., 2014). The hypothesis posits that
individuals believe that those perceived as similar to themselves will think and
act like them when faced with the same situation. When the perceived difference
between the player and the partner’s personality is small, the player chooses a
higher level, suspecting that the partner will reason likewise and choose a higher
level themselves. This makes it harder for a player to best respond to the dis-
tribution of level-k beliefs when the perceived difference between the player and
the partner is small, as it becomes harder to out-think the opponent5.
In contrast, choices in the social preferences game are influenced by the absolute
value of the partner’s perceived type. We find that, for players who engage in
small talk with their partner, cooperation in the public goods game increases
when the partner is believed to be extraverted. This is in line with the known as-
sociation of trait extraversion with pro-social behaviours like cooperation (Carlo
et al., 2005; Burke and Hall, 1986). Moreover, beliefs about partner’s extraver-
sion has a greater effect on cooperation relative to own extraversion, a finding
robust to whether we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or 2-stage least squares
(2SLS) instrumental variable regression specification.
4The impact of personality beliefs on strategic behaviour was significantly more pronounced
among the treated subjects who engaged in small talk, compared to the control, who had no
information upon which to base predictions about their partner’s personality.
5In the paper we use the terms opponent and partner interchangeably to refer to the indi-
vidual the subject was randomly matched with, as the study involved both competitive and
cooperative tasks. However, to keep the language neutral, during the experiment the partner
or opponent was referred to as ‘the other player’ (see Experiment script in Appendix 1.C).
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Since small talk communication is the only means that players have to develop
personality beliefs in the study, and the opportunity to communicate is the only
difference between the control and treatment groups, we conducted a direct ex-
amination of the text used during small talk. We observed that the more talkative
partners are believed to be extraverted, consistent with Mehl et al., 2006, who
found that personality judges rated talkative individuals higher on extraversion.
While the number of words used is especially helpful as a mechanism for detect-
ing extraverts, providing a reasonably accurate forecast of type, there remains a
persistent own-type bias: particularly, extraverts are prone to complementary self
projection bias making them likely to overstate the extraversion in their partners.
Extraversion is particularly relevant when examining the role of personality be-
liefs in influencing strategic behaviour. This is because, of all the personality
traits, subjects could only form reasonably accurate beliefs about a stranger’s
extraversion, after engaging in small talk with them for a brief period. Ex-
traverts, due to their sociability, vigour and outgoing friendliness, are distinctive
by nature, making them the most detectable in a brief interaction. Accurate im-
pressions about the other personality dimensions might require future research
involving longer interaction times in real-world settings.
Alongside our main contribution on the role of personality beliefs on strategic be-
haviour, we contribute to research exploring personality attribution, by focusing
on impressions formed from instant messaging rather than physical appearance
or face-to-face interaction (Eaton and Funder, 2003; Little and Perrett, 2007;
Naumann et al., 2009; Albright et al., 1988). We also add to the existing modest
research on the role of small talk which has focused on topics such as building
solidarity in work places (Pullin, 2010), examining investor sentiment using dis-
cussions on stock message boards (Das and Chen, 2007) and improving medical
outcomes (Ragan, 2014).6 Our study instead focuses on the role of small talk on
unknown future strategic settings and in particular on the relationship with per-
sonality theory which in turn feeds into belief formation. Our focus is therefore
on the mechanism that allows unstructured communication to alter behaviour
and outcomes that are unknown at the time of communication. Lastly, our study
contributes to the literature on strategic sophistication which finds that individ-
uals adjust strategies given the information they have about the opponents (Fe
6We should also contrast the literature on “small talk” with the the large literature on
communication with prior knowledge of what is to follow (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006;
Bochet et al., 2006; Cooper et al., 1992; Dawes et al., 1977) in which individuals can send
messages that relate to future decision-making. In contrast to this “cheap talk” literature, our
paper studies how communication between players can affect behaviour when the nature of any
future interaction (“rules of the game”) is unknown to the players which makes it harder to
incorporate strategic content into communication, forcing our subjects to engage in small talk.
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et al., 2019; Georganas et al., 2015; Gill and Prowse, 2016). Existing work finds
that people adjust strategies based on exogenous information provided such as in-
formation about the opponent’s cognitive ability (Fe et al., 2019). We add to this
literature through a novel examination of how individuals adjust their behaviour
in the light of endogenous belief formation about the opponent’s personality.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 details the experimental
design and the core hypotheses. Section 1.3 presents the results from the experi-
ment. As the very first study of the interaction between personality beliefs, small
talk and strategic behaviour, our work will be necessarily exploratory. Thus, the
study can act as a first step before further research: we discuss this in section
1.4, along with a discussion of the key findings. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Methodology
1.2.1 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted in a laboratory setting. At the onset of the exper-
iment each subject was asked to take the 44-item Big Five Inventory personality
test or BFI (John and Srivastava, 1999). The answers to the BFI questionnaire
were used to compute an average score for each of the 5 personality traits and
the trait scores were then standardised (so each trait distribution had mean 0
and standard deviation 1). This was followed by an incentivised cognitive ability
test, taken from the Raven’s Progressive Matrices test (Raven, 2003), in which
subjects were asked to attempt 30 visual puzzles (adapted from Proto, Rusti-
chini, and Sofianos, 2019). The test was incentivised to motivate cognitive effort
required in the task, as is the standard approach within Economics (Proto, Rus-
tichini, and Sofianos, 2019; Proto, Sgroi, et al., 2019). After the Raven’s test the
subjects were asked their beliefs about their own performance in the test which
was also incentivised. Each subject was randomly allocated to one of two groups
and randomly paired with a partner from the same group as follows:
Control : Players were not allowed to communicate with their partners in this
condition. Subjects were asked to take part in a placebo task for 4 minutes
(full experiment instructions are provided in Appendix 1.C). Then the players
were asked their beliefs about their partner’s personality and cognitive abilities.
For the former, beliefs were elicited using an 11-item short version of the BFI
questionnaire, adapted from Rammstedt and John, 2007 and modified to allow
subjects to indicate how they felt their partners would answer the questions (the
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personality belief questionnaire is presented in Appendix 1.D).7 We could then
form personality beliefs directly from the answers they provided. For the latter,
subjects were asked how they felt their partner’s performed in the Raven’s task.
After answering the questions related to beliefs, subjects were told the rules of
the first game. They were asked for their beliefs about their partner’s strategy
followed by their own decision in the game. After completing the first game they
were told the rules of the second game. As with game 1, they were asked their
beliefs about the partner’s strategy and their own decision in the game. The
partner remained the same for both games. The outcomes of both games were
announced at the end of the experiment. Beliefs about the partner’s cognitive
abilities and personality, and beliefs about their strategies were incentivised.
Treatment : The procedure in the treatment group was the same as the control
except, instead of the placebo task, subjects were allowed to electronically com-
municate with their partners through a chat box on their screens. Note that
crucially communication occurred before the nature of future decisions were ap-
parent which makes it difficult to incorporate strategic content specific to the
game into communication. Communication time was limited to 4 minutes. Fol-
lowing communication, the players were asked to answer the same belief questions
as the control group. After answering the questions, the subjects were told the
rules of the first game and asked to play the game. The process was repeated
with the second game, as with the control condition.
Subjects were asked to play 2 games, the public goods game and the 11-20 money
request game. In the public goods game each subject was allocated 20 Experimen-
tal Pounds (EP) and, along with their partner, were asked to choose (simultane-
ously) how much to contribute (ci) to a joint project. ci was restricted to be an
integer between 0 and 20. Payoffs were determined as: πi = (20− ci) + 34(ci + cj)
where i and j were the two players. Higher contributions while more costly, were
more socially beneficial. In the public goods game, the selfish equilibrium is 0
and the mutually cooperative response is 20. In the 11-20 money request game
participants were asked to play the basic version of the game (Arad and Rubin-
stein, 2012). Each player was randomly matched with another player. They were
both asked to request an amount of money, an integer between 11 and 20 EP.
Each player received the amount they requested. A player received an additional
7In essence, players were asked to retake the BFI, albeit a shorter version, but rather than
considering how they would answer each question, they were instead asked how their partner
would answer. This allows us to form a belief in much the same way as we formed implied
trait values. The 11-item questionnaire consists of 2 items each for the traits extraversion,
conscientiousness, openness and neuroticism and 3 items for the agreeableness trait. An average
score was computed for each trait and the trait scores were then standardised.
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amount of 20 EP if they asked for exactly one less than the other player. This
game has been used to study cognitive hierarchy and in particular level-k think-
ing. In level-k hierarchy models (Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Stahl and
Wilson, 1994) players’ levels or types are heterogeneous but they are assumed to
be drawn from the same distribution. Peoples’ beliefs are based on naive initial
assessment of others’ likely response called level-0 (or L0) and then beliefs are
modified via iterated best response. So level 1 (L1) best responds to L0, L2 to L1
and so on. Following Arad and Rubinstein, 2012, 20 is considered the salient and
L0 choice since it requires no strategic thinking about the other player’s choice.
This implies that a choice of 19 is the L1 choice as it best responds to the L0
strategy and in general the level-X choice is to request 20-X. In the level-k model,
the level chosen by a subject is a measure of their strategic sophistication or type
or rather a measure of the player’s beliefs about the partner’s strategic sophisti-
cation or type (Georganas et al., 2015). The game has no pure Nash equilibrium.
The order of the 2 games was randomised across sessions.
Following the two games, subjects were asked to take the Eyes Test (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001). For this test, subjects were shown 36 close-up photographs
of the eyes and surrounding areas of the face of celebrities and were provided
with 4 response options (such as playful, terrified, joking etc.) per photograph.
The participants were asked to pick the option which most closely described the
mental state of the person in the photograph. Subjects were then asked to answer
a list of 30 questions about their risk attitude, the Domain Specific Risk Taking
Scale or DOSPERT (Blais and Weber, 2006). Each subject was then asked a
series of socio-demographic questions including age, gender and native language.
1.2.2 Logistics
The experiment was conducted between May and November 2018. Subjects were
recruited through the SONA online recruitment system at the University of War-
wick in the UK. The participants were undergraduate, postgraduate and staff
members at the University. The experiment was implemented using Z-tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007) and pre-registered with the AEA RCT registry (Sgroi, 2018).
The experiment received ethical approval from Economics Department Internal
Ethical Approval Process, University of Warwick. 338 subjects took part in the
study, with 170 subjects in the control condition and 168 in the treatment group.
Out of the 170 control group subjects, 110 subjects played the public goods
game first, followed by the 11-20 money request game, and 60 subjects played
the games in reverse order. Out of 168 treatment group subjects, 106 played the
public goods game first and 62 played the 11-20 money request game first. There
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were 17 sessions conducted, 20 subjects per session on average. An experimental
session lasted for approximately 75 minutes.
The final payoff for subjects in the experiment was made up of several com-
ponents. Firstly, there was a show-up fee of £4. Second, the players received
payoffs based on performance in either the public goods game or 11-20 money
request game (chosen randomly). The payoffs for the games were in experimental
pounds (EP) with the exchange rate as 5 EP = £1. Third, 2 questions out of the
36 questions of the Eyes Test and 2 puzzles of the 30 puzzles of the Raven’s test
were randomly selected with each correct answer accruing a further £1. Lastly,
belief questions (about own-cognitive ability, partner’s personality and cognitive
ability, and beliefs about partner’s decisions in the 2 tasks) were also incentivised.
For the personality beliefs, 1 out of 11 questions was randomly picked and if the
answer matched that of the partner then the subject was awarded £1. For the
other 4 belief questions, subject was awarded £1 for each correct answer. The
socio-demographic questions were not incentivised. The average earnings from
the study was £13.20 (including the show-up fee of £4), with a minimum earning
of £8.35 and maximum of £18.
1.2.3 Hypotheses
Of the “Big Five” personality traits, the scope of our paper is limited to the two
broadest, most fundamental and pervasive traits: extraversion and neuroticism
(Costa and McCrae, 1980). These two traits were the original “Big Two” person-
ality dimensions (Eysenck, 1947). Extraversion and neuroticism, have garnered
much attention in the literature owing to their well-established association with
positive and negative affect, respectively (Canli, 2004; Watson, Wiese, et al.,
1999; Watson and Clark, 1992; Costa and McCrae, 1980) which gives these two
traits the greatest chance to be detected in a short bout of communication.
Extraverts by their nature stand out and even in a few minutes it may become
clear that you are dealing with someone who is characterised by sociability, gre-
gariousness, assertiveness, warmth, activity and overall positive emotions (Mc-
Crae and Costa, 1999). On the other hand, the temperamental traits of general
emotionality, fearfulness, anger and impulsivity, are associated with the neuroti-
cism trait, and are related to high negative affect (Costa and McCrae, 1980),
which might also be detectable in a brief conversation. This makes any short
communication, such as in our study, more suited to developing reliable beliefs
about the partner’s (or the opponent’s) extraversion and neuroticism traits, which
can be interpreted by the perceiver as positive and negative vibe given off by the
opponent, respectively. However, a brief small talk conversation seems insuffi-
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cient to form beliefs about the partner’s remaining three Big Five traits. This
is because while a brief chat is sufficient to form an overall positive (extraver-
sion) or negative (neuroticism) view about someone, it is not adequate to convey
any usable information about whether the opponent is trusting (an aspect of
trait agreeableness) or lazy (an aspect of trait conscientiousness) or imaginative
(an aspect of trait openness). Thus, we will limit our hypotheses to the effect
of the fundamental personality traits on belief formation and strategic decision
making.8 Our experimental setup gives us the following testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Personality beliefs about the opponent are not only influenced by
the opponent’s true personality measure, but the beliefs are also influenced by the
player’s own personality.
This hypothesis is consistent with the conceptual framework for the impact of
social environment on personality proposed by Eaton and Funder, 2003, which
posits that perceptions (or predictions) about any individual’s personality trait
can be influenced by the degree to which the predictor possesses that specific trait
themselves. This seems particularly true for extraverts who stimulate a positive
social environment around them due to their own positivity, making them prone
to projecting their extraversion or sociability onto others (Eaton and Funder,
2003; Thorne, 1987). For our study, we would only expect to see personality
projection in the treatment group since any personality beliefs that appear in
the control group must be spurious (given the control group have no information
whatsoever upon which to base predictions about their partner’s personality).
Hypothesis 2: Strategic decision making in outcome interdependent tasks is af-
fected by the individual’s beliefs about the opponent’s personality, an effect which
is significantly more pronounced among treatment group subjects who engage in
small talk communication.
We also formulate individual hypotheses about the unique way in which person-
ality beliefs can affect the two different tasks.
Hypothesis 2a: In the 11-20 money request game, rather than one’s own person-
ality or beliefs about the opponent’s personality, we hypothesise that choices in
the game will be influenced by the perceived differences in the pair’s personalities.
Due to the strategic nature of the 11-20 money request game, the objective of
8With respect to beliefs about the opponent’s IQ, we will refrain from formulating any
hypotheses given the lack of available literature and where appropriate we will present our
results about IQ beliefs as more speculative.
19
1.2. METHODOLOGY
this level-k reasoning game is to correctly gauge the opponent’s choice and then
attempt to out-think them. Thus, the game does not solely depend on one’s
own type, but success in the game is determined by the ability to out-guess
the opponent by assessing their type. Despite the well established link between
IQ and level-k reasoning (Gill and Prowse, 2016), beliefs about opponent’s IQ
might seem like an unreliable measure of the opponent’s strategic sophistication
or type in the limited interaction time available. Beliefs about the opponent’s
fundamental personality traits on the other hand can appear as a more reliable
measure of the opponent’s type due to the increased likelihood of them being
detected through a brief chat. While personality itself lacks any association
with level-k reasoning, any difference (or similarity) between the pair’s types
(which for our study is personality types) can be interpreted by the player as an
indicator of the opponent’s behaviour and thus, in turn, can act as a determinant
of own decision making. Consistent with simulation theories of social cognition,
individuals tend to anchor on self-knowledge to form mental images about similar
others (Tamir and Mitchell, 2013). The perceived similarity hypothesis states that
the greater the perceived similarity between the individual and their opponent the
more likely it is that the individual will believe their opponent to think and act
like themselves (Thomas et al., 2014), making perceived similarity or differences
a potential contributor to iterative reasoning processes.
Hypothesis 2b: Players who believe their opponents (or partners) are extraverted,
will believe that their opponents will cooperate more and then they in turn will
cooperate more themselves.
This seems reasonable given the known association between extraversion and
pro-social behaviours like cooperation (Carlo et al., 2005; Burke and Hall, 1986).
This might encourage the individual to cooperate more, with the hope of mutual
cooperation boosting earnings.
Hypothesis 3: More talkative opponents are believed to be extraverted.
In this paper, we randomly allocate players either to a treatment in which they
engage in small talk with their partners or to a control in which they do not. Since
small talk is the only interaction the subjects engage in before eliciting beliefs
about the partners’ personalities, it must form the basis for these beliefs. From
the player’s perspective the number of words is relatively simple to calculate,
arguably easier than say considering the emotional content of words in a very
brief conversation. Thus, it is hypothesised that subjects using more words will
be rated higher on the extraversion scale as extraverts are usually characterised
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by their sociability and talkativeness (Goldberg, 1990; Costa and McCrae, 1992).
Further, in a study of personality traits in its natural habitat, personality judges
rated talkative participants as more extraverted (Mehl et al., 2006). We will
also evaluate other linguistic features, namely valence, arousal and dominance
content of the words spoken by the partner. Valence refers to the pleasantness
of a stimulus, arousal is the intensity of emotion provoked by a stimulus, and
dominance is the degree of control exerted by a stimulus (Warriner et al., 2013).
Note, while the hypotheses related to personality beliefs (hypothesis 1 ) and the
strategic decision making tasks (hypotheses 2a and 2b) were formulated before
the experimental trials (based on the pertinent literature cited), the results from
the text analysis (hypothesis 3 ) were harder to predict prior to the study owing
to the novelty of the setup and were thus more exploratory in nature.
1.3 Results
This section tests our core hypotheses. Section 1.4 offers a more in-depth dis-
cussion of the key findings of the paper. All regressions reported were run with
standardised variables with standard errors clustered at the pair level. The sum-
mary statistics of the variables used in the paper are presented in the table 1.A.1
and the balance tests for the intervention groups are provided in table 1.A.2.
1.3.1 Result 1: Personality projection
We begin by looking at the factors that might affect the beliefs which players
develop about their partners’ personality traits. The aim is to examine hypothesis
1 which proposes that beliefs about an individual’s personality depend not only
on their true personality traits but are also affected by the predictor’s personality.
Table 1.1 reports the results of an OLS regression model. The dependent vari-
able is the belief reported by the player about their partner’s level of extraversion
and neuroticism.9 The independent variables in columns 1 and 3 are the player’s
own personality scores, the partner’s true personality scores (as reported by the
partner using the BFI), and their interactions with the treatment dummy which
equals 1 if the player was in the small talk condition and 0 otherwise. Columns 2
and 4 also control for the subject’s IQ, Eyes Test score, age, a dummy variable for
being female, and risk aversion (along with the interactions of the control vari-
ables with the treatment dummy). Column 2 shows that in the treatment group,
9Recall that beliefs are formed in much the same way as underlying values: while personality
is assessed using the BFI questionnaire, personality beliefs are elicited using a shorter version
of the BFI (Rammstedt and John, 2007). For both, average trait scores are calculated and the
standardised values are used in the regressions.
21
1.3. RESULTS






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own Extraversion × Treatment 0.2139∗ 0.2962∗∗ -0.1105 -0.1241
(0.117) (0.125) (0.117) (0.130)
Own Neuroticism × Treatment 0.1484 0.1531 -0.0470 -0.0418
(0.125) (0.131) (0.110) (0.109)
Partner’s Extraversion × Treatment 0.4108∗∗∗ 0.4199∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.110)
Partner’s Neuroticism × Treatment 0.0269 -0.0005
(0.103) (0.102)
Own Extraversion 0.0209 0.0248 -0.0822 -0.0718
(0.073) (0.080) (0.073) (0.075)
Own Neuroticism -0.0075 0.0008 0.0462 0.0600
(0.085) (0.087) (0.083) (0.080)
Partner’s Extraversion -0.1280∗ -0.1339∗
(0.070) (0.075)
Partner’s Neuroticism 0.0866 0.1069
(0.071) (0.070)
Treatment 0.3539∗∗∗ -0.3127 -0.5100∗∗∗ -0.1983
(0.098) (0.632) (0.102) (0.550)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 338 338 338 338
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The specification for the OLS regressions is:
Ei(persj) = β1persi×Treat+β2persj×Treat+γ1persi+γ2persj +φzi×Treat+λTreat+ωzi+εi
(1.1)
persi is player i ’s personality, Ei(persj) is player i ’s beliefs about partner j ’s personality and
persj is partner j ’s true personality. Also, Treat is the treatment dummy which equals 1 if the
player is in the small talk group and 0 otherwise, zi are individual characteristics of i (i.e. the
control variables, namely player i ’s IQ, Eyes Test score, age, a dummy variable for being female,
and risk aversion) and εi is an idiosyncratic error term.
an increase in the player’s own extraversion by 1 standard deviation increases
the beliefs about partner’s extraversion by 0.3 standard deviations more than
in the control group (p-value < 0.05). Furthermore, an increase in 1 standard
deviation in partner’s true extraversion increases the player’s beliefs about their
partner’s extraversion by 0.4 standard deviations more in the treatment group
than in the control group (p-value < 0.01). Note that the negative coefficient
in the control group for Partner’s extraversion (in columns 1 and 2) is spurious
and a statistical artifact driven by noise, since in the control group subjects had
no reliable source of information about their partners’ true extraversion. This
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biases the coefficient for Partner’s Extraversion × Treatment upwards. However,
the effect of partner’s true extraversion on beliefs developed about the partner’s
extraversion remains significant when limiting the analysis just to the treatment
group, even after adding the control variables, with coefficient .286 and p-value
< 0.01. This coefficient reflects the impact of partner’s true extraversion on ex-
traversion beliefs, as compared to an ‘ideal’ control group with a coefficient of 0
(which of course is impossible to replicate using human subjects).
Column 4 shows that in the treatment group, an increase in the player’s extraver-
sion by 1 standard deviation decreases the beliefs about partner’s neuroticism by
0.1 standard deviations more than in the control group, although the differential
effect is statistically insignificant. Column 4 also shows that a partner’s true
neuroticism has no significant effect on beliefs developed about their neuroticism
trait. Thus, we find that a 4-minute small talk chat can lead to reliable beliefs
about a partner’s extraversion but not neuroticism. The relation between own
extraversion and beliefs about partner’s extraversion is depicted in Figure 1.1.
Consistent with hypothesis 1, we observe that extraverts project their positive
affect onto their partners.
(a) (b)
Figure 1.1: Relationship between the player’s beliefs about partner’s extraversion
and the player’s own extraversion score. (a) shows that individuals are more likely
to project their own extraversion on to their partners in the Treatment group
compared to Control. (b) shows that this difference in extraversion projection
between the Treatment and the Control group increases with the value of the
predictor’s own extraversion.
For the other 3 Big Five Traits, agreeableness, conscientiousness and openness,
the Pearson correlation coefficients between beliefs and true values in the treat-
ment group were trivial and statistically insignificant, with coefficients (r) 0.0372
(p-value = 0.6319), 0.0403 (p-value = 0.6044) and -0.0588 (p-value = 0.4491),
respectively. Only for extraversion did we observe significant correlation (r =
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0.2513, p-value = 0.0010) between beliefs and true scores in the treatment group,
while the coefficient for neuroticism was also insignificant (r = 0.1169, p-value =
0.1314).
We also observed that overestimation of partner’s extraversion increases with
the player’s own extraversion (Table 1.A.3). This overestimation is significantly
(p-value < 0.05) more pronounced in the treatment group, compared to the
control. Further, we found that with increasing performance in the eyes test,
the inaccuracy in the player’s beliefs about partner’s extraversion is significantly
(p-value < 0.10) lower in the treatment group compared to the control. This
is consistent with the literature on the eyes test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001),
which posits that better performance in the eyes test indicates increased theory
of mind ability, which in turn leads to improved understanding of others’ mental
states. With regards to beliefs about partners’ cognitive abilities, it was observed
that players project beliefs about their own IQ onto beliefs about partners’ IQ,
irrespective of whether they are in the control or treatment group (Table 1.A.4).
1.3.2 Result 2: Strategic decision-making and personality
Since we divided hypothesis 2 into two parts, each associated with one of our two
games, we will also divide our results in the same way.
Result 2a: Level-k reasoning and perceived similarity
Recall that hypothesis 2a claims that level-k reasoning is influenced by the per-
ceived differences (or similarities) in the player and their opponent’s types (which
for our study is personality types). In our data, L2 is the most frequently
played strategy in both conditions: where 20.6% players choose L2 in the con-
trol condition and over 26% do so in the treatment condition (Figure 1.2). The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed that there is no statistical difference between
the distribution of levels of the 2 groups. Further, there is no significant difference
between the payoffs earned in the 11-20 game by the control and the treatment
group subjects (while the treatment group earns 19.7 EP on average, the control
group earns 19.6 EP). Since the level-k game is a competitive game, so long as
the communication is two-sided, small talk is unlikely to benefit either player.
Table 1.2 reports the results of OLS regressions. In columns 1-3 the dependent
variable is the player’s beliefs about the level-k strategy chosen by the partner
and in columns 4-6 the dependent variable is the level-k strategy chosen by the
player. The independent variables are perceived differences between player’s own
personality and the partner’s personality, and the interaction of perceived dif-
ferences with the treatment dummy. The perceived differences are computed
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(a) Control (b) Treatment
(c) Kernel Density Plot
Figure 1.2: The distribution of level-k strategy chosen in the 11-20 money request
game
by taking the standardised absolute difference between the player’s own person-
ality trait scores and the player’s beliefs about the partner’s personality trait
scores. Columns 2 and 4 also include the player’s own personality and the per-
sonality measures interacted with the treatment dummy as explanatory variables.
Columns 3 and 6 include sensible control variables i.e. player’s eyes test score,
IQ, gender, the player’s beliefs about partner’s IQ and the order of play of the
two games, which is a dummy that equals 1 when the 11-20 game is played first
and 0 when the public goods game is played first (along with the variables in-
teracted with the treatment dummy). Columns 3 and 6 also include the control
variables - player’s age and risk aversion, along with their interactions with the
treatment dummy. Column 3 shows that an increase in 1 standard deviation in
perceived difference in extraversion decreases the player’s beliefs about partner’s
level choice by 0.5 more in the treatment group than in the control group (p-value
< 0.10). Column 6 shows that an increase in 1 standard deviation in perceived
difference in extraversion decreases the player’s own level-k strategy by 0.6 more
in the treatment group than in the control group (p-value < 0.05).
Thus, there is an inverse relationship between the perceived difference in extraver-
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Table 1.2: Impact of (absolute) difference between own personality and beliefs





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DiffExtraversion × Treatment -0.5302∗ -0.5562∗ -0.5260∗ -0.6597∗∗∗ -0.7373∗∗∗ -0.6442∗∗
(0.269) (0.283) (0.289) (0.237) (0.242) (0.254)
DiffNeuroticism × Treatment 0.1879 0.2460 0.3734 -0.0415 0.0235 0.1925
(0.248) (0.258) (0.292) (0.248) (0.243) (0.265)
DiffExtraversion 0.1470 0.1430 0.1036 0.2046 0.1792 0.1345
(0.198) (0.194) (0.197) (0.177) (0.172) (0.175)
DiffNeuroticism -0.1579 -0.1632 -0.2618 -0.1604 -0.1620 -0.2974
(0.183) (0.188) (0.213) (0.174) (0.178) (0.186)
Treatment 0.1668 0.1515 -2.8375 0.0677 0.0330 -2.2355
(0.267) (0.268) (2.058) (0.279) (0.276) (1.860)
Own Extraversion × Treatment -0.0312 0.0404 -0.1293 0.0116
(0.294) (0.344) (0.290) (0.312)
Own Neuroticism × Treatment -0.2018 -0.1717 -0.4371 -0.4405
(0.279) (0.306) (0.278) (0.279)
Own Extraversion -0.0532 -0.1518 -0.1726 -0.2696
(0.195) (0.201) (0.211) (0.212)
Own Neuroticism 0.0132 -0.1102 0.1998 0.0391
(0.198) (0.216) (0.198) (0.196)
Eyes Test Score × Treatment 0.5507∗ 0.6041∗
(0.303) (0.309)
Own IQ × Treatment -0.2617 -0.2965
(0.292) (0.299)
IQ Belief × Treatment 0.3253 0.1933
(0.311) (0.264)
Female × Treatment -0.7230 -0.8284
(0.611) (0.555)
Order × Treatment 1.0992∗ 1.0541∗
(0.576) (0.592)
Eyes Test Score -0.4245∗ -0.4401∗
(0.247) (0.248)
Own IQ 0.1777 0.2357
(0.200) (0.210)






Controls No No Yes No No Yes
N 338 338 338 338 338 338
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The specification for the OLS regressions is:
Yi = νDiffpersi × Treat+ τDiffpersi + ηTreat+ κpersi × Treat+ θpersi + ρzi × Treat+ ψzi + ξi (1.2)
Yi is player i ’s beliefs about partner j ’s level chosen in the 11-20 game in columns 1-3. For columns 4-6 Yi is
the level chosen by player i in the game. Diffpersi i.e. the absolute difference in i and j ’s personalities as
perceived by i i.e. |Ei(persj)−persi| where persi is player i ’s personality, Ei(persj) is player i ’s beliefs about
partner j ’s personality and persj is partner j ’s true personality. Also, Treat is the treatment dummy, zi are
individual characteristics of i and ξi is an idiosyncratic error term. zi includes player i ’s eyes test score, IQ,
gender, the i ’s beliefs about partner j ’s IQ, the order of play of the two games, which is a dummy that equals
1 when the 11-20 game is played first and 0 when the public goods game is played first and the additional
control variables, player i ’s age and risk aversion.
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sion between the players, and the player’s level-k strategy, as well as the player’s
beliefs about their partner’s level-k strategy choice. Hence, the smaller the per-
ceived difference between the two players the greater the beliefs about partner’s
level choice and the greater the level chosen by the player.10 This result supports
hypothesis 2a and is consistent with the perceived similarity hypothesis which
posits that people project their own thinking and decision-making process to
predict how their partners might think and act when individuals believe their
partners to possess attributes similar to their own (Thomas et al., 2014). Thus,
when players believe their partners to be similar to themselves (small perceived
difference), they believe their partners will reason more and choose a higher level
(i.e. lower number in the 11-20 game). This in turn makes the player choose a
higher level. Similar results were not observed for perceived difference between
player’s own IQ and partner’s IQ.
Being female enhances beliefs about partner’s level-k choice, as well as player’s
own level-k choice, although there is no significant differential treatment effect.11
Further, an increase in the eyes test score by 1 standard deviation increases level
belief and level chosen by 0.5 and 0.6 more in the treatment than in the control
group, respectively. This supports the finding (Fe et al., 2019; Georganas et
al., 2015) that greater engagement in theory of mind is associated with superior
level-k reasoning, though in this study the effect is significantly (p-value < 0.10)
stronger in the treatment group when the players are able to engage in small
talk with their partners, compared to the control group. In the control group,
order of the tasks has a negative effect on the level-k belief and their own level-k
action, whereas in the treatment group the coefficients are positive.
Next, the paper looks at the distribution of the players’ beliefs about the level-k
strategy chosen by their partners (Figure 1.3). The distribution is presented in
Table 1.3, along with the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium distribution for
risk-neutral players. The distributions of beliefs observed in both treatment and
control groups are different from the equilibrium distribution. In both groups,
L1 (i.e choosing 19) is the most frequently believed level-k choice by partners.
Table 1.4 calculates the expected payoffs based on the distribution of level-k
beliefs observed. For both control and treatment groups, L2 (choosing 18) has
10Note that the results remain similar when we control for beliefs about partner’s personality.
The results are omitted here for parsimony but presented in Table 1.A.5.
11Nettle and Liddle, 2008 and Stiller and Dunbar, 2007 have found that women score higher
on the social-cognitive element of theory of mind, indicating greater ability to reason about
others’ mental states. This could explain why women choose higher levels.
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the highest associated expected payoffs.12
(a) Control (b) Treatment
(c) Kernel Density Plot
Figure 1.3: The distribution of the player’s beliefs about partner’s level-k strategy
in the 11-20 money request game
Table 1.3: Distribution of Level-k beliefs
Level 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Equilibrium (%) 5 10 15 20 25 25
Treatment (%) 12.50 32.14 17.26 5.95 4.17 11.31 4.17 2.38 3.57 6.55
Control (%) 17.06 25.88 18.82 5.29 7.06 10.00 7.06 3.53 1.76 3.53
Table 1.4: Expected payoffs from the distribution of Level-k beliefs
Level 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Treatment (EP) 20.00 21.50 24.43 20.45 17.19 15.83 16.26 13.83 12.48 11.71
Control (EP) 20.00 22.41 23.18 20.76 17.06 16.41 16.00 14.41 12.71 11.35
12It should be noted that the number of people who best-responded to their own belief about
their partner’s level choice i.e. chose to request an amount which was exactly 1 lower than
what they believed their partner would chose was 184 out of 334 (94 in the control group and
90 in the treatment group) i.e. 54.4%. The low proportion of people best-responding to their
own belief suggests that rather than having an exact belief about their partner’s level choice,
they may have formed a distribution of beliefs.
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Table 1.5: Impact of (absolute) difference between own personality and beliefs
about partner’s personality on the probability of choosing the best response -
Probit Model
Control Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pr(Level=2) Pr(Level=2) Pr(Level=2) Pr(Level=2)
DiffExtraversion -0.0453 -0.0492 0.0846∗∗∗ 0.0945∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.036) (0.030) (0.032)
DiffNeuroticism -0.0008 -0.0078 -0.0459 -0.0362
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.034)
Own Extraversion 0.0115 0.0017
(0.029) (0.045)
Own Neuroticism 0.0573∗ -0.0399
(0.032) (0.037)
Own IQ 0.0655∗ 0.0566
(0.035) (0.039)
IQ Belief -0.0482∗ -0.0070
(0.029) (0.035)
Eyes Test Score 0.0541 0.0498
(0.038) (0.032)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 170 170 168 168
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The table reports the average marginal effects from Probit regressions. ‘Controls’ imply the
player’s age, gender, risk aversion, and the order of the two games played.
Table 1.5 uses a probit model to examine the effect of perceived differences in the
player’s and their partner’s personalities on the probability of best responding to
the distribution of level-k beliefs, in the control and treatment groups separately.
The dependent variable is the probability of choosing the best response to the
distribution of beliefs which in this case is L2 for both control and treatment
groups. Column 4 shows that the probability of best responding increases sig-
nificantly (p-value < 0.01) by 9 percentage points with a 1 standard deviation
increase in the perceived difference in extraversion in the treatment group. The
effect is negative and insignificant in the control group. Hence, greater the per-
ceived difference in extraversion, higher the chances of best responding by the
player in the treatment group. Alternatively, this implies that greater the per-
ceived similarity between the player and their partner, lower are the chances of
the player best responding in the treatment group. This result is consistent with
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hypothesis 2a which supports the perceived similarity hypothesis. When the per-
ceived difference in extraversion is small, the player believes that their partner
will act similar to themselves. This makes it harder to out-think or out-reason
the opponent, thus reducing the probability of best responding. This result holds
only when the players engage in small talk as otherwise the players have nothing
to base their personality beliefs on and so absent small talk, their beliefs are
unlikely to affect decision making.
The results hold even after controlling for the player’s IQ and eyes test score,
the player’s beliefs about partner’s IQ and other controls - player’s age, gender,
risk aversion and the order of games played. In the control group, increase in the
player’s IQ by 1 standard deviation increases the probability of best responding by
6 percentage points where as increase in beliefs about the partner’s IQ decreases
the probability of best responding by 5 percentage points. The player’s own
neuroticism measure also has a significantly (p-value < 0.10) positive effect on the
probability of best responding in the control group.13 The relationship between
level choice and perceived difference in extraversion is depicted in Figure 1.4.
(a) (b)
Figure 1.4: Perceived differences in the players and their partners’ extraversion,
and level-k choices made. (a) Effect of perceived difference in extraversion on
level choice in control and treatment groups. The figure shows that perceived
difference in extraversion has a significant negative effect on the player’s level-k
choice in the treatment group. (b) shows that the effect of small talk treatment
on probability of best responding to the distribution of level beliefs increases as
the perceived difference in extraversion increases.
Result 2b: Cooperation and extraversion beliefs
Next, we examine the results of the public goods game to test hypothesis 2b which
states that a player’s cooperation in the game will increase with their beliefs
13Note that the results are robust to the inclusion of personality beliefs as control variables,
which are omitted here for parsimony, but are presented in Table 1.A.6. The results also remain
similar when a logit model is used instead of probit as shown in Table 1.A.7.
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about their opponent’s extraversion, since the player will expect an extraverted
opponent to cooperate more. Of the two fundamental personality traits, we
expect extraversion to be especially relevant for the public goods game, since it
is extraversion that is most associated with pro-social behaviours (Carlo et al.,
2005; Burke and Hall, 1986).14
In the public goods game, the average beliefs about partner’s contribution in the
treatment group was 13 experimental pounds (EP), where as in the control group
it was 10.3 EP. This difference is statistically significant with p-value < 0.01 and
a t-statistic of -3.640. The average contribution in the treatment group was 12.6
EP, whereas in the control group it was 9.8 EP. This difference is statistically
significant with p-value < 0.01 and a t-statistic of -3.525 (Figure 1.5). The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distributions of own contribution as
well as beliefs about partner’s contribution between the treatment and control
groups were rejected with p-value < 0.01 for both. This is consistent with the
existing literature which finds that pre-game communication of any form increases
cooperation rates (Dawes et al., 1977; Bochet et al., 2006).
(a) Contribution Belief (b) Own-Contribution
Figure 1.5: (a) Average Beliefs about Partner’s Contribution and (b) Average
Contribution in the Public Goods Game
Our analysis for the public goods game will only consider the observations in
which the subjects played the public goods game before the level-k reasoning
game. The rationale for this is that playing the level-k game first seems to trigger
level-k reasoning (Georganas et al., 2015), thus biasing decision-making in the
social preferences task. On the other hand, since the level-k game strictly requires
level-k reasoning, without invoking any social preferences (a point made explicitly
in Arad and Rubinstein, 2012), the results of the 11-20 game are not biased
14We also see from Table 1.A.8 that beliefs about partner’s neuroticism has no significant
effect on decision making in the public goods game.
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by playing the public goods game first. Further, treated subjects contribute
significantly more on average compared to control group subjects, only when the
public goods game is played first, where as the difference is insignificant when the
public goods game is played second (Figure 1.A.2). The results from the public
goods game, for those who played the 11-20 game first are presented in Figure
1.A.3 and Table 1.A.11.
We examine hypothesis 2b using equation 1.3. Choicei is player i ’s choice (or
contribution) in the public goods game, persi is player i ’s personality, Ei(persj)
is player i ’s beliefs about partner j ’s personality, zi are individual characteristics
of i and εi is an idiosyncratic error term.
Choicei = β1persi + β2Ei(persj) + γzi + εi (1.3)
Ei(persj) = λ1persj + λ2persi + ρzi + εi (1.4)
Players’ tendency to project their own extraversion onto their partners creates an
endogeneity issue (result 1), and as such estimation of equation 1.3 requires valid
instruments. Beliefs about partner’s extraversion depend on two components -
the player’s own extraversion and the partner’s true extraversion, as discussed
in section 1.3.1. These two components are independent as the two players are
randomly matched. Therefore, beliefs about partner’s extraversion can be in-
strumented with the partner’s true extraversion. Equation 1.4 is the first stage.
persj is the partner j ’s true personality.
The first stage results presented in Table 1.6 show that partner’s true extraversion
significantly enhances beliefs about partner’s extraversion in the treatment, but
not in the control group, since in the control group the player has no interaction
with their partner.15 Table 1.7 presents the results of a two-stage least squares
instrumental variable (IV) regression for the treatment group. Since the endo-
geneity bias only exists for the treatment group, equation 1.3 is estimated without
an instrumental variable for the control group, and is presented in columns 1 and
2 of Table 1.7.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.7 show that in the treatment group, an increase in
1 standard deviation in extraversion belief, increases beliefs about partner’s con-
15To test for weak instruments, a Wald test is conducted, which tests the null that the
coefficients of the endogenous regressors are zero. The null for the treatment group, is rejected
at the 5% level. This suggests that weak instruments are not an issue here. Further, the
F-statistic in the first stage regression (for two-stage least squares) is greater than 10, which
indicates that the instruments are strong (Staiger and Stock, 1997) for the treatment group.
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Table 1.6: First Stage: Extraversion beliefs and Public goods game
Control Treatment









Own Extraversion 0.0299 0.0333 0.2147∗∗ 0.2614∗∗
(0.086) (0.102) (0.106) (0.103)
Partner’s Extraversion -0.1015 -0.0977 0.3541∗∗∗ 0.3648∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.092) (0.093) (0.094)
Own IQ -0.1034 0.0121
(0.103) (0.102)
IQ Belief -0.0559 0.0166
(0.147) (0.095)
Eyes Test Score -0.0470 0.1195
(0.107) (0.073)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 110 110 106 106
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
‘Controls’ refers to the player’s age, gender and risk aversion.
tribution and own-contribution by 0.6 and 0.5 standard deviations, respectively
(p-value < 0.05 for both). On the other hand, an increase in 1 standard deviation
in own-extraversion decreases beliefs about partner’s contribution, as well as the
player’s own-contribution by 0.3 (p-value < 0.05) and 0.2 (insignificant) standard
deviations, respectively. Thus, beliefs about partner’s extraversion has a positive
and relatively larger effect, compared to own-extraversion, on decision-making in
the public goods game in the treatment group. For the control group, column 2
shows that the player’s extraversion significantly (p-value < 0.05) and negatively
impacts contribution level. Beliefs about partner’s extraversion has no significant
effect on both beliefs about partner’s contribution and own-contribution in the
control group (which makes perfect sense since in the control group, where there
is no interaction, players have no basis upon which to form sensible beliefs about
their partners). Columns 3 and 4 can essentially be summarised as showing that
there are two forces at work in determining how the contribution level is affected
by extraversion: a direct and negative effect of own-extraversion, and an indirect
and positive effect that works through beliefs about the partner’s extraversion.
Overall, the role of beliefs seems stronger than own-extraversion though both
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Table 1.7: Impact of beliefs about partner’s personality and own personality on














Extraversion Belief 0.0601 0.1110 0.6091∗∗ 0.5184∗∗
(0.082) (0.092) (0.264) (0.262)
Own Extraversion -0.0733 -0.2041∗∗ -0.3074∗∗ -0.2018
(0.095) (0.088) (0.134) (0.138)
Own IQ -0.0583 -0.0417 0.0856 0.1548
(0.096) (0.084) (0.094) (0.103)
IQ Belief 0.1250 0.1140 0.0871 0.2402∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.100) (0.086) (0.088)
Eyes Test Score -0.0431 -0.0015 0.1043 0.1502
(0.096) (0.118) (0.117) (0.139)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 110 110 106 106
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
‘Controls’ refers to the player’s age, gender and risk aversion.
are important.16 Moreover, consistent with hypothesis 2b, we find that players
cooperate more in the public goods game when they believe their partners to be
extraverted.
Following Soto and John, 2009, we divide extraversion of the player into 2 facets,
assertiveness and activity.17 This is done to examine which particular facet of
extraversion is responsible for driving cooperation decisions. While assertiveness
can be defined as preference for exerting control in a group setting (Soto and
John, 2012), activity (or enthusiasm) describes both positive emotions and out-
going friendliness or sociability (DeYoung et al., 2007). The facet analysis (Table
1.A.10) revealed that of the 2 facets of extraversion, it is facet assertiveness which
16Estimating equation 1.3 for the treatment group using OLS, and not an IV approach, yields
similar results where, in the treatment group, beliefs about partner’s extraversion has a signif-
icant positive effect on both beliefs about partner’s contribution as well as own contribution
in the public goods game and own-extraversion has an insignificant negative impact on both
(Table 1.A.9). However, given the scope for endogeneity bias, the IV approach is likely to be
more appropriate.
17Soto and John, 2009 propose forming 10 facet scores, 2 for each of the Big Five traits,
by dividing the 44 items in the BFI questionnaire. Assertiveness and activity facet scores are
formed for each individual based on their responses to specific items in the BFI.
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is responsible for the negative effect of the player’s extraversion on beliefs about
partner’s contribution, as well as own contribution in the public goods game.
1.3.3 Result 3: Talkativeness and extraversion beliefs
In this section we will consider how a short period of small talk can work to foster
belief formation with a direct examination of the text used by participants in the
experiment. In particular, in line with hypothesis 3 we will focus on the effect
of the number of words spoken by the partner on beliefs to check whether more
talkative players are indeed believed to be extraverted. The number of words
is perhaps the easiest language characteristic to calculate. We also examine
the scores for three affective or emotional components of the partner’s language
use, namely valence, arousal and dominance, using the score-ratings proposed by
Warriner et al., 2013. The valence rating of a word refers to the pleasant emotion
conveyed by a word, with the rating increasing as it moves from unhappy to
happy. Arousal rating of a word increases with the degree of excitement emoted
by it. Finally, the dominance rating of a word increases with the degree to which
it conveys the emotion of being in control.18
Table 1.8 reports the results for the quantitative language characteristics that
we consider. The dependant variables are beliefs about the partner’s fundamen-
tal personality traits. Column 1 shows that beliefs about partner’s extraversion
increase with the number of words spoken by the partner (p-value < 0.01), con-
sistent with hypothesis 3 and the findings of Mehl et al., 2006 who also find
talkative subjects are rated as more extraverted. The coefficient for number of
words remains similar even after adding valence, arousal and dominance as ex-
planatory variables in column 2. Column 3 shows that the result persists even
after controlling for the player’s IQ, eyes test score, age, gender, beliefs about
partner’s IQ, a dummy for non-native speaker (equals 1 if the player is a non-
native English speaker and 0 otherwise) and a dummy for first speaker (equals 1
if the player started the conversation and 0 otherwise). Columns 4-6 show that
18We might also consider the choice of words used by participants. Figure 1.A.4 shows a word
cloud of the words spoken by the subjects during the pre-game small talk communication which
depicts the very general and trivial nature of small talk. Figure 1.A.5 attempts to distinguish
between the most frequently used words by subjects believed to have different personalities.
Through a simple examination of word usage, it’s hard to distinguish between the nature of
language used by subjects believed to have different personalities. Those who are believed to
be highly extraverted (believed to have above median extraversion scores) have a similar set of
most frequently used words when compared to those who are believed to be less extraverted
(believed to have below median extraversion scores) which are likely to reflect the social norms
of small talk (Figures 1.A.5 (a) and (b)). Figures 1.A.5 (c) and (d) show a similar story for
neuroticism beliefs. This is not surprising given the unstructured nature of the small talk but
we know from our results and experimental design that language is playing an important role,
so we will focus on more quantitative measures in this section.
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Table 1.8: Impact of number of words and emotional content of the text spoken





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Words 0.2744∗∗∗ 0.2604∗∗∗ 0.2355∗∗∗ -0.0573 -0.0368 -0.0455
(0.079) (0.076) (0.078) (0.072) (0.076) (0.073)
Valence -0.2723 -0.2545 -0.0578 0.0328
(0.233) (0.234) (0.263) (0.267)
Arousal 0.1718 0.2191 -0.0763 -0.1241
(0.149) (0.147) (0.116) (0.115)
Dominance 0.1918 0.1728 0.0361 -0.0407
(0.256) (0.253) (0.256) (0.255)
Own IQ -0.1178 0.1278
(0.086) (0.079)






IQ Belief 0.1327 -0.0978
(0.081) (0.086)
Non-Native Speaker 0.3788∗∗ -0.2491
(0.151) (0.158)
First Speaker -0.0036 -0.3199∗∗
(0.140) (0.152)
N 168 168 168 168 168 168
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The explanatory variables, namely number of words, and valence, arousal and dominance ratings are
standardised for comparability across coefficients.
beliefs about partner’s neuroticism decrease with the number of words spoken
by the partner, although the impact is insignificant. Valence, arousal and dom-
inance ratings did not have a significant impact on beliefs about either of the
two fundamental personality traits. We also consider whether the beliefs formed
by examining the number of words used in communication provide an accurate
picture of someone’s true personality type. What we see from the results in Table
1.A.12 is that extraverts genuinely do seem to use more words, a result which
is significant (p-value < 0.05), with and without the addition of valence, arousal




While the association between an individual’s personality and strategic behaviour
has been well established within Economics (Proto, Rustichini, and Sofianos,
2019; Proto and Rustichini, 2014; Rustichini et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 2009;
Hirsh and Peterson, 2009), what remains unexplored is the impact of perceptions
about another individual’s personality and how these might influence subsequent
strategic interactions. We examine this by providing subjects the opportunity
to develop beliefs about the fundamental personality traits of their partner in a
controlled laboratory setting, through a brief (4-minute) chat via their computer
screens. We label this type of communication as small talk since there is no
prior knowledge of the definitive rules of any future strategic interaction between
the pair and also based on our observations of the nature of the communication.
Following the short period of small talk and subsequent personality belief elicita-
tion, the pair engage in two well-known one-shot strategic decision making tasks:
the 11-20 money request game (Arad and Rubinstein, 2012), which examines
level-k choices, and the public goods game, which is a game of cooperation. We
examine the causal effect of beliefs about the partner’s personality on decisions
made in the two tasks through comparison with a control group, where subjects
participated in an independent placebo task instead of engaging in small talk.
An examination of personality beliefs in section 1.3.1 revealed that beliefs about
an individual’s extraversion are not only determined by their true extraversion
trait, but are also enhanced by the predictor’s extraversion: extraverts tend to
believe that their partners are also extraverted. This finding lends support to
our first hypothesis which states that while formulating beliefs about someone’s
personality, individuals tend to project their own traits. This effect is signifi-
cantly stronger in the treatment group than in the control group. This links
closely with the psychological literature on extraversion: an extraverted person,
who is subject to positive emotions, fosters a positive social environment around
them and projects their extraversion or sociability onto others (Eaton and Fun-
der, 2003; Thorne, 1987), making them prone to complementary self projection
bias. No such projection was observed for neuroticism.19 We also found that
personality beliefs developed about a partner, after engaging in small talk with
them, were only a reliable or accurate measure of the partner’s extraversion, but
not their neuroticism. This is consistent with the findings of Eaton and Funder,
19This is contradictory to the theory of neurotic projection which is a form of defence mech-
anism through which people tend to project negative feelings, motives or behaviour they might
possess and are uncomfortable with, onto others. This can be attributed to the negative con-
notations of the trait neuroticism. Individuals are less keen to project trait neuroticism as it is
likely to draw attention to their own neuroticism.
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2003 who also observed accurate perceptions about a stranger’s extraversion after
a 5-minute in-person face-to-face conversation.
In section 1.3.2 result 2a, we observed that the perceived similarity or difference
between the personalities of the players and their partners influenced decision
making in level-k reasoning games, consistent with hypothesis 2a. Particularly,
perceived differences in the pair’s extraversion traits inversely affect the player’s
level-k choice, an effect which is significantly stronger in the treatment group,
compared to the control. In level-k reasoning games a player’s strategy reflects
the player’s beliefs about the opponent’s type. The player best responds to
these beliefs, attempting to out-reason or out-think their opponent. In accor-
dance with simulation-based theories of mental modelling, perceptions anchor
onto own-reasoning processes and likely choices and are then adjusted for any dis-
crepancy between self and other, while inferring choices of similar others (Tamir
and Mitchell, 2013). Thus, in level-k games, the perceived similarity or differ-
ences between the type of player and their partner, play a crucial role in predicting
how the opponent might behave and in turn determine own strategy choice. The
perceived similarity hypothesis (Thomas et al., 2014) states that when a player
thinks they are faced by a similar opponent, they believe the opponent will rea-
son and act in ways similar to themselves. Thus, when the player assumes the
partner’s type is similar to their own, it becomes harder for them to out-reason
the partner in the level-k game. When faced by a similar other, player believes
that the opponent, undergoing the same thinking process, will reason harder and
pick a higher level which in turn should make the player choose a higher level as
well. Consequently, when the player suspects their partner’s type is similar to
their own, the probability of them best responding to the distribution of level-k
beliefs falls. This result holds only when the players engage in small talk as in
the control condition the player has no reliable indicator of perceived similarity
with the opponent.
In section 1.3.2 result 2b, we found that when a player thinks that their op-
ponent is extraverted, they believe that their opponent will cooperate more, a
result only observed in the small talk treatment. The result that extraverts are
expected to cooperate more in social situations, is consistent with the finding in
psychology that higher levels of the extraversion trait are associated with pro-
social behaviour (Carlo et al., 2005; Burke and Hall, 1986). Thus, the player
themselves cooperate, expecting cooperation from their opponent. In contrast,
the literature is conflicted on the effect of a subject’s own extraversion on cooper-
ation. While Hirsh and Peterson, 2009 and Ross et al., 2003 find a positive effect
of extraversion on cooperation, Koole et al., 2001 find the opposite. Hirsh and
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Peterson, 2009 posit that individuals who score highly on the enthusiasm facet
of extraversion, owing to their positive outlook, view cooperation as rewarding
and expect cooperative behaviour from their partners as well. The opposing ar-
gument is that introverts, and not extraverts, are likely to cooperate more as
they are more inclined to avoid conflicts (Koole et al., 2001). This paper sup-
ports the latter argument. We would also argue that some of the contradictions
seen in the literature stem from missing the subtle interactions with beliefs that
are highlighted in our results. Further, this negative effect of extraversion is
driven by the assertive facet of an extravert’s personality. Lastly, beliefs about
opponent’s extraversion have a relatively larger effect on decision-making in the
public goods game than own-extraversion. Since these effects work in opposite
directions they may partly explain the apparent contradictions seen in the gen-
eral literature on extraversion and cooperation since they only become apparent
when we disentangle the impact of beliefs and own-characteristics.
Consistent with hypothesis 2, we show that beliefs about a partner’s personal-
ity - specifically beliefs about partner’s extraversion - developed after engaging in
small talk, significantly impact choices made in subsequent strategic interactions.
The reason why extraversion plays a big role in our study is likely because, out
of the two fundamental personality traits, subjects could only form reasonably
accurate beliefs about the partner’s extraversion. Extraverts, characterised by
their sociability, enthusiasm and gregariousness, tend to stand out by nature,
making extraversion the most detectable trait, especially after a brief chat. Ex-
traversion, as one of the principal dimensions of personality, can explain a wide
variety of outcomes, such as subjective well-being measures (Costa and McCrae,
1980), health outcomes (Lai and Qin, 2018), relationship satisfaction (Tov et al.,
2016) and occupational choices (King et al., 2017). This may explain why beliefs
about the extraversion of a partner is crucial for explaining strategic behaviour
in our study.
The brief period of small talk, as the key experimental manipulation in our study,
was the only opportunity for the players to interact and hence the primary basis
for developing personality beliefs. Analysis of the text data from the chat in
Section 1.3.3 revealed that partners who talk more during the chat are believed
to be extraverted, as expressed in our final hypothesis. This result is in keeping
with Mehl et al., 2006 who in a study observed that personality judges rated
talkative participants as more extraverted, since extraversion is characterised




Overall, we find evidence suggesting that beliefs about a partner’s fundamental
personality traits, particularly extraversion, are a significant determinant of de-
cisions made in any subsequent strategic interaction with them. This impact of
beliefs on choices can either be through the absolute value of beliefs about part-
ner’s extraversion (as in the public goods game) or the perceived differences in
the pair’s extraversion (as in the 11-20 money request game). We hope that our
study might open avenues for future research exploring how beliefs about other’s
personality traits affect choices made in various strategic interactions with them.
Being the first study of its kind, our work is limited in scope due to the con-
trolled laboratory setting and limited communication time, making it impossible
to examine the role of the remaining personality traits, agreeableness, conscien-
tiousness and openness, and even intelligence. In order to give these traits a more
reasonable chance of playing a role, a longer, more sustained series of small talk
conversations, something more akin to what occurs in the real-world seems sensi-
ble, and this is only going to be feasible in the setting of a field experiment. Our
hope is that our results will give impetus to new research that looks at repeated
interactions in a more realistic setting.
1.5 Conclusion
The link between personality and strategic behaviour has garnered much atten-
tion in recent Economic literature. We expand on this by providing evidence
of the impact of impressions about others’ personalities on subsequent strategic
interactions with them. In a laboratory setting we show that, when subjects
engage in brief small talk interaction with strangers via an instant messaging
software, they develop beliefs about the stranger’s personality traits, particularly
extraversion, which affect their ensuing strategic behaviour. Extraverts, who are
characterised by sociability and gregariousness, tend to be distinctive by nature,
making extraversion the most detectable trait in a short bout of communication.
Perceptions of trait extraversion, thus, played a crucial role in two well-known
strategic decision making tasks - the 11-20 money request game which exam-
ines level-k reasoning and the public goods game which is a game of coopera-
tion. Analysis of the pre-game interaction revealed that subjects use the number
of words spoken as a a mechanism for detecting extraverts, which does indeed
provide a reasonably accurate forecast of type. However, perceptions about ex-
traversion can be coloured by complementary self projection bias which makes
extraverts prone to projecting their extraversion or positive affect onto those
they interact with. Overall, we hope that this study paves the way for future
research exploring the association between personality impressions and strategic
40
1.5. CONCLUSION
behaviour in a variety of tasks and real-world contexts.
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1.A Additional Tables and Figures
Table 1.A.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Own Extraversion 3.372 0.814 1.25 5 338
Own Neuroticism 2.935 0.811 1 5 338
Extraversion Belief 3.499 0.827 1 5 338
Neuroticism Belief 2.818 0.865 1 5 338
Perceived diff Extraversion 0.882 0.689 0 3.25 338
Perceived diff Neuroticism 0.899 0.714 0 3.125 338
Level Chosen in 11-20 game 2.891 2.522 0 9 338
Level Belief in 11-20 game 2.787 2.566 0 9 338
Own Contribution in PGG 11.163 7.363 0 20 338
Contribution Belief in PGG 11.633 6.956 0 20 338
Own IQ 18.604 4.464 4 28 338
IQ Belief 18.213 4.825 1 30 338
Eyes Test Score 27.817 3.759 11 35 338
Age 21.154 3.622 17 42 338
Risk Aversion 4.317 0.767 1.533 6 338
Female 0.615 0.487 0 1 338
Non-native English speaker 0.349 0.477 0 1 338
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F-test of joint significance (p-value) 0.236
Number of observations 338
Statistical significance indicated as follows:
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OwnExtraversion × Treatment 0.1601∗ 0.2170∗∗ -0.0132 -0.0760 -0.0954 0.0489
(0.086) (0.092) (0.112) (0.092) (0.100) (0.118)
OwnNeuroticism × Treatment 0.1040 0.1121 0.1135 -0.0404 -0.0321 -0.0213
(0.093) (0.096) (0.119) (0.085) (0.083) (0.117)
PartnerExtraversion × Treatment 0.3031∗∗∗ 0.3075∗∗∗ -0.3722∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.081) (0.124)
PartnerNeuroticism × Treatment 0.0169 -0.0004 0.4717∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.078) (0.131)
Eyes Test Score × Treatment 0.0663 0.0773 -0.1817∗ 0.1146 0.1503 -0.0833
(0.072) (0.072) (0.105) (0.099) (0.102) (0.125)
Own Extraversion 0.0101 0.0181 0.1391∗ -0.0740 -0.0552 -0.0261
(0.052) (0.059) (0.082) (0.058) (0.058) (0.073)
Own Neuroticism -0.0061 0.0006 0.0144 0.0343 0.0461 -0.0194
(0.062) (0.064) (0.094) (0.062) (0.061) (0.091)
Partner’s Extraversion -0.8160∗∗∗ -0.8189∗∗∗ -0.0259
(0.052) (0.055) (0.091)
Partner’s Neuroticism -0.6530∗∗∗ -0.6395∗∗∗ -0.1162
(0.053) (0.054) (0.098)
Eyes Test Score -0.0459 -0.0368 0.1731∗∗ -0.0930 -0.1352∗ -0.0816
(0.054) (0.057) (0.080) (0.070) (0.074) (0.090)
Treatment 0.2609∗∗∗ -0.2290 1.0108 -0.3866∗∗∗ -0.1525 -0.4028
(0.071) (0.463) (0.613) (0.080) (0.423) (0.576)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 338 338 338 338 338 338
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The dependant variable, Overestimation of personality beliefs, is computed by taking the difference between the player’s
beliefs about their partner’s personality and the partner’s true personality scores. This difference is then standardised. The
dependent variable is thus a measure of exaggeration or overestimation of the partner’s personality by the player. The
dependent variable, Inaccuracy of personality beliefs, is computed by taking the absolute difference between the player’s
beliefs about their partner’s personality and the partner’s true personality scores. This difference is then standardised. This
dependent variable is thus a measure of the error or inaccuracy in the player’s beliefs about their partner’s personality. The
independent variables are the player’s own personality traits, the true personality trait score of the partner, the player’s eyes
test score and these variables interacted with the treatment dummy. The control variables are the player’s IQ, gender, age
and risk aversion and these variables interacted with the treatment dummy. Columns 1 and 2 show that overestimation of
partner’s extraversion increases with the player’s own extraversion, an effect which is significantly stronger in the treatment
group compared to the control group. In column 3, the negative significant (p-value < 0.10) interaction term between the
player’s eyes test score and the treatment dummy shows that with increasing eyes test score, the inaccuracy in the player’s
beliefs about partner’s extraversion is significantly lower in the treatment group compared to the control. Columns 4 and 5
show no significant effect of own extraversion or neuroticism on overestimation of the partner’s neuroticism in either of the
two groups. Column 6 shows that the player’s performance in the eyes test has no significant impact on the inaccuracy of
their beliefs about partner’s neuroticism.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own IQ Belief × Treatment -0.0588 -0.0626 -0.0445 -0.0474 -0.1807 -0.3183∗∗
(0.086) (0.116) (0.065) (0.088) (0.112) (0.143)
Partner’s IQ × Treatment -0.0345 -0.0186 -0.0261 -0.0141 0.0912 0.0881
(0.081) (0.082) (0.061) (0.062) (0.148) (0.145)
Own IQ belief 0.6706∗∗∗ 0.7319∗∗∗ 0.5077∗∗∗ 0.5541∗∗∗ -0.1120 0.0198
(0.060) (0.078) (0.045) (0.059) (0.079) (0.105)
Partner’s IQ 0.0937∗ 0.0894∗ -0.6296∗∗∗ -0.6328∗∗∗ -0.1668∗∗ -0.1588∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.038) (0.038) (0.082) (0.077)
Treatment -0.0833 0.4362 -0.0631 0.3303 0.0693 0.3750
(0.082) (0.506) (0.062) (0.383) (0.108) (0.625)
Own IQ × Treatment -0.0172 -0.0130 0.1404
(0.110) (0.083) (0.122)
Eyes Test Score × Treatment 0.0276 0.0209 0.1534
(0.099) (0.075) (0.122)
Own IQ -0.0714 -0.0541 -0.1146
(0.069) (0.053) (0.087)
Eyes Test Score 0.0194 0.0147 -0.1784∗∗
(0.077) (0.058) (0.082)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 338 338 338 338 338 338
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Column 1 examines the impact of the player’s beliefs about own IQ, partner’s true IQ and their interaction
with the treatment dummy, on beliefs about the partner’s IQ. While own IQ belief interacted with treatment
dummy has no significant effect, own IQ belief positively impacts beliefs about partner’s IQ. Column 2
includes the player’s (i.e. the predictor’s) true IQ as measured by the Raven’s test, the player’s eyes test
score, along with their interactions with the treatment dummy. Columns 2 also includes the control variables
- player’s age, gender and risk aversion - and the 3 control variables interacted with the treatment dummy.
For columns 3 and 4 the dependant variable is the standardised difference between the beliefs about partner’s
IQ and the partner’s true IQ (as measured by the partner’s performance in the Raven’s test). Hence, for
columns 3 and 4 the dependant variable is a measure of the degree by which the player overestimates their
partner’s IQ. Columns 3 and 4 indicate that an increase in player’s own IQ belief leads to overestimation
of the partner’s IQ, irrespective of being in the treatment or control group i.e. players project beliefs about
their own IQ onto their partner. For columns 5 and 6 the dependant variable is the standardised absolute
difference between the beliefs about partner’s IQ and the partner’s true IQ. Hence, for columns 5 and 6 the
dependant variable is a measure of the inaccuracy in the player’s beliefs about their partner’s IQ. In column
6, the significant (p-value < 0.05) negative interaction between own IQ belief and the treatment dummy,
implies that as own IQ belief increases, the inaccuracy in beliefs about partner’s IQ is significantly lower in
the treatment group compared to the control.
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Table 1.A.5: Impact of (absolute) difference between own personality and beliefs





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DiffExtraversion × Treatment -0.5302∗ -0.5600∗ -0.5396∗ -0.6597∗∗∗ -0.7395∗∗∗ -0.6505∗∗
(0.269) (0.290) (0.299) (0.237) (0.242) (0.254)
DiffNeuroticism × Treatment 0.1879 0.2106 0.3353 -0.0415 -0.0060 0.1645
(0.248) (0.263) (0.292) (0.248) (0.244) (0.262)
DiffExtraversion 0.1470 0.1806 0.1448 0.2046 0.2089 0.1663
(0.198) (0.201) (0.204) (0.177) (0.180) (0.183)
DiffNeuroticism -0.1579 -0.1491 -0.2589 -0.1604 -0.1499 -0.2929
(0.183) (0.190) (0.211) (0.174) (0.182) (0.189)
Treatment 0.1668 0.0079 -2.9732 0.0677 -0.0799 -2.3533
(0.267) (0.285) (2.048) (0.279) (0.286) (1.854)
Own Extraversion × Treatment -0.0578 0.0509 -0.1528 0.0320
(0.306) (0.364) (0.289) (0.317)
Own Neuroticism × Treatment -0.1846 -0.1402 -0.4226 -0.4142
(0.277) (0.303) (0.280) (0.280)
Own Extraversion -0.0612 -0.1633 -0.1773 -0.2771
(0.196) (0.203) (0.214) (0.216)
Own Neuroticism 0.0227 -0.0960 0.2069 0.0490
(0.197) (0.215) (0.201) (0.200)
Extraversion Belief × Treatment -0.2863 -0.2942 -0.2422 -0.2628
(0.272) (0.284) (0.255) (0.263)
Neuroticism Belief × Treatment -0.2533 -0.1483 -0.2287 -0.1007
(0.292) (0.303) (0.282) (0.297)
Extraversion Belief 0.1724 0.1403 0.1498 0.1261
(0.194) (0.197) (0.183) (0.179)
Neuroticism Belief -0.1412 -0.1978 -0.0924 -0.1278
(0.195) (0.196) (0.203) (0.209)
Eyes Test Score × Treatment 0.5905∗ 0.6297∗∗
(0.301) (0.311)
Own IQ × Treatment -0.2809 -0.3072
(0.296) (0.307)
IQ Belief × Treatment 0.3462 0.2073
(0.324) (0.270)
Female × Treatment -0.8057 -0.8928
(0.612) (0.564)
Order × Treatment 1.1902∗∗ 1.1083∗
(0.594) (0.605)
Eyes Test Score -0.4462∗ -0.4522∗
(0.249) (0.254)
Own IQ 0.2175 0.2606
(0.203) (0.220)






Controls No No Yes No No Yes
N 338 338 338 338 338 338
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Here, ‘Controls’ imply the player’s risk aversion, age and their interactions with the treatment dummy.
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Table 1.A.6: Impact of (absolute) difference between own personality and beliefs
about partner’s personality on the probability of choosing the best response -
Probit Model
Control Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pr(Level=2) Pr(Level=2) Pr(Level=2) Pr(Level=2)
DiffExtraversion -0.0453 -0.0550 0.0846∗∗∗ 0.0992∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.035) (0.030) (0.032)
DiffNeuroticism -0.0008 -0.0077 -0.0459 -0.0358
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033)
Own Extraversion 0.0123 0.0168
(0.030) (0.046)
Own Neuroticism 0.0543∗ -0.0438
(0.032) (0.036)
Extraversion Belief -0.0165 -0.0109
(0.035) (0.031)
Neuroticism Belief 0.0296 0.0656∗
(0.033) (0.035)
Own IQ 0.0587∗ 0.0558
(0.036) (0.038)
IQ Belief -0.0441 -0.0028
(0.029) (0.036)
Eyes Test Score 0.0549 0.0497
(0.037) (0.031)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 170 170 168 168
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The table reports the average marginal effects from Probit regressions. ‘Controls’ imply the
player’s age, gender, risk aversion and the order of play of the two games.
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Table 1.A.7: Impact of (absolute) difference between own personality and beliefs
about partner’s personality on the probability of choosing the best response -
Logit Model
Control Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pr(Level=2) Pr(Level=2) Pr(Level=2) Pr(Level=2)
DiffExtraversion -0.0486 -0.0547 0.0843∗∗∗ 0.1016∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.040) (0.029) (0.030)
DiffNeuroticism -0.0019 -0.0074 -0.0459 -0.0370
(0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Own Extraversion 0.0093 0.0185
(0.030) (0.047)
Own Neuroticism 0.0548 -0.0422
(0.034) (0.037)
Extraversion Belief -0.0154 -0.0102
(0.039) (0.032)
Neuroticism Belief 0.0321 0.0665∗
(0.035) (0.035)
Own IQ 0.0618 0.0583
(0.038) (0.040)
IQ Belief -0.0428 -0.0042
(0.027) (0.037)
Eyes Test Score 0.0531 0.0454
(0.038) (0.033)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 170 170 168 168
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The table reports the average marginal effects from Logit regressions. ‘Controls’ imply the
player’s age, gender, risk aversion and the order of play of the two games.
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Table 1.A.8: Impact of beliefs about partner’s personality on beliefs about partner’s






















Extraversion Belief 0.0430 0.0575 0.0951 0.1042 0.1964∗ 0.1879∗ 0.1882∗∗ 0.1667∗
(0.083) (0.082) (0.087) (0.101) (0.101) (0.100) (0.087) (0.083)
Neurotcisim Belief 0.0440 0.0456 -0.0207 -0.0275 0.1771 0.1627 0.1591 0.1697
(0.090) (0.109) (0.087) (0.101) (0.111) (0.109) (0.117) (0.112)
Own IQ -0.0664 -0.0114 0.1265 0.1782∗
(0.106) (0.087) (0.088) (0.101)
IQ Belief 0.1329 0.1016 0.0964 0.2512∗∗
(0.097) (0.107) (0.096) (0.097)
Eyes Test Score -0.0256 0.0221 0.1197 0.1694
(0.096) (0.130) (0.090) (0.117)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 110 110 110 110 106 106 106 106
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table shows that of the two fundamental personality traits - extraversion and neuroticism - only
beliefs about partner’s extraversion affect decision making in the public goods game, for treatment group
subjects. ‘Controls’ refers to the player’s age, gender and risk aversion.
Table 1.A.9: Impact of beliefs about partner’s personality and own personality
on beliefs about partner’s contribution and own contribution in Public Goods














ExtraversionBelief 0.0601 0.1110 0.2036∗∗ 0.1599∗
(0.082) (0.092) (0.099) (0.085)
OwnExtraversion -0.0733 -0.2041∗∗ -0.1831 -0.0919
(0.095) (0.088) (0.118) (0.117)
Own IQ -0.0583 -0.0417 0.0783 0.1484
(0.096) (0.084) (0.086) (0.099)
IQ Belief 0.1250 0.1140 0.0953 0.2474∗∗
(0.091) (0.100) (0.096) (0.099)
Eyes Test Score -0.0431 -0.0015 0.1328 0.1754
(0.096) (0.118) (0.099) (0.127)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 110 110 106 106
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
‘Controls’ refers to the player’s age, gender and risk aversion.
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Table 1.A.10: Impact of beliefs about partner’s personality and own personality















ExtraversionBelief 0.0542 0.1036 0.6169∗∗ 0.5262∗∗
(0.084) (0.093) (0.265) (0.251)
OwnAssertiveness -0.1258 -0.2271∗ -0.3287∗∗ -0.3095∗∗
(0.113) (0.114) (0.128) (0.124)
OwnActivity 0.0593 0.0333 0.0255 0.1562
(0.122) (0.123) (0.125) (0.106)
Own IQ -0.0497 -0.0323 0.0781 0.1396
(0.099) (0.088) (0.098) (0.105)
IQ Belief 0.1391 0.1301 0.1041 0.2708∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.102) (0.091) (0.092)
Eyes Test Score -0.0342 0.0114 0.1193 0.1751
(0.102) (0.122) (0.118) (0.139)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 110 110 106 106
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
‘Controls’ refers to the player’s age, gender and risk aversion. Columns 1 and 2 report the OLS
regression results for the control group. Column 2 shows that the players own assertiveness has
a negative significant effect (p-value < 0.05) on contribution levels whereas facet activity has
an insignificant positive effect. None of the facets significantly impact beliefs about partner’s
contribution. Columns 3 and 4 present the results from 2SLS IV regression for the treatment
group. For the treated subjects, beliefs about partner’s extraversion positively and significantly
(p-value < 0.05) affects beliefs about partner’s contribution as well as own-contribution. With
regards to the player’s own personality, facet assertiveness has a significant negative effect (p-




Table 1.A.11: Impact of beliefs about partner’s personality and own personality on















Extraversion Belief -0.0357 -0.2345∗ 0.1273 1.2682
(0.147) (0.121) (1.065) (1.986)
Own Extraversion 0.1603 0.0317 0.1219 -0.1167
(0.158) (0.158) (0.189) (0.321)
Own IQ 0.1372 0.0435 -0.0345 -0.0495
(0.203) (0.162) (0.120) (0.223)
IQ Belief 0.1792 0.0170 -0.0657 -0.1679
(0.159) (0.133) (0.142) (0.209)
Eyes Test Score -0.2673 0.2327 0.2574 0.0801
(0.174) (0.164) (0.157) (0.330)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 60 60 62 62
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table replicates the IV regression results from the main paper but only for those subjects
which played the 11-20 game first. ‘Controls’ refers to the player’s age, gender and risk aversion.
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Table 1.A.12: Relationship between number of words and emotional content of
text spoken by the subject and the subject’s own personality
Own Extraversion Own Neuroticism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Number of Words 0.1439∗∗ 0.1733∗∗ 0.1781∗∗ 0.1289∗ 0.1282∗ 0.0814
(0.071) (0.073) (0.075) (0.071) (0.071) (0.073)
Own Valence -0.5325∗ -0.5533∗∗ 0.2299 0.3302
(0.284) (0.276) (0.269) (0.255)
Own Arousal 0.0296 0.0358 -0.2117 -0.2409∗
(0.150) (0.152) (0.135) (0.132)
Own Dominance 0.4011 0.4033 -0.0124 -0.0905
(0.279) (0.272) (0.258) (0.252)
Own IQ -0.1804∗∗ -0.0031
(0.085) (0.076)






Non-Native Speaker 0.0798 -0.1319
(0.156) (0.174)
First Speaker 0.1562 0.1071
(0.156) (0.162)
N 168 168 168 168 168 168
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The explanatory variables, namely the number of words spoken by the subject, and valence, arousal
and dominance ratings of language used, are standardised for comparability across coefficients. Number
of words used by the subject is a positive indicator of the subject’s extraversion, even after adding
valence, arousal and dominance ratings of the text used as explanatory variables. The result persists
after controlling for the subject’s IQ, eyes test score, age, gender, a dummy for non-native speaker
(equals 1 if the subject is a non-native English speaker and 0 otherwise) and a dummy for first speaker
(equals 1 if the subject started the conversation and 0 otherwise). Trait neuroticism also appears to
be positively associated with number of words used, although the coefficient becomes insignificant after
adding sensible control variables.
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(a) Contribution Belief (b) Own Contribution
Figure 1.A.1: Distribution of (a) Beliefs about Partner’s Contribution and (b)
Own Contribution in the Public Goods Game
(a) Order 1 (b) Order 2
Figure 1.A.2: Average contribution in Public Goods Game (PGG) (a) when
PGG is played first (order 1) and (b) when the 11-20 game is played first (order
2). Treated subjects contribute more than control group subjects in order 1.
The average contribution of treated subjects is 13.2 EP where as that of control
group subjects is 9.7 EP in order 1. The difference is statistically significant with
t-statistic of -3.8060 and p-value < 0.01. There is no significant difference in
contribution levels between the treatment and control groups in order 2.
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(a) Control (b) Treatment
Figure 1.A.3: Average contribution in Public Goods Game (PGG) for different
orders of play of the two games for (a) Control and (b) Treatment groups. Order
1 is when PGG is played first and order 2 is when the 11-20 game is played first.
On average players contribute more in the treatment group (figure (b)) when
PGG is played first (order 1) compared to when 11-20 is played first (order 2). In
a one-tailed t-test, we reject the null of no significant difference in contribution
between treated players in order 1 and treated players in order 2 in favour of the
alternative that treated players in order 1 contribute more at the 10% significance
level (t-statistic = 1.5752, p-value =0.0586). There is no significant difference for
control group subjects (figure (a)).




(a) Highly Extraverted (b) Less Extraverted
(c) Highly Neurotic (d) Less Neurotic
Figure 1.A.5: Most frequently used words during small talk communication by
subjects who are believed to be (a) highly extraverted (b) less extraverted (c)
highly neurotic and (d) less neurotic.
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1.B Examples of Small Talk Communication
Example 1
Player 1: hey
Player 2: Hey how are you doing :)
Player 1: lol alright
Player 1: you
Player 2: yeah fine haha
Player 1: tbh this is strange
Player 2: this is strange
Player 2: exactly haha
Player 1: omg
Player 1: so...
Player 1: do you have any pets?
Player 2: probably they want to see if we will cooperate depending on our chat or
something haha
Player 2: nope and you?
Player 1: trying to make conversation :D
Player 1: yep, two cats
Player 2: I had fish when I was little haha
Player 2: What are their names?
Player 1: aww like goldfish?
Player 1: Cosmos and Titan
Player 2: Yes a goldfish and one more but I forgot the type lol
Player 2: That is great!
Player 1: i used to have goldfish
Player 1: but we could not keep them cause of the cats
Player 2: Goldfish live a long I think generally haha
Player 2: Oh no!
Player 1: we had 4 goldfish
Player 2: Cats is more interesting haha
Player 2: are*
Player 1: yeah i know
Player 1: only problem is they scratch you
Player 1: a lot
Player 2: Ahaha yes
Player 2: scars all the time
Player 1: so now i have lots of marks on me
Player 2: This keyboard is so bad
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Player 2: Oh no
Player 2: The pain of being a cat owner haha
Player 1: the keyboard never crossed my mind lol
Player 2: I barely can type on it haha
Player 2: It was nice chatting to you haha




Player 1: what is up?
Player 2: not much, you?
Player 1: same, just waiting haha
Player 2: same, it is a bit dead is not it
Player 1: it really is...
Player 2: think I mucked up most of those puzzles tbh
Player 1: although everyone is now typing fervently
Player 1: you think you did that bad?
Player 2: not that bad, but some of them I just did not get
Player 2: or I almost got them and then the time ran out
Player 1: there were some really weird ones though
Player 2: yeah igy
Player 1: yeah same, 30 seconds is a bit too quick for some of those
Player 2: some just made no sense to me
Player 1: true that
Player 1: but they take 2/30 anyway,
Player 2: seems like a bit of a waste of time
Player 2: to do 30 and then only 2 count
Player 1: and for some reason \ q random \ q selection always ends up in me
being paid nothing xD
Player 2: same haha
Player 1: Ikr
Player 2: or i am in a team and the team does really badly and i get almost no
money
Player 1: but yeah, pretty much a waste
Player 2: really*
Player 1: omg yes....
Player 2: its a bit annoying
Player 1: These dictator games where in the end one person decides whether I
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can keep my money or get nothing
Player 2: yes! so irritating
Player 1: Being paid £3 after 1,5 hours....




Player 1: how are you?
Player 2: How are you?
Player 2: haha
Player 1: haha i’m good you?
Player 2: great
Player 2: How are exams going?
Player 1: yeah not too bad, some have gone worse that i had wanted, you?
Player 2: Most of them were alright, three more to go
Player 2: How about you?
Player 2: Any more left?
Player 1: i’ve got 1 more to go, thank god, i have 7 overall
Player 1: how many do you have overall?
Player 2: That’s a lot. When is your last one?
Player 2: I have 6 in total
Player 1: next wednesday
Player 1: so i can go to circle and pop and celebrate by getting black out drunk
haha
Player 2: Still some time to prepare. I have one this Saturday
Player 2: Yeah, pop is back on again next week
Player 1: that’s grim, my boyfriend does to, i don’t get why exams on saturday is
a thing
Player 1: *too
Player 2: None of your 7 exams were on Saturday?
Player 1: nope, i had 1 in week 3, 1 week 4, 3 last week, 1 this week and one next
week
Player 2: Time is running out heh
1.C Experiment Script
This following part is read out by the experimenter (Note that the script presented




Thank you everyone for coming to our experiment today. Before we begin,
please check that the number on the card handed to you matches with the number
on the cubicle that you are seated in.
During the whole experiment, please do not speak with each other. If you
do not understand something, please ask the experimenter by raising your hand.
We will come to you and answer your question individually. Please also refrain
from using your mobile phones during the experiment.
Also bear in mind that you may have to wait a few moments during the
experiment, as we want everyone to finish at the same time. You will see the
message ‘Please wait until the experiment continues’ on your screen when this is
applicable.
Before we begin, I would just like to say, that your participation is very crucial
for our research and we truly appreciate all of you being here. Thank you.
We will now begin the experiment.
General Instructions
In the laboratory experiment you are taking part in, you can - depending on
your decisions and the decisions of your fellow players - earn money in addition
to the show-up fee of £4. It is, therefore, of importance that you read these
instructions carefully.
Today’s experiment consists of the following: In the first section, you will be
asked to answer a few questions and solve some puzzles. In the second section,
you will be asked to make decisions in a few tasks. Lastly, there will be some
questions for you to answer.
Please note that the experiment will not involve any deception and your
answers today will remain strictly anonymous. The generated anonymous data
will only be used for the purpose of our study. Therefore, we request you to
answer to the best of your ability as it is integral to our research.
The outcomes from each task will be disclosed at the end of the experiment.
Detailed instructions for each part will follow.
We will now begin the experiment.
(a) Questionnaire: Personality (44 questions)
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You will be asked to answer some questions about yourself. Your payment will
not be affected by this. Just to remind you, your answers will remain anonymous
so please answer as truthfully as possible as this is critically important for our
research.
You will see a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you.
For example, do you agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with
others? Please pick an option next to each statement to indicate the extent to
which you agree or disagree with that statement.
I see myself as someone who. . .
START BFI QUESTIONNAIRE
(b) PUZZLES: Raven’s Test (30 items)
You will be asked to solve some puzzles, a pattern game.
On the screen, you will see a set of abstract pictures with one of the pictures
missing. You need to choose a picture from the choices given below to complete
the pattern. You will have 30 seconds to complete each set of pictures. The first
picture you will see will be an example, no input is required. You will then be
asked to solve a total of 30 such puzzles. 2 of these 30 puzzles will randomly
be selected. For each correct answer, from the random 2, you will receive £1.
Please make sure to click ‘submit answer’, as otherwise your answer will not be
recorded, and you might lose money.
START RAVEN TEST
Out of the 30 puzzles you just saw, how many puzzles do you think you
correctly solved?
If your answer to this question is correct, then you will win an additional £1.
Now subjects will be allocated to one of 2 groups - control or treatment.
Control Group
Placebo Task 20
Can you please indicate the title and summarize the story of the last movie
you have seen? Please be as specific as possible and include as many details as
possible. Please use a minimum of 250 characters. You will have 4 minutes to
write the summary.
20This task has been adapted from the Placebo Task used in Bursztyn et al., 2017.
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Please write the summary in the box provided on the next screen.
(next screen) Please make sure to click ’Submit’ after you are done, as other-
wise your answer will not be recorded.
Beliefs
You have been randomly and anonymously matched with another person in
this room who is participating in the experiment. Please answer a few questions
about the other player to the best of your ability, before you proceed with the
tasks.
1. You will see a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to the other
player. For example, do you agree that the other player is someone who likes to
spend time with others? Please pick an option next to each statement to indicate
the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement regarding the other
player.
You will see 11 statements about the other player.
1 out of these 11 statements will be randomly chosen and if your answer matches
that of the other player, then you will win an additional £1.
START PERSONALITY PREDICTION QUESTIONNAIRE
2. Recall the visual puzzle task from earlier in the experiment. On the screen,
you saw a set of abstract pictures with one of the pictures missing. You had to
choose a picture from the choices given below to complete the pattern. You had
30 seconds to complete each set of pictures. You were asked to solve a total of 30
such puzzles. How many puzzles do you think the other player, with whom you
have been matched, correctly solved? Please indicate a (whole) number between
0 and 30.
If your answer to this question is correct, then you will win an additional of £1.
Tasks (note that the order of the two tasks below were randomised)
You will now take part in a few decision-making tasks with the player with
whom you have already been matched. Note that you will be participating in all
tasks with the same player. Your payoff from these tasks will be calculated in
Experimental Pounds (EP). The exchange rate between £ and EP is 1:5, i.e. 5
EP = £1.
The outcomes from each task will be disclosed at the end of the experiment.
You will receive payment based on your results from one of the tasks randomly
67
APPENDIX
selected from the tasks in this part of the experiment. Please note that each task
is equally likely to be chosen for payment.
Task 1: PGG
You will now participate in a task with the player with whom you have been
matched. You have 20 EP and the other player has 20 EP as well. Your task in
the game, and also the other player’s task, is to decide how much to contribute to
a joint project. You can choose to contribute any amount between 0 and 20 EP
(only integer numbers). Your earnings from the project is the total contribution
to the project, made by you and the other player, multiplied by a factor of 3/4.
Your payoff from this task will be your earnings from the project, plus the amount
you did not contribute. Thus, your final payoffs (in EP) will be given by:
Your payoff = (20 – your contribution)+3/4(your contribution + the other
player’s contribution)
Other player’s payoff = (20 – the other player’s contribution)+3/4(your con-
tribution + the other player’s contribution)
If for example, you contribute 20 EP to the project and the other player
contributes 20 EP then,
Your payoff will be: 20–20 + 3/4(20 + 20) = 30
The other player’s payoff will be: 20–20 + 3/4(20 + 20) = 30
If for example, you contribute 0 EP to the project and the other player con-
tributes 20 EP then,
Your payoff will be: 20–0 + 3/4(0 + 20) = 35
The other player’s payoff will be: 20–20 + 3/4(0 + 20) = 15
If you have a question, please raise your hand.
If you have read the instructions and do not have any questions, please click
‘OK’ to proceed to a practice quiz. The quiz is to make sure that you understand
the task and your answers will not affect your payoffs from the experiment.
Suppose you choose to contribute 20 EP and the other player chooses to
contribute 0 EP.
Your payoff will be:
The other player’s payoff will be:
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Suppose you choose to contribute 10 EP and the other player chooses to
contribute 14 EP.
Your payoff will be:
The other player’s payoff will be:
You have correctly answered the practice quiz. Click ‘Continue’ to proceed
with the task.
How much money do you think the other player will contribute? Please
indicate a number (an integer) between 0 and 20.
If your answer to this question matches that of the other player, then you will
win an additional £1.
How much would you like to contribute? Please choose a number (an integer)
between 0 and 20.
Task 2: 11-20 money request game
You will now participate in a different task with the same player.
You and the other player are playing a game in which each player requests
an amount of money. The amount must be (an integer) between 11 and 20
Experimental Pounds. Each player will receive the amount he or she requests. A
player will receive an additional amount of 20 Experimental Pounds if he or she
asks for exactly one Experimental Pound less than the other player.
If for example, you request 19 EP and the other player requests 20 EP then,
Your payoff will be: 19 + 20 = 39
The other player’s payoff will be: 20
If for example, you request 17 EP and the other player requests 16 EP then,
Your payoff will be: 17
The other player’s payoff will be: 16 + 20 = 36
If you have a question, please raise your hand.
If you have read the instructions and do not have any questions, please click
‘OK’ to proceed to a practice quiz. The quiz is to make sure that you understand
the task and your answers will not affect your payoffs from the experiment.
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Suppose you choose to request 13 EP and the other player chooses to request
14 EP.
Your payoff will be:
The other player’s payoff will be:
Suppose you choose to request 15 EP and the other player chooses to request
18 EP.
Your payoff will be:
The other player’s payoff will be:
You have correctly answered the practice quiz. Click ‘Continue’ to proceed
with the task.
How much money do you think the other player will request? Please indicate
a number (an integer) between 11 and 20.
If your answer to this question matches that of the other player, then you will
win an additional £1.
What amount of money would you request? Please choose a number (an
integer) between 11 and 20.
Treatment Group
Chat Instructions
You have been randomly and anonymously matched with another person in
this room who is participating in the experiment.
Before you proceed with the tasks, you are allowed to chat with the other
player for 4 minutes. You can type in the box provided at the bottom of the
screen and press Enter on your keyboard to send your messages.
Your message should not contain any personal information such as your name
or your computer ID. The purpose is to preserve anonymity throughout the ex-
periment. You are allowed to chat freely in English and in a non-abusive manner.
Beliefs
Now that you have chatted with the other player please answer a few questions
about the other player, before you proceed with the tasks.
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1. You will see a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to the other
player. For example, do you agree that the other player is someone who likes to
spend time with others? Please pick an option next to each statement to indicate
the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement regarding the other
player.
You will see 11 statements about the other player.
1 out of these 11 statements will be randomly chosen and if your answer matches
that of the other player, then you will win an additional £1.
START PERSONALITY PREDICTION QUESTIONNAIRE
2. Recall the visual puzzle task from earlier in the experiment. On the screen,
you saw a set of abstract pictures with one of the pictures missing. You had to
choose a picture from the choices given below to complete the pattern. You had
30 seconds to complete each set of pictures. You were asked to solve a total of 30
such puzzles. How many puzzles do you think the other player, with whom you
chatted, correctly solved? Please indicate a (whole) number between 0 and 30.
If your answer to this question is correct, then you will win an additional £1.
Tasks (note that the order of the two tasks below were randomised)
You will now take part in a few decision-making tasks with the player you
chatted with. Note that you will be participating in all tasks with the same
player. Your payoff from these tasks will be calculated in Experimental Pounds
(EP). The exchange rate between £ and EP is 1:5, i.e. 5 EP = £1.
The outcomes from each task will be disclosed at the end of the experiment.
You will receive payment based on your results from one of the tasks randomly
selected from the tasks in this part of the experiment. Please note that each task
is equally likely to be chosen for payment.
Task 1: PGG
You will now participate in a task with the player you chatted with. You
have 20 EP and the other player has 20 EP as well. Your task in the game,
and also the other player’s task, is to decide how much to contribute to a joint
project. You can choose to contribute any amount between 0 and 20 EP (only
integer numbers). Your earnings from the project is the total contribution to the
project, made by you and the other player, multiplied by a factor of 3⁄4. Your
payoff from this task will be your earnings from the project, plus the amount you
did not contribute. Thus, your final payoffs (in EP) will be given by:
71
APPENDIX
Your payoff = (20– your contribution)+3/4(your contribution + the other
player’s contribution)
Other player’s payoff = (20– the other player’s contribution)+3/4(your contri-
bution + the other player’s contribution)
Examples and quiz related to the game, then partner’s strategy belief and own
choice
Task 2: 11-20 money request game
You will now participate in a different task with the same player.
You and the other player are playing a game in which each player requests
an amount of money. The amount must be (an integer) between 11 and 20
Experimental Pounds. Each player will receive the amount he or she requests. A
player will receive an additional amount of 20 Experimental Pounds if he or she
asks for exactly one Experimental Pound less than the other player.
Examples and quiz related to the game, then partner’s strategy belief and own
choice
FOR BOTH CONTROL AND TREATMENT:
Eyes Test (36 questions)
In this section, you will be asked to look at 36 pictures of different pairs of
eyes.
For each set of eyes, choose the word which best describes what the person
in the picture is thinking or feeling. You may feel that more than one word is
applicable but please choose just one word, the word which you consider to be
most suitable. Before making your choice, make sure that you have read all 4
words. You should try to do the task as quickly as possible, but you will not be
timed. If you do not know what a word means you can read the meaning of the
word provided at the bottom of the screen.
2 of these 36 questions you answer will randomly be selected. For each correct
answer, from the random 2, you will receive £1.
You will first see a practice question with four options. The correct option
will be highlighted. After that you may proceed to the questions.





Thank you. Now, in the final section, you will be asked to answer some
questions about yourself.
(a) Risk
Please indicate the likelihood that you would engage in the described activity
or behaviour if you were to find yourself in that situation.
START DOSPERT
(b) Personal information
1. How old are you? (in years)
2. What is your year of study? (1, 2, 3, Post-graduate Other)
3. What is your gender? (M, F, Other, Prefer not to say)
4. What is your nationality?
5. Is English your Native language? (Yes, No)
6. What is your current degree course?
7. Would you consider your degree course mostly: (quantitative, qualitative)
8. Have you ever taken any game theory modules/courses? (Yes, No)
9. How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life in general? (1-7 scale from
completely dissatisfied to completely satisfied)
Profit display screen
1. Number of correct answers from the visual puzzles task (out of 30):
2. Your payoff (in EP) from the first decision-making task:
3. Your payoff (in EP) from the second decision-making task:
4. Number of correct answers from the eyes task (out of 36):
5. Additional amount earned (in £):
6. Total earnings (in £):
Thank you for completing the experiment successfully. Please queue at the




1.D Personality Beliefs Questionnaire
The personality beliefs questionnaire used in the study was adapted from Ramm-
stedt and John, 2007 and is presented below:
Please pick an option next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you
agree or disagree with the statement regarding the other player.
For each of the below statements the subject could pick any one of five options -
Disagree strongly, Disagree a little, Neither agree nor disagree, Agree a little and
Agree strongly
1. The other player is reserved.
2. The other player is generally trusting.
3. The other player tends to be lazy.
4. The other player is relaxed, handles stress well.
5. The other player has few artistic interests.
6. The other player is outgoing, sociable.
7. The other player tends to find fault with others.
8. The other player does a thorough job.
9. The other player gets nervous easily.
10. The other player has an active imagination.
11. The other player is considerate and kind to almost everyone.
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2 Climate Change and Diet1
with Thomas Hills and Daniel Sgroi
Despite extensive scientific evidence, the public remains largely uninformed about
the detrimental environmental effects of meat consumption. We conducted a pre-
registered online randomised control trial, involving 1220 subjects, of which only
9% reported diet as impacting climate change. Evaluating 6 information interven-
tions to reduce planned meat consumption, the most effective interventions were
based on scientific knowledge, and efficacy salience i.e. providing concrete infor-
mation about the consequences of one’s actions. A targeted messaging approach
that highlights the health impact of a plant-based diet for individuals with health
concerns was also effective. The greatest resistance to the interventions was asso-
ciated with motivated reasoning around meat consumption: frequent meat eaters
reported lower prior knowledge, lower responses to the evidence, and more moral
offence at being informed. Further insight into the information interventions is
provided by evaluating donations to a climate change charity and the recall value
of information provided.
2.1 Introduction
Plant-based diets are of utmost importance in the path to mitigating climate
change (Schiermeier, 2019). A global shift towards a diet with lower meat content
(based on dietary recommendations by the Harvard Medical School for Public
Health) is estimated to reduce the costs of climate change mitigation by up to
50% in 2050, compared to a reference case where there are no changes to diet
or climate policy (Stehfest et al., 2009). Despite scientific consensus regarding
the benefits of a plant-based diet, meat intake related climate change mitigation
actions rank low among the public in perceived effectiveness compared to actions
such as energy saving, recycling and reduced levels of driving (Vanhonacker et al.,
2013; de Boer et al., 2016; Truelove and Parks, 2012).
Interventions aiming to enhance public awareness about the ecological impact of a
1Ethical approval for the study was granted by the University of Warwick (HSSREC
03/19-20). The experiment is registered at the AEA RCT registry https://doi.org/10.1257/
rct.5069-1.0 (RCT ID AEARCTR-0005069) and https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5584-1.0 (RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005584). This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC) CAGE Centre under grant RES-626-28-0001. The authors are grateful to seminar par-
ticipants at the Warwick Business School and Department of Economics, Warwick University,
for their helpful comments. The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
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dietary shift and increase intention to reduce meat content in individual diets have
been scattered and inconclusive. Harguess et al., 2020 offer a systematic review of
experimental studies aiming to reduce meat consumption. These studies largely
focus on providing information about the health effects of meat consumption
(Bertolotti et al., 2016; Fehrenbach, 2015) or the environmental impact of meat
production (Graham and Abrahamse, 2017) or both (Vainio et al., 2018; Verain
et al., 2017). A branch of literature has also used animal welfare arguments,
in order to invoke empathy, to persuade individuals to reduce their meat intake
(Kunst and Palacios Haugestad, 2018; Tian et al., 2016). However, what remains
absent in the literature is a comprehensive evaluation of different information
interventions aiming to reduce meat consumption.
In this paper we evaluate on a level playing-field a range of information interven-
tions in relation to individual differences among those receiving the interventions.
We outline these briefly below as well as discussing policy ramifications.
One simple barrier to the adoption of a plant-based diet is low public aware-
ness about the impact of dietary choices on climate change (Sanchez-Sabate and
Sabaté, 2019; de Boer et al., 2016; Macdiarmid et al., 2016; Vanhonacker et al.,
2013). The deficit model of science communication (Bauer et al., 2007), a widely
used framework, promotes the enhancement of public knowledge about complex
issues like climate change through scientific facts. With regards to meat con-
sumption, there is a dearth of knowledge regarding not only the environmental
impacts of meat but also the general health ramifications of a meat-rich diet
(Lacroix and Gifford, 2019). Emphasizing the personal health impact of eating
meat has an added benefit of making communication interventions more person-
ally relevant to those who may feel climate change is an otherwise distant threat
(Monroe et al., 2019; Ockwell et al., 2009). However, the benefits of the deficit
model can be moderated by barriers such as scepticism, perceived inefficacy and
social norms. Furthermore, acceptance of scientific facts about climate change
is dependent on perceived scientific (Lewandowsky, Gignac, et al., 2013) and
social consensus (Lewandowsky, Cook, et al., 2019). Additionally, it has been
observed that individuals have a tendency to reject scientific information about
climate change when it contradicts pre-existing beliefs (Druckman and McGrath,
2019; Hart and Nisbet, 2012). Such directional motivated reasoning (Kunda,
1990) or strategic ignorance (Carrillo and Mariotti, 2000) could further blunt the
effectiveness of the deficit model.
The extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) (Witte, 1992) posits that persua-
sive messages highlighting potential threats, such as from Climate Change, should
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also include efficacy information to promote attitude and behaviour change. Ef-
ficacy describes an individual’s perception that an issue is addressable and that
they are capable of taking necessary action to tackle the issue (Balch, 1974).
Efficacy includes both efficacy expectation and outcome expectancy. While effi-
cacy expectation (or self efficacy) is the belief that one is capable of performing
a certain behaviour, outcome expectancy (or response efficacy) is an individual’s
estimate that the behaviour will lead to specific outcomes (Bandura, 1977). Prior
literature has found that messages with high self efficacy (Xue et al., 2016) and
response efficacy (Hart and Feldman, 2016b) content can have a positive impact
on encouraging action to combat climate change. In this study, we focus on re-
sponse efficacy information. We combine response efficacy with (1) salience or
vividness (Chang and Lee, 2010; Gonzales et al., 1988) (what we call efficacy
salience) and (2) capacity for an individual to affect others (Wolske et al., 2020;
Weeks et al., 2015) (what we call social efficacy).
Many meat-eaters enjoy eating meat but dislike the notion that their diet involves
killing or harming of animals. This state of inconsistent beliefs is termed the
“meat paradox” (Loughnan et al., 2010). Meat-eaters can resolve this form of
cognitive dissonance, where beliefs and behaviour are inconsistent (Festinger,
1957), by not associating meat-eating with living and sentient animals or by
withdrawing moral status from animals (Loughnan et al., 2010). Inducing higher
cognitive dissonance through statements and images which connect meat with
living animals has been shown to have a positive impact in reducing willingness
to eat meat (Tian et al., 2016; Kunst and Hohle, 2016) and provides another
possible intervention. However, this may be reduced by hedonic motivations like
pleasure derived from meat consumption (Feinberg et al., 2019).
Doherty and Webler, 2016 posit that descriptive social norms (information about
others’ behaviour) are an important predictor of public engagement in climate
actions. In particular, eating meat is a well-reinforced norm as meat is often
served in social gatherings and restaurants (Sparkman and Walton, 2017). Infor-
mation about social norms have shown a positive effect on energy conservation
(Allcott, 2011; Hafner, Elmes, Read, and White, 2019), littering (Cialdini et al.,
1990), recycling (Schultz, 1999) and towel reuse in hotels (Goldstein et al., 2008).
Sparkman and Walton, 2017 found that dynamic descriptive social norms (which
involve considering how the behaviour of others is changing over time) are more
effective than static social norms (which considers the current behaviour of other
people) in encouraging lower levels of meat consumption.
The information interventions used in this paper address all these major barriers
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to reducing meat intake: the scientific knowledge gap, perceived inefficacy of
action, personal relevance, cognitive dissonance and social norms. A prominent
drawback of prior information interventions promoting reduced meat intake is
the frequent reliance on a ‘no information’ control group for estimating effect
sizes of the interventions (for instance, Graham and Abrahamse, 2017; Verain et
al., 2017), potentially leading to overestimation or bias since it is hard to know
participants’ prior knowledge. This study avoids this issue by using a control
group which was offered a baseline amount of scientific information about the
greenhouse gas emissions caused by farm animals. This control group is compared
with 6 treatment conditions each of which is provided an additional statement
pertaining to the barriers discussed, along with the control group information. A
list of the treatment conditions used in this study, along with their supporting
theories, is presented in table 2.1. Following our pre-registration, our principal
objective is not to compare treatments, but to evaluate among the possible set of
presently popular alternatives which might be likely to have at least a short term
effect and why. This falls down to the principle that if any of these approaches
are effective, they should have at least a short term impact, and therefore provide
a basis for more substantial change.





















eating less meat ex-
pressed in terms of
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The study was run as an online survey experiment. Subjects were initially asked
about actions they could take to mitigate climate change and then the number
of days they consumed meat in a week. Subjects then received the intervention
followed by a set of questions similar to those seen at the beginning. The paper
examines the influence of the interventions on the difference between post and
prior beliefs as well as the intended reduction in weekly meat consumption (re-
ferred to as ‘∆ Days’). Together, these provide insight into the instantaneous
impact of each intervention.
Prior research (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Bostrom et al., 2013) has highlighted the
need for targeting and tailoring information to specific subject groups to en-
courage public engagement in climate action. Accordingly, the paper collects
information regarding baseline beliefs and practices to help formulate strategies
for targeted messaging. As moral convictions related to meat intake have been
observed to impact behaviour (Feinberg et al., 2019), the study also measures
moral offence taken by subjects on being told the consequences of meat con-
sumption. More moral offense among those who eat more meat would indicate
that meat eating may be perceived as a sacred value (Hanselmann and Tanner,
2008), and therefore reduce the impact of information interventions.
Towards the end of the study, subjects are asked to report the evidence offered to
them during the survey as a measure of the recall value of the different treatments.
Finally, the paper adds a directly-incentivised element by allowing participants
to donate funds given to them in the experiment to a climate change charity, and
tests the impact of each treatment on decision to donate.
The results of the study show that compared to a control group, which was pro-
vided baseline scientific information about the environmental impact of meat, an
additional statement providing scientific information or a statement designed to
make individual efficacy salient led to the strongest impacts on planned meat
intake. For example, these led individuals to intend to reduce their dietary car-
bon dioxide (CO2) emissions by more than 30 kg/year. If we extrapolate the
results to a population the size of the U.S., the interventions would reduce the
production of CO2-equivalents by approximately 10 million tonnes per year. Note
that these estimates should be interpreted cautiously as they rely on large-scale
and persistent impact of the information interventions. Nonetheless they can be
useful for comparison with future studies. We also find results supporting the
use of targeted information, based on prior beliefs and individual characteristics.
Providing information on the health benefits of a plant-based diet was effective
in encouraging subjects with prior health concerns to opt for reduced meat con-
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sumption. Our results also indicate that more scientific information and messages
about social norms can encourage donation to a climate change charity among
those who report low baseline ecological concerns. Further, we measure the recall
value of the information interventions using text-based cosine similarity between
information provided during the study and information recalled by subjects at
the end. We found that although efficacy salience had the highest recall value,
the difference compared to the control group was insignificant.
In addition, the more meat a person consumed, the less they acknowledged the
relationship between climate and diet, the more resistant they were to new in-
formation, the lower their efficacy beliefs, and the more likely they were to take
moral offence at being told the consequences of their behaviour. This constella-
tion of results strongly indicates directional motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990)
or strategic ignorance (Carrillo and Mariotti, 2000), impairing the ability of meat
eaters to objectively consider scientific information about meat consumption.
This study contributes to ongoing research exploring effectiveness of interventions
in encouraging a reduced-meat diet (Bertolotti et al., 2016; Fehrenbach, 2015;
Graham and Abrahamse, 2017; Vainio et al., 2018; Verain et al., 2017), by con-
ducting a comparative evaluation of 6 interventions against a control. The study
also adds to research finding evidence of motivated reasoning among individuals
exposed to information related to climate change (Druckman and McGrath, 2019;
Hart and Nisbet, 2012). More broadly, the paper contributes to studies evalu-
ating interventions to ‘nudge’ sustainable behaviours (Allcott and Rogers, 2014;
Allcott, 2011; Cialdini et al., 1990; Hafner, Elmes, and Read, 2019), specifically
studies using information interventions (Goldstein et al., 2008; Hafner, Elmes,
Read, and White, 2019). Lastly, the paper complements research exploring nar-
rative approaches to presenting information (Shiller, 2017; Slater et al., 2003;
McQuiggan et al., 2008).
Overall, this study makes a novel attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of six
information interventions - framed using six different theoretical viewpoints -
against a control group. Our results offer guidance to future researchers and
policy-makers about information strategies for large-scale communication cam-
paigns that are likely to be most effective in reducing meat consumption and
producing corresponding reductions in emissions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 describes the experiment
design used for the study. Next, Section 2.3 presents the results of the study and





The study was conducted as an online survey-based experiment. The experiment
began with a series of questions designed to assess baseline ecological concerns.
For this the 7 item questionnaire proposed by Stedman, 2004 was used. This
questionnaire is based on the “New Environmental Paradigm” (NEP), developed
by Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978. Each item on the questionnaire could be an-
swered on a scale of 1 to 5, with ecological concern rising from 1 to 5. The average
of the answer to these 7 questions was calculated as a measure of prior ecological
concern for each subject. Related to this, subjects were also asked how concerned
were they about climate change and how concerned their friends thought they
were about climate change on a 5-point scale where 1 was not at all concerned
and 5 extremely concerned.2 This was followed by asking subjects what they be-
lieve are effective ways of combating climate change, for which they were allowed
to write any answers that came to mind. This provided us with a knowledge base
from which to compare the effectiveness of our various interventions.
Next, subjects were asked their baseline efficacy beliefs. Efficacy beliefs were cal-
culated by taking the average value of the answers to two questions. They were
asked the degree to which they agreed with the following statements on a scale
of 1 to 5 where 1 is Strongly Disagree and 5 is Strongly Agree: (1) Individuals
can influence climate change and (2) Collectively humans have little influence
on climate change (reverse coded). Subjects were then asked about the number
of days they consume meat in a week to measure baseline or pre-intervention
frequency of meat consumption. This was followed by asking participants the
degree to which they agree with the statement that “there is a relationship be-
tween climate change and people’s food choices” which provides a baseline level
of issue importance and follows Hart and Feldman, 2016a.
Participants were then randomly allocated into either the control group or one
of 6 treatment conditions. Depending on the condition they were assigned to,
they faced a different information intervention related to meat consumption and
climate change. The exact information provided to the subjects in the different
conditions is presented in Appendix 2.B. Following the intervention, subjects
2These two measures were elicited simply to confirm positive correlations with the baseline
or prior ecological concern measure. As expected, prior ecological concern was significantly pos-
itively correlated with answers to both questions, i.e., subject’s concern about climate change
(with Pearson correlation coefficient (r) = 0.6633 and p < 0.01) and how concerned their friends
think they are about climate change (r = 0.4670 and p < 0.01).
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were asked the degree to which they now agree with the statement that there is a
relationship between climate change and people’s food choices. When compared
to baseline issue importance, this provided a basic measure of the effectiveness of
each intervention in shifting perceptions about the importance of diet on climate
change.
Post intervention subjects were asked the same efficacy belief questions as they
were asked pre-intervention. We then asked participants the number of days in
a week they planned to consume meat. This was subtracted from the baseline
answer from before the intervention to produce a measure in days of the effect
of each intervention (referred to as “∆ Days” in the paper) and provides us
with the key dependent variable for the study. Participants were also again
asked what likely actions they could undertake to reduce climate change together
with the information that they could recall from the experiment, providing us
with measures of salience and also a set of text data for each participant. To
measure the degree of moral offence taken by subjects at being informed about
the consequences of meat intake, they were asked if it was morally wrong to show
people the consequences of their own behaviour. The subjects were further asked
certain socio-demographic questions like age, gender, educational qualification,
political beliefs and perceived social network (the number of people who might
notice if they changed their diet). Subjects were also asked if any close family
member had ever suffered from any heart disease, stroke, cancer, diabetes, high
blood pressure or high cholesterol. This question was asked to ascertain if the
subject had any genetic history of diseases.
The experiment concluded by asking participants if they would like to keep or
donate to a climate change related charity a bonus amount offered to them.
This provided us with an incentivised measure of the external validity of the
various information interventions. A detailed experimental script for the entire
experiment is provided in Appendix 2.C.
2.2.2 Logistics
The experiment was designed using oTree (Chen et al., 2016) and it was con-
ducted online on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The subject pool were
registered MTurk workers in the U.S. The study was preregistered with the AEA
RCT registry (Bose et al., 2019; Bose et al., 2020). Ethical approval for the study
was granted by University of Warwick Humanities & Social Sciences Research
Ethics Committee (HSSREC). The experiment took approximately 10 minutes.
There were 1458 observations collected in total, after removing those who had
technical issues owing to browser/device compatibility. In order to remove noise,
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originating from insincere responses, bots and autofill, the final dataset only in-
cluded those subjects that spent more than 10 seconds on the intervention page
and wrote more than 3 words when asked to recall the evidence presented during
the study.
The final dataset comprised of 1220 subjects: 177 in the Control condition, 175 in
Treatment 1 (More scientific information), 179 in Treatment 2 (Efficacy salience),
174 in Treatment 3 (Health information), 177 in Treatment 4 (Animal welfare),
164 in Treatment 5 (Social norms) and 174 in Treatment 6 (Social efficacy). Data
for the control and treatment groups 1, 3 and 6 were collected in December 2019
whereas data for treatment groups 2, 4 and 5 were collected in March 2020.
This raises a potential issue: what if the salience of COVID19 or any other
event which occurred between the two data-gathering exercises rendered our two
sets of data incomparable? In order to exclude this possibility we collected an
additional 88 control condition observations in March 2020 (and we used this
data only as part of the following comparability exercise since it was not part
of our pre-registered plan). We then compared the two sets of control group
observations from December and March, failing to reject the null of equal means
(using t-tests) and equal distributions (using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests) for ∆
Days, donation to charity, prior ecological concerns, efficacy beliefs (baseline and
post intervention), and baseline and post-intervention meat intake of the two sets
at the 5 and 10% significance levels. This suggests that there was no change in
behaviour related to our experiment between December 2019 and March 2020.
All subjects received a participation fee of $1.50 and a bonus of $0.50 (which
they could either keep for themselves or donate to a climate change charity in
the final part of the experiment). The average earnings from the experiment was
$1.85, with 372 out of the 1220 subjects choosing to donate their bonus earnings.
2.3 Results
The results sections is divided into 3 main parts: the impact on beliefs, the impact
on reduction in weekly meat consumption (∆ Days) and the impact on donations
to charity. In the final part of the results section we also provide a brief discussion
of the text used by participants when they are asked to recall the information
they were shown, and a discussion of moral convictions. The summary statistics
of the variables used in the paper are presented in the table 2.A.1 and the balance
tests for the intervention groups are provided in table 2.A.2.
83
2.3. RESULTS
2.3.1 Baseline beliefs and practices
Only 111 (around 9%) of 1220 participants mentioned a dietary change from
meat-based to plant-based foods when asked about personal actions they could
take to mitigate climate change before the interventions (figure 2.A.1). The num-
ber of subjects mentioning eating less meat as an effective personal action went up
to 633 (around 52%) post intervention. The interventions significantly increased
the proportion of people that mentioned diet-related solutions as actions effective
against climate change for the control and all 6 treatment groups. Paired t-tests
rejected the null of no difference in baseline and post-intervention proportions for
the control and all 6 treatment conditions (p < 0.01).
Figure 2.1: Difference between post-intervention and baseline values across the
different interventions. Figure (a) plots the average increase in the proportion
of people who mentioned dietary shift-related solutions as an action they can
personally take to combat climate change post-intervention, compared to base-
line. Figure (b) plots the average increase in perceived issue importance post-
intervention compared to baseline perceived importance. Figure (c) plots the
average difference between post-intervention and baseline weekly meat intake.
Figure (d) plots the average increase in efficacy beliefs post-intervention com-
pared to the baseline.
The difference between post-intervention and baseline beliefs and practices are
presented in figure 2.1. The interventions significantly enhanced beliefs about
issue importance (i.e. the degree to which subjects agree with the statement
“There is a relationship between climate change and people’s food choices”) for
the control and all 6 treatment conditions (results of a paired t-test for each
condition significant with p < 0.01). It should be noted that the increase in
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issue importance for the animal welfare group is significantly lower compared to
the control group (t-statistic 2.1730 and p < 0.05) as shown in Figure 2.1 (b),
which may be a result of individuals believing animal welfare is an unrelated
moral argument (Feinberg et al., 2019). Furthermore, all 6 treatment conditions
and the control led to reduced intended meat consumption post-intervention (p
< 0.01). Efficacy beliefs were also significantly higher for all treatments except
social norms and social efficacy (results of paired t-tests were significant for con-
trol, health information and efficacy salience groups with p < 0.05 and for more
scientific information and animal welfare groups with p < 0.10).
(a) Baseline (b) Post intervention
Figure 2.2: Relationship between baseline number of days of meat consumption
per week and the (a) pre-intervention and (b) post-intervention degree to which
subjects agree that there is a relationship between climate change and people’s
food choices.
We discuss meat consumption and beliefs in more detail below, but the base-
line frequency of meat consumption was negatively correlated with perceived
issue importance prior to the intervention (Pearson correlation coefficient (r) =
-0.2848 with p < 0.01) as shown in Figure 2.2. The relation between baseline
weekly meat consumption and post-intervention beliefs in the importance of diet
to climate change was also negative (r = -0.1846 with p < 0.01). In other words,
both before and after the intervention, more frequent meat-eaters found the issue
less important. Nonetheless, because frequent meat-eaters have more potential
range to change their views, frequency of meat consumption and the change in
issue importance between post and pre-intervention is positively correlated (r =
0.1544 with p < 0.01). We also observed a significant negative correlation of
baseline frequency of meat consumption with both baseline efficacy beliefs (r =
-0.1107 with p < 0.01) and post-intervention efficacy beliefs (r =-0.1140 with p <
0.01). Finally, there was also a significant negative correlation between baseline
frequency of meat intake and prior ecological concern (r = -0.2034 with p < 0.01).
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Thus, frequent meat-eaters reported being less concerned about the climate and
felt they had limited abilities to ameliorate climate outcomes.
2.3.2 Effect of the information interventions on ∆ Days
Table 2.2 reports the results from an OLS regression with the dependent variable
being the intended change in number of days of weekly meat consumption (∆
Days). All regressions in the paper were run with standardised explanatory
variables and the tables report robust standard errors. Column 1 examines the
impact of being a member of one of the different treatment (intervention) groups
on ∆ Days, relative to the control group. Columns 2 and 3 show that the results
of column 1 are robust to the inclusion of control variables such as prior ecological
concern, pre-intervention weekly meat consumption, baseline efficacy beliefs and
the socio-demographic variables, age, female, democrat and education (a dummy
which equals 1 if the subject reported that the highest degree obtained by them
is greater than a school degree and 0 otherwise). Column 3 shows that the more
scientific information and the efficacy salience interventions significantly reduce
planned meat consumption per week by 0.22 days (p < 0.05) and 0.21 days (p <
0.05) more, respectively, compared to the control group.
To get a better grasp of the effect size of the treatments we convert the estimates
to CO2 emissions. In terms of CO2 emissions, by shifting away from meat 1
day per week, an individual can reduce their CO2 emissions by around 161.11 kg
CO2 per year (calculation based on estimates provided by Weber and Matthews,
2008; see Appendix 2.D). Thus, exposure to more scientific information and ef-
ficacy salience conditions can reduce CO2 emissions by 35.4 kg/year and 33.8
kg/year more compared to the control group, respectively. The effect sizes of the
treatments are presented in figure 2.3 (a).
The higher the prior ecological concerns and baseline efficacy beliefs of the partic-
ipant, the greater the intended change in diet. A 1 standard deviation increase in
prior ecological concern and baseline efficacy beliefs reduces planned weekly meat
intake by 0.10 and 0.15 days (both with p < 0.01), respectively. Also, there is a
significant (p < 0.01) positive impact of pre-intervention diet on the dependant
variable. Among the demographic variables, being female has a positive signifi-
cant (p < 0.05) effect on intention to reduce meat consumption. Indeed, females
in our study consumed less meat than males prior to the study (4.04 days/week
versus 4.36 days/week, difference significant with p < 0.01 and t-statistic 2.7207).
The change in meat consumption is consistent with two separate empirical obser-
vations in the literature. Firstly, females have been observed to display greater
concern and knowledge about climate change than males (McCright, 2010). Sec-
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Table 2.2: Impact of information interventions on planned reduction in number
of days of meat consumption per week
Dependent Variable: ∆ Days
(1) (2) (3)
More scientific information 0.2177∗∗ 0.2339∗∗ 0.2176∗∗
(0.1060) (0.1039) (0.1041)
Efficacy salience 0.2006∗ 0.2118∗∗ 0.2095∗∗
(0.1040) (0.1027) (0.1028)
Health information 0.0727 0.0828 0.0803
(0.1127) (0.1113) (0.1106)
Animal welfare -0.0226 0.0295 0.0293
(0.1020) (0.1013) (0.1015)
Social norms -0.0480 0.0130 0.0093
(0.0984) (0.0979) (0.0975)
Social efficacy -0.0883 -0.0963 -0.1124
(0.0973) (0.0983) (0.0992)
Prior Ecological Concern 0.1007∗∗∗ 0.0975∗∗∗
(0.0298) (0.0304)
Pre-intervention Diet 0.2115∗∗∗ 0.2193∗∗∗
(0.0286) (0.0287)










N 1220 1220 1220
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
ondly, males tend to more strongly associate meat with healthiness than females
(Love and Sulikowski, 2018) and hence might be less inclined to reduce their
weekly meat intake. Table 2.2 is replicated with the dependent variable as pro-
portional planned reduction in weekly meat intake i.e ∆Days
Pre−intervention Diet and the
results are presented in table 2.A.3. Exposure to the efficacy salience treatment
has the biggest effect in terms of proportionate reduction in weekly meat con-
sumption, compared to the control group, and the effect remains significant after
controlling for baseline characteristics and socio-demographic variables.
To investigate the effects of targeted messages, we examine if the information
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(a) All subjects (b) Subjects with health concerns
(c) Subjects with high baseline efficacy beliefs (d) Frequent meat eaters
Figure 2.3: Regression coefficients showing the effect size of the information
interventions on intended reduction in number of days of meat consumption per
week across different targeted groups. The right hand axis plots the equivalent of
reduced meat consumption (days per week) in terms of reduced CO2 emissions
per year. The regression coefficients plotted show the effect size after controlling
for baseline beliefs and practices, and socio-demographic characteristics.
interventions had a differential impact on participants depending upon their prior
health concerns, baseline efficacy beliefs, and baseline weekly frequency of meat
consumption.
We first look at the effect of any prior family history of diseases on intended
reduction in meat intake. Table 2.3 reports the results. The positive and sig-
nificant (p < 0.01) interaction term between health information and history of
diseases indicates that the health information condition has a significantly bigger
effect on ∆ Days if the subject has a family history of diseases, compared to
when they do not (figure 2.A.4). When the subject has prior health concerns
the health information condition is significantly more effective than the control
group, where as when the subject has no prior health concerns the control group
information is more effective as shown in table 2.A.4. Figure 2.3 (b) and table
2.A.4 show that when the subject has a history of family diseases, along with
more scientific information and efficacy salience, the health information condi-
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tion also has a significantly larger effect on ∆ Days, relative to the control group.
Health information increases ∆ Days by 0.34 days/week more than the control
(p < 0.05) i.e. a reduction in CO2 emissions by 54.78 kg/year per person.
Table 2.3: Impact of health information intervention on planned re-
duction in number of days of meat consumption per week depending
on history of diseases in the family
Dependent Variable: ∆ Days
(1) (2) (3)
Health information × Disease 0.6685∗∗∗ 0.6786∗∗∗ 0.6913∗∗∗
(0.2387) (0.2356) (0.2359)
Health information -0.3511∗ -0.3522∗ -0.3622∗
(0.1958) (0.1931) (0.1923)
Disease -0.3144∗∗ -0.3371∗∗ -0.3510∗∗
(0.1457) (0.1458) (0.1486)
Prior Ecological Concern 0.0842 0.0617
(0.0575) (0.0599)
Pre-intervention Diet 0.1510∗∗∗ 0.1571∗∗∗
(0.0560) (0.0564)










N 351 351 351
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Disease is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the subject indicated that they
had a history of diseases in the immediate family and 0 otherwise.
We also look at the differential effect of the interventions on subjects with varied
baseline efficacy beliefs and pre-intervention diet. In table 2.A.5, the interaction
terms of the dummy variable ‘High Efficacy Beliefs’ (= 1 if subject reported ≥
median baseline efficacy beliefs and 0 otherwise) with more scientific information,
efficacy salience, animal welfare and social norms conditions are significant and
positive. This implies that, the impact of these interventions on ∆ Days is
significantly greater for subjects with high baseline efficacy beliefs than those
with low efficacy beliefs (depicted in figure 2.A.5). Figure 2.3 (c) and table 2.A.6
show that when the subject has high baseline efficacy beliefs, along with more
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scientific information and efficacy salience, social norms has a significantly (p
< 0.10) larger effect on ∆ Days, relative to the control group. Figure 2.3 (d)
and table 2.A.8 show that for frequent meat eaters (pre-intervention meat intake
≥ the median value i.e. 4 days/week), more scientific information and efficacy
salience are the only treatment conditions which have a significantly larger effect
on ∆ Days, relative to the control group.
2.3.3 Donation behaviour, evidence recall and moral of-
fence
After the intervention, all subjects were offered the opportunity to either donate
a bonus sum of $ 0.50 to a climate change charity or to keep it for themselves.
A probit model evaluating the effect of the interventions on donation (table 2.4),
revealed that after the inclusion of sensible control variables, no treatment had a
significant effect on donation behaviour. Prior ecological concern is a strong pos-
itive determinant of donation behaviour. An increase in prior ecological concern
by 1 standard deviation increases the probability of donation by 12 percentage
points. Column 3 shows that, for those with low prior ecological concern (below
median), more scientific information and social norms conditions increased the
probability of donation by 14.1 (p<0.05) and 14.9 (p<0.05) percentage points
more than control, respectively. Social efficacy also had a small significant (p
<0.10) impact on donation behaviour for those with low prior concern. The
average donation levels across the 7 groups are depicted in figure 2.A.7.3
The paper also evaluates the text reported by the subjects when they were asked
to recall the evidence presented to them during the course of the study. For
each participant we calculated a cosine similarity score between the words they
reported and the evidence they were shown which varied by treatment. Cosine
similarity was calculated by converting the reported evidence (R) and actual
evidence (A) to vector representations (after removing punctuation and stop-
words from both) and then by measuring the cosine of the angle between these
two vectors. A cosine similarity of 1 would mean that the reported and actual
evidence are perfectly similar.




3The significant negative effect of baseline efficacy beliefs on donation behaviour is poten-
tially because subjects with high perceived efficacy believe in the power of human actions taken
at a personal level in combating climate change. This perhaps makes them less inclined to con-
tribute a portion of their earnings to a climate change organisation. Although, any conclusive
inference is beyond the scope of the present study.
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Table 2.4: Impact of information interventions on decision to donate bonus earn-
ings
Dependent Variable: Prob(donate=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Low Priors High Priors
More scientific information 0.0600 0.0335 0.1415∗∗ -0.0471
(0.0480) (0.0455) (0.0594) (0.0652)
Efficacy salience 0.0586 0.0221 0.0727 -0.0227
(0.0477) (0.0446) (0.0553) (0.0643)
Health information 0.0044 -0.0149 0.0313 -0.0360
(0.0466) (0.0438) (0.0548) (0.0637)
Animal welfare 0.0621 0.0203 0.0456 0.0190
(0.0479) (0.0444) (0.0562) (0.0659)
Social norms 0.1116∗∗ 0.0708 0.1489∗∗ 0.0179
(0.0499) (0.0467) (0.0632) (0.0655)
Social efficacy 0.0619 0.0589 0.1101∗ 0.0362
(0.0481) (0.0466) (0.0626) (0.0648)
Prior Ecological Concern 0.1166∗∗∗ 0.1363∗∗∗ -0.0338
(0.0142) (0.0276) (0.0482)
Pre-intervention Diet -0.0809∗∗∗ -0.0857∗∗∗ -0.0651∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0164) (0.0170)
∆ Days 0.0250∗ 0.0216 0.0225
(0.0129) (0.0178) (0.0173)
Baseline Efficacy Beliefs -0.1078∗∗∗ -0.0541∗∗∗ -0.1433∗∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0178) (0.0183)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
N 1220 1220 545 675
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The dependant variable is the binary variable donate, which equals 1 if the subject donated
their bonus earnings to the climate change charity and 0 otherwise. The table reports the
average marginal effects from Probit regressions. Columns 3 and 4 show the impact of the
interventions on subjects with low and high prior ecological concern, respectively. The control
variables are the subject’s age and dummy variables for being female, democrat and having
an educational qualification greater than a school degree. Coefficients for the control variables
(omitted here for parsimony) are presented in the Appendix in table 2.A.9.
The group which received efficacy salience information had the highest mean
cosine similarity score of 0.36. However, the difference compared to the control
group score (0.33) was not significant (figure 2.A.9).
After the intervention, we included the question “Is it morally wrong to show
people the consequences of their own behaviour?” which was answered on a scale
of 1 to 5 where 1 is very morally wrong and 5 is very morally right. We found a
significant positive correlation between the answer to the morality question and
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∆ Days, with Pearson’s correlation coefficient .0998 and p < 0.01 (figure 2.A.10).
This implies that subjects who have committed to a greater behavioural change
are less inclined to take any moral offence from being shown the consequences
of own behaviour. However, people who had a higher baseline meat intake were
more inclined to report moral offence at being shown the consequences of their
own behaviour (Pearson correlation coefficient -0.0655 and p < 0.05).
2.4 Discussion
There is shockingly low awareness among individuals about the impact of meat
consumption on climate change, despite the United Nation’s Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change releasing new evidence to this effect in 2019 (Schier-
meier, 2019). In the present study, only 9% of the subjects at baseline listed diet
change as effective in combating climate change. This study is a comparative
evaluation of six different information interventions to increase this awareness
and encourage a dietary shift away from meat-based foods.
Our work highlights two interventions that may have the most impact on planned
behaviour. Compared to a control group with baseline scientific information, the
largest influence was seen with an additional statement providing more scientific
facts or a statement highlighting response efficacy (efficacy salience). If such
interventions were effective at scale and maintained over time, then extrapolating
our results to a population the size of the U.S., these interventions would reduce
the production of CO2-equivalents by approximately 10 million tonnes per year,
which is useful for comparison with other studies in the future.
While the more scientific information intervention supports the deficit model of
science communication, the efficacy salience intervention validates the impor-
tance of salient and vivid (Chang and Lee, 2010) response efficacy information.
The success of the deficit model highlights a pre-existing knowledge gap about
the relationship between climate change and diet which can be addressed with
more scientific information (Bauer et al., 2007). Also, consistent with Bandura,
1977), we see that it is not enough that individuals know that they can engage in
a behaviour (i.e. consume less meat). In fact, it is also necessary that the indi-
viduals are aware that consuming less meat will have the desired environmental
impact, i.e. their own actions can make a difference, and by how much presented
in a currency they can understand.
Our results also suggest that a targeted messaging approach, dependent upon
prior beliefs and individual characteristics, can have a significant impact. For
subjects with pre-existing health concerns, providing information on the health
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benefits of a plant-based diet was effective in encouraging reduced intended meat
intake. This is consistent with the notion that health information serves as a
form of intrinsic motivation and is therefore more likely to be effective when
the subject already has prior health concerns. This may also be consistent with
motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) since behavioural change in this instance may
well be in a participant’s own best interest if prior health concerns are a valid
predictor of future poor health. A summary of our key results and how they work
for different population groups is provided in table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Targetted messaging approach to encourage reduced meat consump-
tion. The effectiveness of different information interventions for different subject





























Even more dramatically, subjects who ate meat more are less inclined to ac-
knowledge the relationship between climate change and diet at baseline and are
less inclined to accept new evidence indicating the same. This is consistent with
(Tobler et al., 2011) who find that frequent meat eaters perceive the environ-
mental benefits of reducing meat intake as small. This is also consistent with
the idea of directional motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) or strategic ignorance
(Carrillo and Mariotti, 2000) where people are willing to modify their own beliefs
to the extent allowed by self-justification. Frequent meat eaters were more likely
to ignore the relationship between climate change and food choices, a form of
“science denial” (Washburn and Skitka, 2018) that may not be obvious to those
who frequently eat meat.
We also elicited the moral offence taken by subjects on being told the conse-
quences of meat consumption to investigate whether or not meat might be seen
as a sacred value, one that is morally licensed irrespective of its cost. This would
make moral value of meat consumption resistant to trade-offs with climate or
animal suffering (Hanselmann and Tanner, 2008). We observe that people who
had a higher baseline meat intake were more inclined to report moral offence at
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being shown the consequences of their own behaviour. These results are consis-
tent with holding meat as a sacred value and might also explain the reluctance
of those who consume particularly high amounts of meat to recognise the link
between diet and climate change.
The paper provides further insight into the effectiveness of the information in-
terventions by evaluating the effect of the treatments on decision to donate to
a climate change charity and by measuring the recall value of the information
provided. It is observed that using messages with more scientific information
or social norm frames can encourage donation to climate change charities among
those who report low baseline ecological concerns, compared to the control group.
On recall, although efficacy salience was observed to have the highest recall value
among the treatment groups, the difference compared to the control group was
insignificant which leads us to believe that our results cannot be explained with
reference to the relative memorability of the treatments.
Overall, in the absence of a comprehensive and comparative evaluation of differ-
ent communication campaigns to encourage a shift towards plant-based foods,
our study for the first time compares the effectiveness of six different information
interventions to reduce meat intake to a control group with baseline scientific
information. The study recommends the use of clear scientific information and
information highlighting that individual actions can make a difference in the path
to mitigating climate change. The study also endorses the need for targeted in-
formation interventions for specific subgroups and stresses the crucial role played
by frequent meat-eaters who are resistant to new information. The results of
the study can inform policy related to climate change communication, ultimately
resulting in significant environmental benefits.
2.5 Conclusion
There is a broad scientific consensus that reduced meat consumption can have
significant positive effects upon the current climate change crisis. Despite this,
there is a lack of awareness of the link between diet and climate change among the
general population. This creates an opening for information provision to provide
positive benefits. However, there are many alternative approaches to providing
additional information and there is no existing consensus on the best approach.
We provide a first attempt to compare and contrast the leading approaches with
a control group which received baseline scientific information.
Our results show that compared to a control group, which was provided baseline
scientific information about the environmental impact of meat intake, an addi-
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tional statement about more similar scientific facts or a statement highlighting
response efficacy of action can reduce an individual’s CO2 emissions by more than
30 kg/year. Extrapolating our results to a population the size of the U.S., our
interventions could reduce the production of CO2-equivalents by approximately
10 million tonnes per year. Our results also support a targeted messaging ap-
proach, dependent upon prior beliefs and individual characteristics, to promote
behaviour change. For instance, for subjects with pre-existing health concerns,
providing information on the health benefits of a plant-based diet was effective
in encouraging reduced intended meat intake.
Additionally, the paper finds that using messages with more scientific informa-
tion or social norms frames can encourage donation to climate change charities
among those who display low baseline ecological concern. Furthermore, our re-
sults indicate that the more meat a person consumed, the less they acknowledged
the relationship between climate and diet, the more resistant they were to new
information, and the more likely they were to take moral offence at being told
the consequences of their behaviour. This indicates the presence of motivated
reasoning around meat consumption among frequent meat eaters.
Overall, our findings provide a general taxonomy that should guide future re-
searchers and policy-makers about the most effective communication strategies
to promote a meat-free or low-meat diet. Effectively, this could reduce an individ-
ual’s carbon footprint, ultimately leading to substantial environmental benefits.
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Bostrom, A., Böhm, G., & O’Connor, R. E. (2013). Targeting and tailoring cli-
mate change communications. WIREs Climate Change, 4 (5), 447–455.
https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.234
Carrillo, J. D., & Mariotti, T. (2000). Strategic ignorance as a self-disciplining




Chang, C.-T., & Lee, Y.-K. (2010). Effects of message framing, vividness congru-
ency and statistical framing on responses to charity advertising. Interna-
tional Journal of Advertising, 29 (2), 195–220. https://doi.org/10.2501/
S0265048710201129
Chen, D. L., Schonger, M., & Wickens, C. (2016). Otree—an open-source platform
for laboratory, online, and field experiments. Journal of Behavioral and
Experimental Finance, 9, 88–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef .2015.12.
001
Cialdini, R., Reno, R., & Kallgren, C. (1990). A Focus Theory of Normative
Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public
Places. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 1015–1026. htt
ps://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.58.6.1015
de Boer, J., de Witt, A., & Aiking, H. (2016). Help the climate, change your diet:
A cross-sectional study on how to involve consumers in a transition to a
low-carbon society. Appetite, 98, 19–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.
2015.12.001
Doherty, K. L., & Webler, T. N. (2016). Social norms and efficacy beliefs drive the
Alarmed segment’s public-sphere climate actions. Nature Climate Change,
6 (9), 879–884. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3025
Druckman, J. N., & McGrath, M. C. (2019). The evidence for motivated reasoning
in climate change preference formation. Nature Climate Change, 9 (2),
111–119. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0360-1
Dunlap, R. E., & Van Liere, K. D. (1978). The new environmental paradigm: A
proposed measuring instrument and preliminary results. Journal of Envi-
ronmental Education, 9, 10–19.
FAO. (2006). Livestock a major threat to environment [Accessed May 6, 2021].
http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2006/1000448/index.html
Fehrenbach, K. S. (2015). Designing messages to reduce meat consumption: A test
of the extended parallel process model (PhD dissertation) [Arizona State
University].
Feinberg, M., Kovacheff, C., Teper, R., & Inbar, Y. (2019). Understanding the
process of moralization: How eating meat becomes a moral issue. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 117 (1), 50–72. https://doi.org/10.
1037/pspa0000149
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press.
Goldstein, N., Cialdini, R., & Griskevicius, V. (2008). A room with a viewpoint:
Using social norms to motivate environmental conservation in hotels. Jour-




Gonzales, M. H., Aronson, E., & Costanzo, M. A. (1988). Using social cognition
and persuasion to promote energy conservation: A quasi-experiment 1.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 18 (12), 1049–1066.
Graham, T., & Abrahamse, W. (2017). Communicating the climate impacts of
meat consumption: The effect of values and message framing. Global En-
vironmental Change, 44, 98–108. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.
2017.03.004
Hafner, R., Elmes, D., Read, D., & White, M. P. (2019). Exploring the role of
normative, financial and environmental information in promoting uptake
of energy efficient technologies. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 63,
26–35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2019.03.004
Hafner, R. J., Elmes, D., & Read, D. (2019). Promoting behavioural change to
reduce thermal energy demand in households: A review. Renewable and
Sustainable Energy Reviews, 102, 205–214. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
rser.2018.12.004
Hanselmann, M., & Tanner, C. (2008). Taboos and conflicts in decision making:
Sacred values, decision difficulty, and emotions. Judgment and Decision
Making, 3 (1), 51–63. https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-5948
Harguess, J. M., Crespo, N. C., & Hong, M. Y. (2020). Strategies to reduce
meat consumption: A systematic literature review of experimental studies.
Appetite, 144, 104478. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2019.104478
Hart, P. S., & Feldman, L. (2016a). The Impact of Climate Change–Related Im-
agery and Text on Public Opinion and Behavior Change. Science Com-
munication, 38 (4), 415–441. https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547016655357
Hart, P. S., & Feldman, L. (2016b). The influence of climate change efficacy
messages and efficacy beliefs on intended political participation. PLoS
ONE. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0157658
Hart, P. S., & Nisbet, E. C. (2012). Boomerang effects in science communication:
How motivated reasoning and identity cues amplify opinion polarization
about climate mitigation policies. Communication Research, 39 (6), 701–
723. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650211416646
Higgs, S., & Thomas, J. (2016). Social influences on eating. Current Opinion in
Behavioral Sciences, 9, 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.10.005
Huang, T., Yang, B., Zheng, J., Li, G., Wahlqvist, M. L., & Li, D. (2012). Car-
diovascular disease mortality and cancer incidence in vegetarians: a meta-
analysis and systematic review. Annals of nutrition & metabolism, 60 (4),
233–240. https://doi.org/10.1159/000337301




Kunst, J. R., & Hohle, S. M. (2016). Meat eaters by dissociation: How we present,
prepare and talk about meat increases willingness to eat meat by reducing
empathy and disgust. Appetite, 105, 758–774. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
appet.2016.07.009
Kunst, J. R., & Palacios Haugestad, C. A. (2018). The effects of dissociation on
willingness to eat meat are moderated by exposure to unprocessed meat:
A cross-cultural demonstration. Appetite, 120, 356–366. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.appet.2017.09.016
Lacroix, K., & Gifford, R. (2019). Reducing meat consumption: Identifying group-
specific inhibitors using latent profile analysis. Appetite, 138, 233–241.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2019.04.002
Lewandowsky, S., Cook, J., Fay, N., & Gignac, G. E. (2019). Science by social
media: Attitudes towards climate change are mediated by perceived social
consensus. Memory & Cognition, 47 (8), 1445–1456. https://doi.org/10.
3758/s13421-019-00948-y
Lewandowsky, S., Gignac, G. E., & Vaughan, S. (2013). The pivotal role of
perceived scientific consensus in acceptance of science. Nature Climate
Change, 3 (4), 399–404. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1720
Lorenzoni, I., Nicholson-Cole, S., & Whitmarsh, L. (2007). Barriers perceived
to engaging with climate change among the uk public and their policy
implications. Global Environmental Change, 17 (3), 445–459. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2007.01.004
Loughnan, S., Haslam, N., & Bastian, B. (2010). The role of meat consumption
in the denial of moral status and mind to meat animals. Appetite, 55 (1),
156–159. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2010.05.043
Love, H. J., & Sulikowski, D. (2018). Of Meat and Men: Sex Differences in Implicit
and Explicit Attitudes Toward Meat. Frontiers in psychology, 9, 559. htt
ps://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00559
Macdiarmid, J. I., Douglas, F., & Campbell, J. (2016). Eating like there’s no
tomorrow: Public awareness of the environmental impact of food and re-
luctance to eat less meat as part of a sustainable diet. Appetite, 96, 487–
493. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2015.10.011
McCright, A. M. (2010). The effects of gender on climate change knowledge and
concern in the American public. Population and Environment, 32 (1), 66–
87. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-010-0113-1
McQuiggan, S. W., Rowe, J. P., Lee, S., & Lester, J. C. (2008). Story-based
learning: The impact of narrative on learning experiences and outcomes.
In B. P. Woolf, E. Aı̈meur, R. Nkambou, & S. Lajoie (Eds.), Intelligent
tutoring systems (pp. 530–539). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
99
REFERENCES
Monroe, M. C., Plate, R. R., Oxarart, A., Bowers, A., & Chaves, W. A. (2019).
Identifying effective climate change education strategies: A systematic re-
view of the research. Environmental Education Research, 25 (6), 791–812.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13504622.2017.1360842
NASA. (2020). The causes of climate change [Accessed May 6, 2021]. https :
//climate.nasa.gov/causes/
Ockwell, D., Whitmarsh, L., & O’Neill, S. (2009). Reorienting Climate Change
Communication for Effective Mitigation: Forcing People to be Green or
Fostering Grass-Roots Engagement? Science Communication, 30 (3), 305–
327. https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547008328969
PETA. (2013). How many animals have you saved? find out! [Accessed May 6,
2021]. https://www.peta.org/blog/many-animals-saved/
Salomon, E., Preston, J. L., & Tannenbaum, M. B. (2017). Climate change help-
lessness and the (de)moralization of individual energy behavior. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 23, 15–28. https://doi.org/10.1037/
xap0000105
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2.A Additional Tables and Figures
Table 2.A.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Change in meat intake (days/week) 0.597 1.052 -5 7 1220
Donation to charity 0.305 0.461 0 1 1220
Prior Ecological Concern 4.025 0.734 1 5 1220
Pre-intervention diet 4.239 2.05 0 7 1220
Post-intervention diet 3.642 2.147 0 7 1220
Baseline Efficacy Beliefs 3.688 1.024 1 5 1220
Post-intervention Efficacy Beliefs 3.788 1.033 1 5 1220
Disease (history of family diseases) 0.594 0.491 0 1 1220
Age 36.329 10.394 19 78 1220
Female 0.388 0.487 0 1 1220
Democrat 0.555 0.497 0 1 1220
Education 0.774 0.419 0 1 1220
Moral offence taken 3.975 0.84 1 5 1220
The dummy variable ‘female’ included in the analysis in the paper takes value 1 if the subject listed
their gender as female, and 0 otherwise. The 747 subjects for whom the female dummy variable
takes value 0 includes 743 males, 3 subjects who chose ‘Other’ as their gender and 1 subject who
chose ‘Prefer not to say’ when asked about their gender. Similarly, the dummy variable ‘democrat’
takes value 1 if the subject answered ‘Democrat’ when asked ‘Which party would you prefer to win
the next election?’, and 0 otherwise. The 543 for whom the democrat dummy variable takes value
0 includes 374 subjects who answered ‘Republican’ when asked the same question, 104 subjects
who chose ‘Other’ and 65 subjects who answered ‘Prefer not to say’.














Prior Ecological Concern 3.9693 4.0449 4.0607 4.0353 3.9960 3.9843 4.0854 0.59 0.7366
(0.7508) (0.7588) (0.6985) (0.6904) (0.7736) (0.7837) (0.6824)
Pre-intervention Diet 4.4972 4.0800 4.2458 4.3448 4.0565 4.0793 4.3563 1.22 0.2948
(1.9832) (2.0579) (2.0679) (1.9845) (2.2098) (2.0544) (1.9737)
Baseline Efficacy 3.6949 3.8029 3.7095 3.6724 3.6271 3.5640 3.7385 0.96 0.4489
(1.0793) (0.9926) (1.0039) (0.9687) (0.9516) (1.1298) (1.0393)
Age 35.4859 37.4114 36.4525 34.6379 36.3220 37.2073 36.8391 1.55 0.1580
(8.9450) (11.0984) (10.1761) (10.0462) (10.4399) (10.7626) (11.0740)
Female 0.3503 0.4400 0.3352 0.3736 0.3672 0.3720 0.4770 1.94 0.0709*
(0.4784) (0.4978) (0.4734) (0.4851) (0.4834) (0.4848) (0.5009)
Democrat 0.6045 0.5714 0.5475 0.5920 0.5085 0.4695 0.5862 1.68 0.1229
(0.4903) (0.4963) (0.4991) (0.4929) (0.5013) (0.5006) (0.4939)
Education 0.7345 0.8229 0.8212 0.7414 0.7571 0.7988 0.7414 1.54 0.1613
(0.4429) (0.3829) (0.3842) (0.4391) (0.4301) (0.4021) (0.4391)
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.A.3: Impact of information interventions on proportionate planned re-




More scientific information 0.0544∗ 0.0460 0.0411
(0.0283) (0.0281) (0.0283)
Efficacy salience 0.0655∗∗ 0.0612∗∗ 0.0587∗∗
(0.0282) (0.0274) (0.0274)
Health information 0.0044 0.0028 0.0021
(0.0295) (0.0291) (0.0289)
Animal welfare -0.0169 -0.0173 -0.0177
(0.0306) (0.0300) (0.0302)
Social norms -0.0073 -0.0048 -0.0067
(0.0282) (0.0276) (0.0276)
Social efficacy -0.0365 -0.0419 -0.0446
(0.0279) (0.0280) (0.0286)
Prior Ecological Concern 0.0187∗∗ 0.0177∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0078)
Pre-intervention Diet -0.0111 -0.0088
(0.0093) (0.0092)










N 1220 1220 1220
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.A.4: Impact of information interventions on planned reduction in number
of days of meat consumption per week for those with and without prior history
of diseases in the family
Dependent Variable: ∆ Days
Prior history No history
More scientific information 0.3061∗∗ 0.3498∗∗∗ 0.0529 -0.0048
(0.1195) (0.1170) (0.2079) (0.2020)
Efficacy salience 0.2446∗ 0.2639∗∗ 0.0673 0.0382
(0.1300) (0.1275) (0.1781) (0.1724)
Health information 0.3174∗∗ 0.3423∗∗ -0.3511∗ -0.3666∗
(0.1365) (0.1337) (0.1960) (0.1938)
Animal welfare 0.0653 0.1242 -0.2015 -0.1793
(0.1255) (0.1240) (0.1778) (0.1741)
Social norms -0.0093 0.0865 -0.1894 -0.1889
(0.1306) (0.1330) (0.1642) (0.1576)
Social efficacy 0.1108 0.0925 -0.4464∗∗ -0.4825∗∗
(0.1061) (0.1109) (0.1907) (0.1907)
Prior Ecological Concern 0.0613 0.1294∗∗∗
(0.0384) (0.0486)
Pre-intervention Diet 0.2362∗∗∗ 0.1944∗∗∗
(0.0349) (0.0489)










N 725 725 495 495
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.A.5: Impact of information interventions on planned reduction in number
of days of meat consumption per week depending on baseline efficacy beliefs
Dependent Variable: ∆ Days
(1) (2) (3)
More scientific information × High efficacy beliefs 0.4410∗∗ 0.3883∗ 0.3936∗
(0.2122) (0.2084) (0.2089)
Efficacy salience × High efficacy beliefs 0.6858∗∗∗ 0.6268∗∗∗ 0.6309∗∗∗
(0.2036) (0.2027) (0.2031)
Health information × High efficacy beliefs 0.3549 0.2841 0.2821
(0.2263) (0.2236) (0.2240)
Animal welfare × High efficacy beliefs 0.3920∗ 0.3559∗ 0.3475∗
(0.2041) (0.2024) (0.2027)
Social norms × High efficacy beliefs 0.4500∗∗ 0.4148∗∗ 0.3959∗∗
(0.1956) (0.1934) (0.1936)
Social efficacy × High efficacy beliefs 0.1265 0.0359 0.0381
(0.2005) (0.1999) (0.2004)
More scientific information -0.0329 0.0238 0.0035
(0.1626) (0.1611) (0.1626)
Efficacy salience -0.1525 -0.1149 -0.1204
(0.1458) (0.1467) (0.1473)
Health information -0.1150 -0.0691 -0.0702
(0.1703) (0.1697) (0.1711)
Animal welfare -0.2146 -0.1568 -0.1537
(0.1557) (0.1540) (0.1534)
Social norms -0.2639∗ -0.2017 -0.1974
(0.1517) (0.1516) (0.1520)
Social efficacy -0.1584 -0.1083 -0.1256
(0.1634) (0.1633) (0.1646)
High Efficacy Beliefs -0.0344 -0.2456 -0.2535
(0.1299) (0.1680) (0.1684)
Prior Ecological Concern 0.1042∗∗∗ 0.1010∗∗∗
(0.0304) (0.0309)
Pre-intervention Diet 0.2091∗∗∗ 0.2170∗∗∗
(0.0285) (0.0287)










N 1220 1220 1220
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
High efficacy beliefs is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the subject’s baseline efficacy beliefs
is greater than or equal to the median value and 0 otherwise.
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Table 2.A.6: Impact of information interventions on planned reduction in number
of days of meat consumption per week for those with high and low baseline efficacy
beliefs
Dependent Variable: ∆ Days
High efficacy Low efficacy
More scientific information 0.4081∗∗∗ 0.4039∗∗∗ -0.0329 -0.0117
(0.1362) (0.1334) (0.1627) (0.1663)
Efficacy salience 0.5333∗∗∗ 0.5128∗∗∗ -0.1525 -0.1401
(0.1421) (0.1419) (0.1458) (0.1484)
Health information 0.2398 0.2123 -0.1150 -0.0850
(0.1489) (0.1435) (0.1704) (0.1738)
Animal welfare 0.1774 0.1981 -0.2146 -0.1764
(0.1318) (0.1354) (0.1558) (0.1552)
Social norms 0.1860 0.2048∗ -0.2639∗ -0.2200
(0.1235) (0.1223) (0.1517) (0.1531)
Social efficacy -0.0319 -0.0898 -0.1584 -0.1381
(0.1162) (0.1182) (0.1634) (0.1669)
Prior Ecological Concern 0.0765 0.1099∗∗∗
(0.0491) (0.0401)
Pre-intervention Diet 0.2532∗∗∗ 0.1695∗∗∗
(0.0367) (0.0467)










N 640 640 580 580
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.A.7: Impact of information interventions on planned reduction in number
of days of meat consumption per week depending on baseline frequency of meat
consumption
Dependent Variable: ∆ Days
(1) (2) (3)
More scientific information × Frequent meat eater 0.3458∗ 0.3180 0.3050
(0.2002) (0.1964) (0.1966)
Efficacy salience × Frequent meat eater 0.2563 0.1968 0.1842
(0.1940) (0.1896) (0.1903)
Health information × Frequent meat eater 0.3057 0.2172 0.2080
(0.2138) (0.2107) (0.2130)
Animal welfare × Frequent meat eater 0.3955∗∗ 0.3567∗ 0.3545∗
(0.1951) (0.1952) (0.1967)
Social norms × Frequent meat eater 0.3199∗ 0.3232∗ 0.3135∗
(0.1887) (0.1875) (0.1873)
Social efficacy × Frequent meat eater 0.1463 0.0574 0.0752
(0.1977) (0.1981) (0.1990)
More scientific information 0.0233 0.0250 0.0173
(0.1315) (0.1300) (0.1299)
Efficacy salience 0.0407 0.0730 0.0793
(0.1322) (0.1302) (0.1295)
Health information -0.1239 -0.0685 -0.0649
(0.1521) (0.1496) (0.1507)
Animal welfare -0.2511∗ -0.2052 -0.2034
(0.1375) (0.1374) (0.1377)
Social norms -0.2259∗ -0.1989 -0.1961
(0.1313) (0.1307) (0.1312)
Social efficacy -0.1791 -0.1432 -0.1699
(0.1551) (0.1553) (0.1571)
Frequent meat eater 0.0820 -0.1349 -0.1441
(0.1253) (0.1611) (0.1610)
Prior Ecological Concern 0.1048∗∗∗ 0.1013∗∗∗
(0.0301) (0.0306)
Pre-intervention Diet 0.1789∗∗∗ 0.1919∗∗∗
(0.0536) (0.0542)










N 1220 1220 1220
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Frequent meat eater is a dummy variable which equals 1 if subject reports that their baseline
number of days of weekly meat consumption is greater than or equal to the median value (4
days) and 0 otherwise. 108
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Table 2.A.8: Impact of information interventions on planned reduction in number
of days of meat consumption per week for frequent and infrequent meat eaters
Dependent Variable: ∆ Days
Frequent Infrequent
More scientific information 0.3692∗∗ 0.3038∗∗ 0.0233 0.0293
(0.1507) (0.1471) (0.1317) (0.1240)
Efficacy salience 0.2970∗∗ 0.2567∗ 0.0407 0.0779
(0.1418) (0.1393) (0.1325) (0.1261)
Health information 0.1818 0.1355 -0.1239 -0.0775
(0.1500) (0.1477) (0.1524) (0.1450)
Animal welfare 0.1444 0.1440 -0.2511∗ -0.1736
(0.1383) (0.1385) (0.1378) (0.1358)
Social norms 0.0941 0.1125 -0.2259∗ -0.1935
(0.1354) (0.1324) (0.1316) (0.1276)
Social efficacy -0.0328 -0.1157 -0.1791 -0.1566
(0.1223) (0.1236) (0.1555) (0.1552)
Prior Ecological Concern 0.1093∗∗∗ 0.0602
(0.0384) (0.0456)
Pre-intervention Diet 0.0789 0.4054∗∗∗
(0.0719) (0.0523)










N 771 771 449 449
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.A.9: Impact of information interventions on decision to donate bonus
earnings
Dependent Variable: Prob(donate=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Low Priors High Priors
More scientific information 0.0600 0.0335 0.1415∗∗ -0.0471
(0.0480) (0.0455) (0.0594) (0.0652)
Efficacy salience 0.0586 0.0221 0.0727 -0.0227
(0.0477) (0.0446) (0.0553) (0.0643)
Health information 0.0044 -0.0149 0.0313 -0.0360
(0.0466) (0.0438) (0.0548) (0.0637)
Animal welfare 0.0621 0.0203 0.0456 0.0190
(0.0479) (0.0444) (0.0562) (0.0659)
Social norms 0.1116∗∗ 0.0708 0.1489∗∗ 0.0179
(0.0499) (0.0467) (0.0632) (0.0655)
Social efficacy 0.0619 0.0589 0.1101∗ 0.0362
(0.0481) (0.0466) (0.0626) (0.0648)
Prior Ecological Concern 0.1166∗∗∗ 0.1363∗∗∗ -0.0338
(0.0142) (0.0276) (0.0482)
Pre-intervention Diet -0.0809∗∗∗ -0.0857∗∗∗ -0.0651∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0164) (0.0170)
∆ Days 0.0250∗ 0.0216 0.0225
(0.0129) (0.0178) (0.0173)
Baseline Efficacy Beliefs -0.1078∗∗∗ -0.0541∗∗∗ -0.1433∗∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0178) (0.0183)
Age -0.0030 -0.0123 0.0311∗
(0.0128) (0.0174) (0.0184)
Female -0.0554∗∗ -0.0342 -0.0670∗
(0.0257) (0.0344) (0.0355)
Democrat -0.0439∗ -0.0018 -0.0773∗∗
(0.0264) (0.0341) (0.0358)
Education 0.1236∗∗∗ 0.1700∗∗∗ 0.0692
(0.0313) (0.0447) (0.0450)
N 1220 1220 545 675
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The dependant variable is the binary variable donate, which equals 1 if the subject donated
their bonus earnings to the climate change charity and 0 otherwise. The table reports the
average marginal effects from Probit regressions. Columns 3 and 4 show the impact of the
interventions on subjects with low and high prior ecological concern, respectively.
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(a) Baseline (b) Control
(c) More scientific information (d) Efficacy salience
(e) Health information (f) Animal welfare
(g) Social norms (h) Social efficacy
Figure 2.A.1: Actions to combat climate change listed at baseline and post-
intervention. (a) Wordcloud representing baseline answers to actions you can
take personally to combat climate change. (b) to (h) Wordclouds representing
post interventions answers to actions you can take personally to combat climate
change across the different groups. Meat intake-related actions were identified
by the use of words such as vegetarian, meat, plant-based, vegan and beef.
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(a) Proportion mentioning diet (b) Issue importance
(c) Weekly meat consumption (days) (d) Efficacy beliefs
Figure 2.A.2: (a) Proportion of subjects that mentioned diet as an effective ac-
tion to combat climate change (b) issue importance (c) weekly meat consumption
(days) and (d) efficacy beliefs before and after intervention across different con-
ditions.
Figure 2.A.3: (a) Average planned reduction in number of days of meat con-
sumption per week across groups. A oneway ANOVA test rejected the null of no





(b) Subjects with prior health concerns
Figure 2.A.4: The differential effect of the health information intervention on
intended change in weekly meat consumption depending on whether the subject
has prior health concerns. (a) shows that health information is more effective than
the Control when the individual has prior health concerns (disease=1). (b) plots
the mean change in weekly meat consumption for control and health information
groups, only when subjects have prior health concerns. The null of equal means
was rejected by a t-test with t-statistic -2.3716 and p = 0.0186.
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(a) More scientific information (b) Efficacy salience
(c) Animal welfare (d) Social norms
Figure 2.A.5: Interaction plots showing effects of (a) More scientific information,
(b) Efficacy salience, (c) Animal welfare and (d) Social norms on intended re-
duction in number of days of meat consumption per week, for different baseline
efficacy beliefs values. High efficacy beliefs is a dummy variable which equals 1 if
the subject’s baseline efficacy beliefs is greater than or equal to the median value
and 0 otherwise.
(a) Animal welfare (b) Social norms
Figure 2.A.6: Interaction plot showing effects of (a) Animal welfare and (b) Social
norms conditions on planned reduction in number of days of meat consumption
per week, for different frequencies of baseline meat consumption. Frequent meat
eater is a dummy variable which equals 1 if subject reports that their baseline
number of days of weekly meat consumption is greater than or equal to the





Figure 2.A.7: Donation to charity across groups. (a) presents the proportions
that donated to charity in all groups. (b) presents the proportions that donated
to charity when the subject had low prior ecological concern, across the different
groups. A oneway ANOVA test rejected the null of no significant difference in




(a) Control (b) More scientific information
(c) Efficacy salience (d) Health information
(e) Animal welfare (f) Social norms
(g) Social efficacy
Figure 2.A.8: Evidence recall from different treatment conditions
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Figure 2.A.9: Cosine similarity scores between the evidence the subjects could
recall and the actual evidence given to them across the different groups
Figure 2.A.10: Relationship between ∆ Days and answer to “Is it morally wrong
to show people the consequences of their own behaviour?” on a scale of 1 to 5




The following are the messages which were used in the interventions. Sources of
the information mentioned below were not included as part of the information
interventions.
Control
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates global
greenhouse gas emissions caused by farm animals is greater than all forms of
transport combined.
Studies show that by switching to a vegetarian diet from a meat rich diet, an
individual could reduce their carbon dioxide emissions by half.




In addition, studies show that reducing carbon dioxide emissions can have a net





In addition, studies show that by switching to a vegetarian diet an individual can
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by an amount that is equivalent to driving
about 3000 miles less per year in a standard car.






In addition, studies show that vegetarians have a significantly lower risk of mor-
tality from heart disease and overall cancer incidence.




In addition, studies show that by switching to a vegetarian diet an individual can











In addition, studies show that if you switch to a vegetarian diet from a meat rich
diet you could influence people close to you to do the same.
Source: Higgs and Thomas, 2016
2.C Experiment Script
1. Rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements:
Answer on a 5-point likert scale where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly
agree.




(b) Ecological, rather than economic, factors must guide our use of natural
resources.
(c) We attach too much importance to economic measures of the well-
being of our society.
(d) We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can
support.
(e) When humans interfere with nature, it often produces disastrous con-
sequences.
(f) Humans must live in harmony with nature in order to survive.
(g) There are limits to growth beyond which our industrialized society
cannot expand.
2. How concerned about climate change are you?
Answer on a 5-point likert scale where 1 is Not at all concerned and 5 is
Extremely concerned.
3. How concerned about climate change do your friends think you are
Answer on a 5-point likert scale where 1 is Not at all concerned and 5 is
Extremely concerned.
4. What actions could you take personally to reduce climate change? Please
mention 3 actions. Leave empty if you cannot think of any.
5. Rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements:
Answer on a 5-point likert scale where 1 is Strongly disagree and 5 is
strongly agree.
(a) Individuals can influence climate change.
(b) Collectively humans have little influence on climate change.
6. How many days in a week do you eat meat? Please indicate a number
between 0 to 7 days.
7. Rate the degree to which you agree with the following statement.
There is a relationship between climate change and people’s food choice.





8. Rate the degree to which you agree with the following statement.
The information I read made me feel that there is a relationship between
climate change and people’s food choices.
Answer on a 5-point likert scale where 1 is Strongly disagree and 5 is
strongly agree.
9. Rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements.
Answer on a 5-point likert scale where 1 is Strongly disagree and 5 is
strongly agree.
(a) Individuals can influence climate change.
(b) Collectively humans have little influence on climate change.
10. After reading the information provided, how many days in a week will you
eat meat? Please indicate a number between 0 to 7 days.
11. What actions could you take personally to reduce climate change? Please
mention 3 actions. Leave empty if you cannot think of any.
12. Please write down everything you can recall from the evidence presented
to you.
13. Is it morally wrong to show people the consequences of their own behaviour?
Options - very morally wrong, morally wrong, neither morally wrong nor
right, morally right, very morally right
14. What is your age?
15. What is your gender?
Options - Male, Female, Other, Prefer not to say
16. Please indicate the highest academic degree you have completed.
Options - None, High/Secondary School, Vocational Training, Bachelor,
Master, PhD
17. In which part of the US are you currently located?
18. Which party would you prefer to win the next election?
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Democrat, Republican, Other, Prefer not to say.
19. How many people would notice if you changed your diet?
20. How many of these people do you think might be influenced to change their
diets as well?
21. Have you or any member of your immediate family (father, mother, sib-
lings, and grandparents) had or suffered from heart disease, stroke, cancer,
diabetes, high blood pressure or high cholesterol?
You have now reached the end of the study.
For your participation today, you will be receiving $1.50.
Additionally, for your effort, we would like to offer you a bonus of $.50.
You can keep the bonus earnings for yourself or you can give it to the
experimenters who will donate on your behalf to the Adaptation
Fund.
The Adaptation Fund was set up under the Kyoto protocol of United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.The fund
finances projects and programmes which help vulnerable communities in
developing countries adapt to climate change.
Do you want to donate your bonus earnings to The Adaptation
Fund?
Thank you for participating in the study. We appreciate your help with
our research.
Your earnings today is $x.
In case of donation to The Adaptation Fund;
Also, we want to thank you for your donation to The Adaptation Fund.
2.D Carbon dioxide emissions
Weber and Matthews, 2008 estimate that by switching to a plant-based diet just
1 day per week from red meat and dairy, a household can reduce their greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions equivalent to driving 1160 miles less per year. The authors
normalise the data to the unit of a household using US census data in 1997 which
included around 267 million residents in 101 million households. Hence, the size
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of each household is around 267
101
i.e 2.64. Thus, by switching to a plant-based
diet 1 day per week an individual can reduce their GHG emission equivalent to
driving 1160
2.64
or 439.39 miles per year less. Further, the authors estimates that
driving 12,000 miles in a standard automobile (25 miles/gallon) produces around
4.4 t CO2 per year. Which means, that by switching to a plant-based diet 1 day




kg CO2 per year.
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3 Attitude towards Immigrants: Evidence from U.S.
Congressional Speeches1
Immigration and attitudes towards immigration have been key features in eco-
nomic development and political debate for decades. It can be hard to disentangle
true beliefs about immigrants even where we have seemingly strong evidence such
as the voting records of politicians. This paper builds an “immigration corpus”
consisting of 24,351 U.S. Congressional speeches relevant to immigration issues
between 1990-2015. The corpus is used to form two distinct measures of attitude
towards immigrants - one based on sentiment (or valence) and one based on the
concreteness of language. The linguistic measures, particularly sentiment, show
systematic variation over time and across states in a manner consistent with the
history and experiences of immigrants in the U.S. The paper also computes a
speaker specific measure of sentiment towards immigrants which is found to be
a significant positive predictor of voting behaviour with respect to immigration
related bills. Applying a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic modelling algo-
rithm provides further insight into how different topics (such as border security
or national security) have risen and fallen in importance over time in the face of
key events such as 9/11.
3.1 Introduction
The number of international migrants worldwide has increased rapidly in recent
years with the total number of migrants reaching 272 million in 2019 (according
to the latest World Migration Report by the United Nations; International Or-
ganization for Migration, 2020). Political turmoil, conflict, poverty and limited
educational or employment opportunities force millions of people to migrate from
their countries. The largest number of international migrants were reported to be
living in the U.S. in 2019, the total number reaching 51 million (United Nations,
2019). Immigrants contribute significantly to the economy of the host country in
terms of filling key labour market gaps, contributing to tax revenues and social
security (United Nations, 2017). Particularly in the U.S., immigrants comprise
up to a third of the workforce in several industries including farming, fishing
1I am grateful to Daniel Sgroi and Thomas Hills for their invaluable feedback and guidance.
I thank Giovanni Facchini for his generosity with time and for sharing the voting data used
in the paper. I am also grateful to Ying Li, Elliott Ash, Arianna Ornaghi, Clement Imbert,
Sharun Mukand and seminar participants at Warwick University for their helpful comments. I
declare no conflict of interest.
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and forestry, textile manufacturing, food manufacturing, and home health care
(Sherman et al., 2019). Immigrants also help the ageing U.S. population, which
is crucial for improving the ratio of workers to retirees as 78% of the foreign-born
population are of working age compared to 59% of native born; immigrants con-
tribute significantly to the U.S. housing market and immigrants’ children tend to
gain more education, have higher salaries and work in higher-paying professions
compared to their parents (Sherman et al., 2019). Yet, immigrants, as one of
the most vulnerable sections of the society, are subject to constant human rights
violation and discrimination.
In the U.S., for example, the members of the Congress play a massive role in
terms of shaping legislation related to immigrant issues. Congress members vote
on bills which either liberalise or restrict immigration. Variables such as party
affiliation, regional ideologies and differences (Fetzer, 2006; Goldin, 1994), and
key economic and socio-demographic variables (Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011;
Milner and Tingley, 2011; Gonzalez and Kamdar, 2000) have been helpful in
explaining voting behaviour of Congress legislators on immigration bills. This
paper looks at another measure which helps shed light on variation in immigrant
outcomes and voting behaviour of legislators on immigration related bills - Con-
gressional speeches. The Congressional speeches record all speeches verbatim
delivered by legislators on the floor of the Congress.
This paper uses the United States Congressional Records from 1990 to 2015
which is a record of all speeches delivered on the floor of Congress. From the
Congressional records, an “immigration corpus” is formed by identifying speeches
which contain immigration, refugees and related words. This yields a corpus
consisting of 24,351 Congressional speeches with 43.6 million total number of
words. The corpus comprises of speeches from 1098 unique speakers.
This immigration corpus is used to form two distinct linguistic measures of atti-
tude towards immigrants - sentiment or valence and language concreteness. Sen-
timent measure of each immigration speech is computed using the valence ratings
proposed by Warriner et al., 2013. Valence of a word refers to the pleasant emo-
tion conveyed by a word, with the rating increasing as it moves from unhappy
to happy. Concreteness2 value of immigration speeches are calculated as a proxy
for social distance. In this paper, concreteness measure of each speech is com-
puted using the ratings proposed by Brysbaert et al., 2014. Self-categorisation
theory posits that humans are conditioned to view different social groups as
2Concreteness can be defined as a word’s ability to make specific and definite references to
particular objects (Hills et al., 2017).
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either in-group (within close social proximity) or out-group (socially distant)
(Turner, 1985). Concrete linguistic patterns reflect positive out-group behaviour
or lesser perceived social distance as supported by Linguistic Intergroup Bias
model (Maass et al., 1989) and Construal Level Theory (Trope and Liberman,
2010). Use of concrete language declines when one shifts from describing fam-
ily and friends to neighbours to colleagues to visitors and finally to foreigners
(Snefjella and Kuperman, 2015). Thus, concreteness of language used can act as
an indicator of intergroup bias which helps create and sustain stereotypes about
social groups (Mastro et al., 2014).
The approach in this paper is inspired from Li and Hills, 2020 who form an
immigration corpus from a collection of New York Times articles to quantify and
compare sentiment and social distance towards different immigrant groups, as
expressed in the articles. The present work, however, builds linguistic measures
of attitude towards immigrants to study variation in immigrant outcomes over
time and predict voting behaviour of politicians on immigration-related bills.
The sentiment and concreteness measures of immigration-related speeches deliv-
ered in the U.S. Congress were used to examine variation of attitude towards
immigrants of the Congress members over time and by political affiliation and
region. It was observed that, the variation of linguistic measures, particularly
sentiment, is consistent with the history of immigrant outcomes, with a marked
decline following the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. and the sub-
sequent introduction of several anti-immigration bills. The sentiment measure
displayed strict partisan polarisation consistently since early 1990s. There was
also a clear regional distinction with conservative southern U.S. states displaying
lower pro-immigrant sentiment compared to the north-eastern states.
Analysis of voting behaviour of Congressional members on seminal immigration
bills in the decades before and after the 9/11 attacks was also undertaken in
the paper. It was observed that speaker sentiment (as computed from speeches
delivered on matters related to immigration policy) is a significant positive pre-
dictor of speaker’s pro-immigration voting pattern even after controlling for a
list of speaker characteristics, party affiliation and district level socio-economic
variables. Depending on the econometric specification, a 1 standard devia-
tion increase in speaker speech sentiment can increase the probability of a pro-
immigration vote by 2 to 5 percentage points. Speaker speech sentiment is an
especially strong predictor of voting behaviour in the southern, south-western
and western U.S. states.
Lastly, a Latent Dirichlet Allocation or LDA topic modelling algorithm (Blei et
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al., 2003) was used to identify the different immigration-related topics discussed in
the U.S. Congress. This helps recognise the key topics for immigration legislation
and examine the distribution of the different topics over time. The distribution
of topics shows a hike in concern towards border security and national security
following the 9/11 attacks and a decline in discussions related to educational
policies and government aid in speeches addressing immigration. The distribution
of topics over time expresses the variation in concern over different immigrant
issues and is generally reflected by the nature of the bills introduced in Congress
during the time. Applying LDA is an alternative, time saving and efficient way of
examining the historical trends of immigration legislation compared to extensive
manual studying of Congressional bills.
The present work adds to the small branch of literature which looks at linguis-
tic bias towards immigrants, particularly in news coverage (Li and Hills, 2020;
Mastro et al., 2014). This paper expands the literature by evaluating attitude or
bias towards immigrants in political speeches. More broadly, the present study
contributes to literature deriving measures of implicit bias from language use and
how that might affect decision making. Related to this is the work by Rice et al.,
2019 which looks at implicit racial bias in written judicial opinions in U.S. state
and federal courts, and Ash et al., 2021 who build a similar measure for gender
attitudes of U.S. circuit court judges.
This study also adds to the existing branch of literature which examines roll call
voting patterns of U.S. Congress members on immigration bills (Facchini and
Steinhardt, 2011; Milner and Tingley, 2011; Fetzer, 2006; Gonzalez and Kamdar,
2000). While the existing studies have relied on economic, demographic and
political determinants of voting behaviour in the U.S. Congress, this paper uses
a language-based measure of inherent attitude towards immigrants to predict
pro-immigration voting behaviour. Lastly, this paper contributes to the modest
literature which has focussed on analysing U.S. Congressional speeches using
Natural Language Processing tools to build measures of partisanship (Gentzkow
et al., 2019; Jensen et al., 2012).
Congressional speeches delivered on immigration issues are crucial for the follow-
ing reasons: (1) They are better able to capture the intensity of the speaker’s
attitude towards immigration since it yields a continuous measure. This is supe-
rior to examining a speaker’s attitude towards immigration based on past voting
behaviour which gives a binary measure since a vote is either in favour of or
against liberalising immigration. (2) The immigration corpus, due to its sheer
volume, is expected to be more informative of the speaker’s attitude towards im-
127
3.2. DATA
migrants compared to other measures, such as past voting behaviour. (3) In the
absence of past voting behaviour, for example in case the bill does not go to a
vote, Congressional speeches can be a useful measure for estimating the speaker’s
attitude towards the particular issue under debate.
Moreover, the study of political speeches, not only during Congressional sessions,
but also during campaign trails and other public appearances, is crucial to form
measures of the speaker’s attitude towards immigration or other relevant issues.
The benefit of the method proposed in this paper is that it can be applied to study
politicians’ attitude on other critical issues such as gender, race, climate change,
etc. Developing a language-based measure of politicians’ attitudes towards any
key issue can be helpful in predicting legislative outcomes related to the topic.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: sections 3.2 and 3.3 describe the
data and the methodology used in the paper, respectively. Section 3.4 presents
the results obtained. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Congressional Speeches and Speaker Data
The paper uses United States Congressional Records from 1990 to 2015. This
is a record of all speeches on the floor of Congress (for both chambers of the
Congress). The records were digitised using optical character recognition or OCR
on scanned print volumes (Gentzkow et al., 2019). The source of the data from
1990 to 1993 is HeinOnline. The source of the data from 1994 to 2015 is the
United States Government Publishing Office. The records were issued in bound
editions compiling data from an entire Congressional session. This yields a total
of 1,767,180 speeches. The speakers and the state they belong to are identified
at the beginning of speeches. The speaker is matched with their biographical
data obtained from Github repository on Congress legislators3. The repository
data contains information on current and historical U.S. legislators such as party
affiliation, year of birth, gender, race, military service and ICPSR code4.
3.2.2 Voting Data
For voting records on immigration bills, voting dataset from Facchini and Stein-
hardt, 2011 is utilised, which provides data for 1265 immigration votes cast by
445 Congress members in the U.S. House of Representatives (speaker character-
3https://github.com/unitedstates/congress-legislators/tree/1473ea983d5538c25f5d315626445ab038d8141b
4ICPSR code is an identification number assigned to members of the U.S. Congress.
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istics provided in Table 3.A.1) between 1990-2006. The dataset identifies 8 bills
from 1990 to 2006, 3 before and 5 after the 9/11 attacks, which affect outcomes
for immigrants in the U.S. The list only includes final votes and excludes inter-
mediate votes (such as floor amendments). The list of these 8 bills and whether
the bills were for (pro) or against (contra) liberalising immigration are presented
in Table 3.1. Votes on immigration related issues increased substantially after
the 9/11 attacks in 2001, although the effect was not immediate. Particularly,
votes on immigrant rights and benefits peaked around 1995-1996 in the 104th
Congress, only to be followed by a stark increase in votes on border security,
after 9/11, in the 109th Congress in 2005-2006 (Fennelly et al., 2015).
Table 3.1: Final passage votes on immigration issues in the House of Represen-
tatives 1990-2006
Congress Date Bill Topic Keyword Direction
101 3.10.1990 H.R.4300* Immigration The 1990 Immigration Act (IM-
MACT)
Pro
104 21.3.1996 H.R.2202* Illegal Im-
migration
Illegal Immigration Reform and Im-
migrant Responsibility Act
Con
105 24.9.1998 H.R.3736 Skilled Im-
migration
Temporary Access to Skilled Work-
ers and H-1B Nonimmigrant Pro-
gram Improvement Act
Pro
109 10.2.2005 H.R.418 Illegal Im-
migration
Real ID Act Con
109 16.12.2005 H.R.4437* Illegal Im-
migration
Border Protection, Anti-terrorism
and Illegal Immigration Control
Con
109 14.9.2006 H.R.6061 Illegal Im-
migration
Secure Fence Act Con
109 21.9.2006 H.R.6094 Illegal Im-
migration
Community Protection Act of 2006 Con
109 21.9.2006 H.R.6095 Illegal Im-
migration
Immigration Law Enforcement Act
of 2006
Con
This table is adapted from Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011. Major legislations on immigration during this period are
marked using an asterisk (*).
Of the 8 bills, Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011 classified 3 as major immigration leg-
islations. The first major bill was the 1990 Immigration Act or IMMACT. Among
other provisions, the IMMACT raised the annual cap for legal permanent resi-
dents to 675,000 from 530,000 (Leiden and Neal, 1990). This was followed by the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. The bill’s
provisions included expedited removal procedure of undocumented immigrants
and criminal penalty for those immigrants who re-enter or attempt to re-enter
the U.S. within a specific time period after removal (Grable, 1998).
Of the bills post 9/11, a major bill was the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism
and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005. The bill’s provisions included the
construction of a 700 miles long fence along the US-Mexico border and elimination
of the visa lottery programme (Fetzer, 2006). More critically, if approved, the
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bill would have made illegal presence in the U.S. an aggravated felony instead of
a civil offence and made any individual found to have aided an undocumented
immigrant to remain in the U.S. liable to up to five years in prison (Fetzer, 2006).
Although the bill was passed in the house, it was not passed in the Senate.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Immigration Corpus
All speeches were first cleaned by removing punctuation and upper case. The
speeches were then lemmatized to reduce words to their base forms, while main-
taining context, using NLTK WordNet lemmatizer (Bird et al., 2009).
From the Congressional records, speeches containing the words immigration or
refugee or related words were identified to form the “immigration corpus” (similar
to Li and Hills, 2020)5. The immigration corpus is what is referred to throughout
the rest of the paper as a collection of all immigration policy-related speeches
made on the floor of the Congress. All procedural phrases were removed from
the immigration speeches by using the list of procedural bigrams provided by
Gentzkow et al., 2019. Following Gentzkow et al., 2019, all speakers’ last names
and names of states and months were also removed from the speeches. The paper
excludes speeches where the speaker is identified by office and not by name (such
as ‘chairman’). This yields a total of 24,351 immigration related speeches from
1098 distinct speakers between 1990 to 2015. The immigration corpus contains a
total of 43,564,960 words and the average number of words per speech is 17896.
3.3.2 Valence and Concreteness
For each speech the paper computes the valence (or sentiment) and concreteness
(or proxy for social distance) ratings. For the former, the paper uses valence
norms proposed by Warriner et al., 2013. Warriner et al., 2013 provides valence
norms for approximately 14,000 words, each rated on a scale of 1 to 9.7. The
valence rating of a word refers to the pleasant emotion conveyed by it, with the
rating increasing as it moves from unhappy to happy. Valence of a speech was
computed by taking the mean valence rating of all words in the speech. For
5The full list of words is provided in Appendix 3.B
6It should be noted that after removing speeches where the speaker was identified by office
and not by name, there were no immigration speeches identified in 2015. However, these
speeches were re-incorporated in the corpus when training the LDA topic modelling algorithm
as detailed in section 3.4.3




concreteness, the paper uses concreteness norms proposed by Brysbaert et al.,
2014. Brysbaert et al., 2014 offers the concreteness ratings of nearly 37,000
English words, each rated on a scale of 1 to 5, going from abstract to concrete.8
Concreteness of a speech was calculated by taking the mean concreteness ratings
of all the words in the speech.
3.3.3 Topic Model
The paper uses a Latent Dirichlet Allocation or LDA model (Blei et al., 2003)
to extract the different topics discussed in the immigration corpus9. The LDA
model assumes that there is a fixed number of topics or patterns which explains
the structure of a corpus. LDA is a Bayesian model in which each document of
a corpus is modelled as a finite mixture over an underlying set of topics. The
LDA model reduces each document in a corpus to a “bag-of-words” which is
a representation of text that describes the number of occurrences of each word
in the document, ignoring the sequence in which the words appear. The model
assumes that a set of documents can be explained by a fixed number of underlying
patterns or topics. Each document in the corpus is a distribution over these topics
and each topic is a distribution over the words which form the corpus vocabulary.
For interpreting the topics extracted from the immigration corpus the paper
examines the most relevant words pertinent to each topic. For this the paper
uses the relevance measure proposed by Sievert and Shirley, 2014. Let V denote
the number of words in the vocabulary of the immigration corpus, w be a word
∈ 1, ....., V , φkw be the probability that w belongs to topic k ∈ 1, ....K and pw
be the marginal probability of word w in the immigration corpus. Then the
relevance of word w to topic k is defined as:




where λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) is the weight given to the probability that word w is assigned




The paper aims to track trends in topics over different years, similar to Li, Hills,
8Brysbaert et al., 2014 computed the concreteness rating of each word by taking the average
rating across roughly 30 participants.
9The LDA model was implemented using gensim package in Python.
10The lift of a word (Taddy, 2012) is the ratio of a word’s probability within a topic to the
word’s marginal probability of being in the corpus. The lift measure is used to rank terms within
topics. This paper calculated the top relevant words for each topic by trying different values
of k, between 5 to 15 and different values of λ between 0.5 to 1, to find the most contextually
appropriate topics and keywords, presented in Table 3.5.
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and Hertwig, 2020. This was done to understand the key topics associated with
immigration over time. All speeches that occurred in the same year were con-
sidered as 1 document. For each document the paper calculates the probability
that document d belongs to topic k as:
φd(k) =
|w ∈ d : topic(w) = k|
|d|
(3.2)
where the numerator is the number of words in document d that are assigned to
topic k and the denominator is the total number of words in document d.
3.4 Results
The results are divided into 3 sections. Section 3.4.1 presents descriptive results
which examine the variation of immigrant speech valence and concreteness over
time, while also evaluating partisan and regional variation. Section 3.4.2 ex-
amines if linguistic measures of attitude towards immigrants can predict voting
behaviour on immigration bills in the House of Representatives. Lastly, section
3.4.3 presents the results obtained from applying an LDA topic modelling algo-
rithm to the immigration corpus.
3.4.1 Descriptive Results
(a) Valence (b) Concreteness
Figure 3.1: Variation in (a) valence and (b) concreteness of immigration policy-
related speeches over time
This section begins by looking at the variation in valence and concreteness mea-
sures of Congressional speeches (in both chambers of the Congress) over time.
Figures 3.1 (a) and (b) plots the mean valence and concreteness of immigration
speeches over time, respectively. Figure 3.1 (a) shows a small rise in the valence
measure following the Immigration Act (IMMACT) of 1990. The bill, which was
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signed into law by President George H. W. Bush, raised the annual cap on im-
migrant admissions (Leiden and Neal, 1990), a positive step towards liberalising
immigration policy. The amount of attention paid to immigration policy varies
by year. The number of votes on immigration policy (including votes on amend-
ments and procedure) declined during the 103rd Congress (1993-1994) and rose in
the 104th Congress (1995-1996) (Fennelly et al., 2015). The Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRARA) of 1996, signed by President
Clinton on 30th September 1996, aimed primarily at curbing the flow of illegal
immigration into the United States (Grable, 1998). This is expressed by a steep
drop in the valence measure leading up to the introduction of IIRARA. This is
followed by an increase in valence measure leading to the House passing the Tem-
porary Access to Skilled Workers and H-1B Nonimmigrant Program Improvement
Act of 1998, temporarily increasing the annual number of H1B visas11.
There was an increase in valence towards late 1990s leading to the Congress en-
abling around 400,000 illegal immigrants, who had been deemed ineligible for ear-
lier amnesties, to obtain green cards in December 2000 (Schuck, 2005). Further,
in March 2001, 150,000 undocumented Salvadorans acquired temporary legal sta-
tus (Schuck, 2005). However, such positive immigrant measures came to an end
with the attack on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001. There was
a drastic decline in the valence measure after 2001. Following the attacks, there
was a major shift in immigration policies in the U.S. Immigrant policy debates
became centred on national security issues (Rodriguez, 2008; Hing, 2006; Schuck,
2005). The post 9/11 era saw the enactment of the USA Patriot Act in 2001,
increasing the surveillance of immigrants, and the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security in 2002, aimed at securing national borders and identifying
perceived threat posed by non-citizens residing in the U.S. (Rodriguez, 2008).
From 2005 onwards, votes on immigration policy became centred on issues of bor-
der security (Fennelly et al., 2015). This included the Real ID Act of 2005, which,
among other provisions, tightened the eligibility criteria for asylum seekers (Cian-
ciarulo, 2006). This period also included other restrictive bills, adversely affecting
immigrants, such as Border Protection, Anti-terrorism and Illegal Immigration
Control Act of 2005, Secure Fence Act of 2006 and Immigration Law Enforce-
ment Act of 2006. The valence measure improved after this under the Democratic
control of Congress (both House and Senate) from 2007-2011. Around this time,
there were several attempts to pass different versions of the Development, Relief,
and Education for Alien Minors Act or DREAM Act, aiming to grant legal status
to undocumented individuals who came to the U.S. as minors. It came closest
11The H1B visa allows U.S. organizations to hire skilled foreign workers for specialised jobs.
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to being passed in 2010 when the bill was passed in the House, but fell of short
of the votes required to proceed in the Senate (American Immigration Council,
2021). Further, there was an increase in the valence measure around the time of
President Obama’s announcement of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) in 2012, by executive Branch memorandum. The DACA program en-
titled individuals who had travelled to the U.S. as minors to apply for deferred
action from deportation (American Immigration Council, 2012).
The concreteness measure, which is a proxy for social distance (with higher values
indicating close social proximity), has overall displayed an increasing trend during
the period under consideration. This is consistent with Hills et al., 2017 who find
that American English usage has become more concrete in nature with time.
Although, Figure 3.1 (b) shows a fall in the measure following the 9/11 attacks
in 2001, indicating an increase in perceived social distance towards immigrants.
(a) Valence (b) Concreteness
Figure 3.2: Partisan variation in (a) valence and (b) concreteness of immigration
policy-related speeches over time
Next, the speakers were matched with data on individual characteristics. There
were 1026 speakers, from both chambers of the Congress, for whom biographical
data was available. These were grouped according to their party affiliation to
examine the partisan variation of the valence and concreteness measures over
time. There were 510 Republicans, 512 Democrat and 4 Independent legislators
in the dataset. Figure 3.2 plots the results. Figure 3.2 (a) shows that the va-
lence measure for Democrats and Independents (grouped together and labelled
as Democrat) has been consistently higher than that for Republicans since early
1990s. The concreteness measure (Figure 3.2 (b)) has been higher for Democrats
and Independents (grouped together and labelled as Democrat) than Republi-
cans for most of the period under consideration, although the distinction is less
clear. This is indicative of polarised attitudes of the Congress members towards
immigrants, with Democrats showing more pro-immigrant attitude. This result
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aligns with a vast literature which has documented the positive association be-
tween liberal ideology and support for immigration (Brooks et al., 2016; Kugler
et al., 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Hix and Noury, 2007; Fetzer, 2006).
Further, the paper examines valence and concreteness across the different states
in the U.S. Figure 3.3 shows the mean valence of immigration speeches across
states in years 1990 (Figure 3.3 (a)) and 2006 (Figure 3.3 (b)). The lighter shades
indicate states with lower valence or sentiment. States with the lowest sentiment
towards immigrants in 1990 were the southern states of Texas, Louisiana, Ten-
nessee and North Carolina. Other low sentiment states were California, Utah and
Wyoming in the west and North Dakota and South Dakota in the mid-west. Fig-
ure 3.3 (b) shows an increase in the number of southern states with low sentiment
towards immigrants. In 2006 the southern states of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Florida, South Carolina and North Carolina showed some of the lowest average
valence measures. The anti-immigrant attitude in the south is consistent with
Fetzer, 2006 who found that people from the southern U.S. states oppose im-
migration owing to their conservative political culture. Figure 3.A.1 shows the
mean concreteness ratings of immigration-related speeches across states in 1990
and 2006 where the variation is less distinct compared to the valence measure.
(a) Speech valence in 1990
(b) Speech Valence in 2006
Figure 3.3: Valence of immigration policy-related speeches across different states
in the U.S. in (a) 1990 and (b) 2006
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Figure 3.4 shows the average valence or sentiment of immigration related speeches
over time in the different regions in the U.S. The Census Bureau of the United
States divides the country into 4 regions - North-east, Midwest, South and West.12
While there are clear overlaps, the north-eastern states appear to have had the
most positive or highest sentiment towards immigrants over time. This is likely
because of the strong democratic support in the North-eastern states, especially
since the early 1990s (Harris, 2014). The southern states on the other hand
have consistently displayed a lower speech sentiment. Figure 3.4 (b) shows the
sentiment for just the north-eastern and southern states for clearer comparison.
Regional variation of the concreteness measure over time, presented in Figure
3.A.2, was not as distinct as the sentiment measure.
(a) All regions (b) South and Northeast
Figure 3.4: Variation in valence of immigration policy-related speeches over re-
gions in the US. (a) shows valence over time for all regions (b) shows valence over
time for the southern and north-eastern states.
3.4.2 Voting Behaviour
Having evaluated the variation in linguistic measures of attitude towards im-
migrants of Congress members over time, by party and by region, the paper
next studies their voting behaviour. The paper seeks to examine if the linguistic
measures computed for each speaker can predict their voting behaviour on bills
related to immigrant issues. With regards to voting behaviour, the paper makes
the following predictions:
Prediction 1: Speakers with higher speech valence (i.e. greater pro-immigrant
12The North-eastern States are Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont. The Mid-western states are Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Dakota, Wisconsin. The southern States include Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Geor-
gia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Oklahoma, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia. Lastly, the Western States are Alaska, Arizona, Cal-




sentiment) are more likely to vote in favour of bills liberalising immigration.
Speech sentiment is hypothesised to be a significant predictor of future voting
behaviour on immigration bills. This result is expected to hold even after con-
trolling for the speaker’s individual characteristics, party affiliation and Con-
gressional district characteristics. This is because speech valence captures the
inherent opinion that Congress members have about immigrant issues, above
and beyond their party’s position and their district’s demographic and socio-
economic features. Further, due to the high frequency of speeches made and the
length of these speeches, a measure computed from speeches is more informa-
tive of the speaker’s voting intentions than other potential measures of attitude
towards immigrants.
Prediction 2: Speaker speech valence is hypothesised to be a strong predictor of
pro-immigration voting behaviour even after limiting the dataset to include only
southern, western or south-western states or states with high foreign born popu-
lation.
Members of the southern and western states in the U.S., owing to their con-
servative political ideologies or anti-immigration stance, have been observed to
oppose immigration (Fetzer, 2006). In such states, where the sentiment towards
immigrants is low (Figure 3.4), valence measure of speeches is expected to be
a predictor of voting behaviour of Congress members. Moreover, prediction 2
posits that in states that are majorly opposed to immigration, the sentiment to-
wards immigrants is more polarised and hence the valence measure is expected
to be a good predictor of voting behaviour on immigration-related bills.
Hawley, 2011 noted that in the U.S., higher the local foreign born population in
the state, greater the partisan influence on support for restricting immigration.
This is consistent with the group threat theory which posits that competition for
limited resources leads to conflict among different demographic groups i.e. larger
the size of the out-group, greater the threat perceived by the in-group (Blumer,
1958; Blalock, 1967; LeVine and Campbell, 1972). Accordingly, it is hypothesised
that in such polarised states, with large foreign born population, the polarised
sentiment towards immigrants is a good predictor of Congress member’s support
towards immigration policy.
Prediction 3: Concreteness measure of immigration-related speeches is not a good
predictor of voting behaviour of Congress members on immigration bills.
Concreteness of immigration-related speeches has been observed to grow over
time during the period considered (Figure 3.1). This could imply that with
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the growth in immigrant population over time in the U.S., the perceived social
distance towards immigrants has declined. This is consistent with contact theory
(Allport, 1954) which suggests that biases towards outgroups are lessened though
more interaction. However, the rise in the concreteness measure over time could
also be because American English usage has become more concrete in nature
with time (Hills et al., 2017). Further, due to the unsystematic regional variation
of the concreteness measure over time (Figures 3.A.1 and 3.A.2), concreteness is
hypothesised to not be a good predictor of voting behaviour on immigrant issues.
The list of bills provided in Table 3.1 is used to examine the relationship between
speaker speech sentiment and voting behaviour on immigration bills in the House
of Representatives. The paper uses the probit model presented in equation (3.3)
to evaluate the effect of speech sentiment on speaker’s voting behaviour.
Prob(V oteidt = 1) = Φ(γ1V alenceidt+γ2Zi+γ3Ydt+δs+Postt+δs×Postt) (3.3)
where the binary dependent variable V oteidt takes the value 1 if the speaker i
from district d votes in favour of liberalising immigration at time t. φ() is the
cumulative distribution function. The key explanatory variable V alenceidt is the
average sentiment or valence of all immigrant related speeches delivered by the
speaker a year leading up to the vote. For example, if a vote occurs in March 1996,
the value of V alenceidt will be the average valence value of all the immigration
speeches delivered by the speaker between March 1995 and February 1996. Zi
accounts for the speaker i′s individual characteristics. Ydt includes district level
characteristics of district d in year t. The dummy variable Postt takes the value 1
if the vote occurred after the 9/11 attacks and 0 otherwise. δs are state dummies.
The model also accounts for state specific shocks post 9/11 attacks by including
δs × Postt interaction terms. The district level variables examined, along with
their definitions, are provided in Table 3.2.
The results of equation (3.3) are presented in table 3.3 and the summary statistics
for the variables used are provided in Table 3.A.2. The regressions use standard-
ised values of the valence variable. The table reports the average marginal effects
from probit regressions. Column 1 shows that an increase in 1 standard deviation
in the valence or sentiment of the speaker’s speeches increases the probability of
a pro-immigration vote by 5 percentage points (p < 0.01). Column 2 also ac-
counts for the speakers’ personal characteristics namely, whether the speaker was
non-white or female and the speaker’s age. The valence measure still remains sig-
nificant (p < 0.05). Further, it is observed that being non-white significantly (p
< 0.01) increases the probability of a pro-immigration vote. The variables age
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Table 3.2: District level variables
Variable Definition




The increase in the foreign born population compared to last
period
African American The share of African American people in the total population
in the district
Hispanic The share of people with Hispanic origin in the total popula-
tion in the district
Democratic Vote
Share
The Democratic share of the votes at the last House election.




The percentage of the population in the district over 16 who
are employed in executive, administrative, managerial and pro-
fessional speciality occupations
Unskilled ratio The percentage of the population in the district over 25 years
of age with less than 4 years of High School
Farm worker The share of farm workers in the total labour force in the
district.
The data for the district level variables used in the paper are obtained from Facchini and Steinhardt,
2011.
and female, though positive and significant in column 2, become insignificant
after including additional control variables in columns 3 and 4.
Column 3, along with including the dummy variables Democrat (which equals 1 if
the speaker is from a democratic party) and No military service (which equals 1 if
the speaker has never performed any military service), also includes district level
characteristics. Further, column 4 includes the contributions from labour and
corporate political action committees (PACs), expressed as a share of total PAC
contributions, as control variables. This is included in the regressions because
interest groups have been observed to shape migration policy (Facchini, Mayda,
and Mishra, 2011).
Columns 3 and 4 of table 3.3 show that even after controlling for speaker specific
characteristics, district level variables and interest group contributions, speaker
speech sentiment remains a significant positive predictor of voting behaviour.
Column 4 shows that an increase in 1 standard deviation in speaker speech va-
lence increases the probability of a pro-immigration vote by 2 percentage points
(p < 0.05). Further, among the control variables, it was observed that being
a democrat significantly increases the Congress member’s probability of a pro-
immigration vote. The share of farm workers has a significant negative effect.
Also, the skill level of the population significantly impacts voting behaviour. An
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Table 3.3: Impact of speech sentiment on Immigration votes
All bills Major bills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Valence 0.0476∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗ 0.0167∗ 0.0242∗∗ 0.0284∗
(0.0177) (0.0140) (0.0097) (0.0100) (0.0167)
Non-white 0.4714∗∗∗ 0.1262∗∗∗ 0.1575∗∗∗ 0.1685∗∗
(0.0492) (0.0475) (0.0457) (0.0762)
Age 0.0037∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0049∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0019)
Female 0.0957∗∗ 0.0125 0.0059 -0.0286
(0.0483) (0.0335) (0.0359) (0.0544)
Democrat 0.2564∗∗∗ 0.2883∗∗∗ 0.2939∗∗∗
(0.0407) (0.0608) (0.0854)
No Military Service -0.0404 -0.0447 -0.0562
(0.0309) (0.0347) (0.0448)
Foreign Born -0.0851 -0.4402∗ -0.2257
(0.2306) (0.2354) (0.4578)
Foreign Born Growth -0.0442∗∗ -0.0239 -0.0490∗∗
(0.0206) (0.0187) (0.0233)
African American 0.1714 0.1180 -0.1603
(0.1539) (0.1512) (0.2166)
Hispanic -0.1403 0.1088 -0.0265
(0.1633) (0.1802) (0.2232)
Democratic Vote Share 0.1980∗ 0.1565 0.1192
(0.1032) (0.1047) (0.1484)
Unemployment -1.2480 -2.4244∗∗ -2.1876
(1.0413) (1.1118) (1.5581)
Highly Skilled Ratio 0.6117∗∗ 1.0202∗∗∗ 0.8588
(0.2805) (0.3377) (0.5407)
Unskilled Ratio 1.3138∗∗∗ 1.7441∗∗∗ 1.9765∗∗∗
(0.3236) (0.3760) (0.4972)
Farm worker -1.6431∗∗ -2.5525∗∗∗ -2.1445∗∗
(0.7112) (0.7411) (0.9935)
Labour PAC -0.0900 -0.0067
(0.1534) (0.2179)
Corporate PAC -0.1671 -0.1817
(0.1139) (0.1573)
Post 9/11 -0.0784 -0.1018 -0.1129 -0.1395 0.1137
(0.1511) (0.1271) (0.0940) (0.1442) (0.2035)
N 1137 1082 1082 844 316
Standard errors, clustered at the speaker level, in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All regressions control for state fixed effects and state interacted with Post 9/11 dummy fixed effects.
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increase in the percentage of highly skilled individuals in the district has a sig-
nificant positive effect on pro-immigration vote, consistent with the results of
Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011 and Milner and Tingley, 2011. However, contra-
dictory to Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011, this paper also finds that an increase in
the percentage of unskilled individuals in the district has a positive effect on the
legislator’s probability of voting in favour of liberalising immigration.13 Column
5 replicates column 4 by only considering the major votes as highlighted in Ta-
ble 3.1. Speaker speech sentiment remains a positive and significant (p < 0.10)
predictor of pro-immigration voting behaviour. Thus, consistent with prediction
1, the paper finds evidence of the following:
Result 1: Speaker speech sentiment is a significant positive predictor of pro-
immigration voting behaviour, even after controlling for speaker’s individual char-
acteristics, party affiliation and the district’s socio-economic features.
Next, the paper evaluates the ability of the valence measure to predict pro-
immigration voting behaviour in the southern, south-western and western states.
The results are presented in Table 3.4. The table also looks at the voting be-
haviour of representatives in high immigration states i.e. states with a large share
of foreign born individuals14. Speaker speech valence is a positive and significant
predictor of voting in favour of liberalising immigration in the south, south-west,
west and the high immigration states.
In the southern states, an increase in 1 standard deviation in speaker speech
valence significantly (p < 0.05) increases the probability of a pro-immigration
vote by 3 percentage points. The effect is even stronger in the south-western and
western states. An increase in 1 standard deviation in speaker speech valence
13Literature exploring the relation between native skill levels and attitude towards immi-
gration is divided and largely focusses on two perspectives - labour market competition and
fiscal burden on public services (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011;
Milner and Tingley, 2011; Facchini and Mayda, 2009). The labour market competition ar-
gument states that natives will oppose immigrants with same skill levels (because increased
supply in labour will decrease wages), while supporting immigrants with contrasting skills (due
to increase in real wages) (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). On the other hand, the public fi-
nance argument posits that high-skilled natives will oppose low-skilled immigration, especially
in states with high redistribution where immigrants have greater access to public services (Mil-
ner and Tingley, 2011). However, several researchers concur that there is a need for exploring
variables which affect attitude towards immigration, beyond economic concerns (Burns and
Gimpel, 2000; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Accordingly, this paper shows the impact of
politicians’ sentiment towards immigrants in predicting pro-immigration voting behaviour.
14Similar to Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011, this paper also evaluates the effect on pro-
immigration voting behaviour in south-western states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas,
Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah) and high immigration states i.e. states with
the highest share of foreign born people. In the current dataset, the high immigration states
were Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland,
New Jersey, Nevada, New York, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia and Washington.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Valence 0.0331∗∗ 0.0419∗∗∗ 0.0499∗∗ 0.0211∗
(0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0207) (0.0113)
Non-white 0.1464∗∗∗ -0.0201 -0.0209 0.0835∗
(0.0359) (0.0597) (0.0763) (0.0505)
Age -0.0005 -0.0021 -0.0009 0.0001
(0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0015)
Female 0.1265∗ -0.0041 -0.0691 0.0214
(0.0674) (0.0641) (0.0721) (0.0403)
Democrat 0.2062∗∗∗ 0.3338∗∗∗ 0.3452∗∗∗ 0.2391∗∗∗
(0.0532) (0.0741) (0.1159) (0.0484)
No Military Service 0.0093 -0.0071 0.0015 -0.0339
(0.0458) (0.0526) (0.0575) (0.0351)
Foreign Born 1.2495∗∗∗ -1.0623∗∗∗ -1.9541∗∗∗ -0.0794
(0.3710) (0.3401) (0.4693) (0.2506)
Foreign Born Growth 0.0399∗∗ -0.1120∗∗∗ -0.1200∗∗∗ -0.0802∗∗∗
(0.0175) (0.0406) (0.0462) (0.0274)
African American -0.0332 -0.1835 -0.3169 0.1845
(0.1992) (0.3402) (0.4909) (0.1885)
Hispanic -0.3181∗ 0.1793 0.4698 -0.0691
(0.1894) (0.2496) (0.4147) (0.1901)
Democratic Vote Share 0.0152 0.2849 0.2943 0.1784
(0.1154) (0.2137) (0.3122) (0.1192)
Unemployment 1.3779 -1.7474 -2.9285 -1.1945
(1.2407) (1.3157) (1.9384) (1.3109)
Highly Skilled Ratio -0.7411∗ 0.9259 2.4481∗∗∗ 0.6858∗∗
(0.3906) (0.5781) (0.7374) (0.3310)
Unskilled Ratio 0.0351 1.7023∗∗ 3.6025∗∗∗ 1.4614∗∗∗
(0.3271) (0.6787) (1.1269) (0.3996)
Farm worker -0.9956 -2.5328∗∗∗ -4.6462∗∗∗ -2.0781∗∗
(1.2290) (0.9347) (1.3900) (0.8940)
Post 9/11 -0.5713∗∗∗ 0.0147 -0.1451 -0.0417
(0.0955) (0.0962) (0.2772) (0.2177)
N 369 325 260 734
Standard errors, clustered at the speaker level, in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All regressions control for state fixed effects and state interacted with Post 9/11 dummy fixed effects.
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significantly increases the probability of a pro-immigration vote by 4 percentage
points in the south-west (p < 0.01) and by 5 percentage points in the west (p
< 0.05). In the high immigration states an increase in 1 standard deviation in
valence significantly (p < 0.10) increases the probability of a pro-immigration
vote by 2 percentage points. Further, being a non-white significantly increases
the legislator’s probability of a pro-immigration vote in the south and in the high
immigration states. Being a democrat has a significant effect on the probability of
a pro-immigration vote across all 4 specifications considered.15 Thus, consistent
with prediction 2, the following result is observed:
Result 2: Even after limiting the dataset to southern, western or south-western
states, or high immigration states, speaker speech sentiment remains a significant
positive predictor of pro-immigration voting behaviour.
Lastly, the ability of the concreteness measure to predict pro-immigration voting
behaviour was tested for all votes, as well as for votes in southern, south-western,
western and high immigration states. The results are presented in tables 3.A.3
and 3.A.4. For all regions, as well as for the selected geographic specifications,
concreteness was not found to be a good predictor of voting behaviour. Thus,
consistent with prediction 3, the following is observed:
Results 3: Concreteness was observed not to be a good predictor of the speaker’s
voting behaviour on immigration bills.
3.4.3 Immigrant Topics
This section presents the results from applying a Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA) model to the immigration corpus. The LDA algorithm helps to under-
stand the key topics for immigration legislation, discussed in the U.S. Congress
between 1990 to 2015. Table 3.5 presents 10 relevant words describing each of
the 8 topics that were identified. Each topic was labelled by careful considera-
tion of the keywords16. The topics reflect the possible categories of immigration
legislation. The 8 topics are immigrant benefits or assistance, border security,
national security, defense, educational policy, health care, policy amendment and
15The district level economic variables have different impacts on pro-immigration voting
behaviour, depending on the geographic specification. This could potentially be due to cultural
or ideological differences across the regions. However, further investigation with respect to the
economic variables is beyond the scope of the present work.
16To maximise the dataset for training the LDA model the paper uses all speeches containing
immigration, refugee and related words, even those where the speaker is identified by office and
not by name. The LDA model was applied to 26,467 immigration related speeches in both








child, program, amendment, law, fund, assis-
tance, public, government, health, provision
2 Border security security, act, law, border, national, depart-
ment, amendment, bill, work, right
3 National Security security, national, intelligence, report, agency,
service, government, federal, program, fund




program, school, child, federal, fund, educa-
tional, education, law, assistance, amount




act, program, service, fund, amount, amended,
law, fiscal, available, section
8 U.S. Government
Support
refugee, law, war, government, American, sup-
port, need, right, world, program
Next, the paper examines the distribution of these topics over time. Figure 3.5
plots the time variation of the 8 topics. The distribution of topics over time
expresses the variation in concern over different immigrant-related issues and is
generally reflected by the nature of the bills introduced during the time. Figure
3.5 (a) shows that discussion on benefits and rights of immigrants peaked in
1995-96, consistent with the findings of Fennelly et al., 2015. Figure 3.5 (b)
shows that border security concerns first peaked in 2002 with the formation of
the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, post the 9/11 attacks. This
period also included the USA Patriot Act of 2001, which among other provisions,
increased the surveillance of immigrants living in the U.S. (Rodriguez, 2008). The
second peak in Border security topics was in 2005-2006 with bills such as Border
Protection, Anti-terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, Secure
Fence Act of 2006 and Immigration Law Enforcement Act of 2006. Similarly,
Figure 3.5 (c) shows a peak in national security-related discussions around mid-
2000s.
For discussions related to defense, Figure 3.5 (d) shows a peak in 2000 (which
could be due to the National Defense Authorisation Act of 1999, which had im-
migration provisions (Fennelly et al., 2015)). This is followed by another peak
17The value of λ (defined in section 3.3.3) was set at 1 and the top 20 keywords were evaluated
for each topic. Of the top 20 words, the 10 most interpretive words (and excluding words
with no semantic interpretation such as would, year, subsection) are presented in the paper.
Experimenting with different values of λ between 0.5 to 1 yielded very similar results.
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(a) Immigration Benefits (b) Border Security
(c) National Security (d) Defense
(e) Educational Policy (f) Health Care
(g) Policy Amendment (h) US Government Support
Figure 3.5: Immigrant Topics over Time
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between 2011-2014. This period marked the U.S. military involvement in the
Syrian Civil War. Figure 3.5 (e) shows that educational policy topics peaked in
1994, likely with the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, which involved immigra-
tion provisions (Fennelly et al., 2015), and had scattered attention after that,
with a prominent decline following 2001. Figure 3.5 (f) shows that health care
topics peaked in 2009 (potentially with the Children’s Health Insurance Program
Reauthorisation Act of 2009, which included immigration provisions (Fennelly
et al., 2015)). Not surprisingly, discussion over policy amendments in Congress
have been scattered all over the period under consideration. Finally, discussions
related to U.S. government support or aid was maximum between 1990-1993, a
period which included the Gulf War, and tailed off since early 2000s.
3.5 Conclusion
Anti-immigrant narratives have taken the centre stage in various recent political
events, be it the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom in 2016 or Donald
Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign in the United States. With anti-immigrant
sentiment on the rise, it is crucial to scrutinise politicians’ inherent attitude
towards immigrants, which plays a substantial role in shaping immigration policy
in western countries.
This paper creates an “immigration corpus” which consists of 24,351 Congres-
sional speeches containing immigration, refugee and related words, delivered on
the floor of the U.S. Congress between 1990 and 2015. The corpus is used to build
two distinct measures of attitude towards immigrants - sentiment or valence and
language concreteness. Out of these two, sentiment showed systematic variation
over time, consistent with the history of immigrant outcomes in the U.S., with a
marked decline following the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. and the
subsequent introduction of several anti-immigration bills. The sentiment measure
was strictly polarised with democrats displaying a consistently higher sentiment
than republicans in the period considered. The sentiment measure also displayed
orderly variation over regions, with the conservative states in the south show-
ing consistently low sentiment towards immigrants. The concreteness measure,
barring fluctuations around major immigrant events such as the 9/11 attacks,
displayed an overall increasing trend during the period considered.
The paper also computed speaker specific values of speech sentiment to show
that sentiment is a significant positive predictor of speakers’ pro-immigration
voting behaviour on immigration policy-related bills. This result holds even after
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controlling for speaker characteristics, party affiliation and district level socio-
economic variables.
Further, the paper applies a Latent Dirichlet Allocation or LDA topic modelling
algorithm to the immigration corpus to identify the different immigration policy-
related topics discussed in the U.S. Congress and also to study the distribution
of such topics over time. The topic distributions show a hike in concern over
border security and national security following the 9/11 attacks and a decline in
discussion on topics like educational policies and government aid.
Congressional speeches delivered on issues related to immigration are vital for
predicting immigrant outcomes in the U.S. A linguistic measure of attitude to-
wards immigrants developed using speeches could be more helpful for predicting
immigrant outcomes compared to other measures like past voting behaviour of
speakers on immigration bills. This is because the former provides a continuous
measure thus capturing the intensity of the speaker’s attitude compared to the
latter which is a binary measure. Further, the U.S. Congress members play an
important role in shaping legislation related to immigrant issues by voting ei-
ther in favour of or against bills which liberalise or restrict immigration. Thus,
a linguistic measure of attitude towards immigrants is useful for predicting the
speaker’s voting behaviour.
Overall, the study of speeches delivered by Congress members either during Con-
gressional sessions or during campaign trails and other public appearances can be
critical for building measures of the politician’s attitude towards immigration or
other key issues. Future researchers can use a similar methodology as employed
in the paper to analyse politicians’ attitudes on other crucial matters, such as
gender, race and climate change, and use it to predict the politician’s voting
behaviour on bills related to such topics.
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3.A Additional Tables and Figures
Table 3.A.1: Characteristics of Voters






No Military Service 304
Table 3.A.2: Summary Statistics of Voting Data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Vote 0.391 0.488 0 1 1265
Valence 5.526 0.194 4.635 6.262 1265
Age 56.211 9.481 30 81 1213
Foreign Born 0.112 0.108 0.002 0.585 1265
Foreign Born growth 0.507 0.810 -0.718 5.254 1265
African American 0.123 0.161 0.001 0.801 1265
Hispanic 0.118 0.151 0.003 0.745 1264
Democratic Vote Share 0.51 0.259 0 1 1260
Unemployment 0.059 0.025 0.018 0.204 1264
High Skilled Ratio 0.316 0.087 0.116 0.582 1264
Unskilled ratio 0.22 0.093 0.044 0.623 1265
Farm Worker 0.019 0.023 0 0.204 1264
Labour PAC 0.195 0.191 0 0.888 1010
Corporate PAC 0.369 0.15 0 1 1010
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Table 3.A.3: Impact of speech concreteness on Immigration votes
All bills Major bills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Concreteness -0.0044 0.0084 0.0064 0.0130 0.0244
(0.0172) (0.0162) (0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0188)
Non-white 0.4805∗∗∗ 0.1299∗∗∗ 0.1663∗∗∗ 0.1740∗∗
(0.0498) (0.0477) (0.0470) (0.0795)
Age 0.0037∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0046∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0020)
Female 0.1001∗∗ 0.0119 0.0067 -0.0322
(0.0486) (0.0336) (0.0371) (0.0559)
Democrat 0.2562∗∗∗ 0.2845∗∗∗ 0.2968∗∗∗
(0.0411) (0.0599) (0.0852)
No Military Service -0.0365 -0.0363 -0.0447
(0.0309) (0.0338) (0.0457)
Foreign Born -0.0614 -0.3835 -0.2031
(0.2309) (0.2372) (0.4596)
Foreign Born Growth -0.0434∗∗ -0.0207 -0.0453∗
(0.0211) (0.0194) (0.0246)
African American 0.1636 0.1074 -0.1952
(0.1556) (0.1555) (0.2190)
Hispanic -0.1565 0.0763 -0.0580
(0.1619) (0.1775) (0.2217)
Democratic Vote Share 0.1993∗ 0.1642 0.1067
(0.1042) (0.1057) (0.1449)
Unemployment -1.1203 -2.2365∗∗ -1.8928
(1.0496) (1.1219) (1.5861)
Highly skilled Ratio 0.6235∗∗ 1.0326∗∗∗ 0.9385∗
(0.2846) (0.3517) (0.5669)
Unskilled Ratio 1.3087∗∗∗ 1.7287∗∗∗ 1.9529∗∗∗
(0.3263) (0.3798) (0.5045)
Farm worker -1.6471∗∗ -2.5004∗∗∗ -2.0986∗∗
(0.7024) (0.7321) (0.9878)
Labour Pac -0.0805 0.0091
(0.1515) (0.2261)
Corporate PAC -0.1418 -0.1485
(0.1093) (0.1565)
Post 9/11 -0.1175 -0.1294 -0.1308 -0.1694 0.0600
(0.1590) (0.1311) (0.0965) (0.1465) (0.2097)
N 1137 1082 1082 844 316
Standard errors, clustered at the speaker level, in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All regressions control for state fixed effects and state interacted with Post 9/11 dummy fixed effects.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Concreteness 0.0113 0.0093 -0.0007 0.0214
(0.0169) (0.0226) (0.0280) (0.0152)
Non-white 0.1572∗∗∗ -0.0105 -0.0051 0.0872∗
(0.0338) (0.0599) (0.0758) (0.0512)
Age -0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0009 0.0003
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0015)
Female 0.1105 0.0112 -0.0353 0.0197
(0.0693) (0.0630) (0.0691) (0.0405)
Democrat 0.1999∗∗∗ 0.3297∗∗∗ 0.3316∗∗∗ 0.2361∗∗∗
(0.0504) (0.0721) (0.1101) (0.0494)
No Military Service 0.0212 -0.0091 -0.0089 -0.0275
(0.0451) (0.0551) (0.0616) (0.0354)
Foreign Born 1.2688∗∗∗ -0.9215∗∗∗ -1.7137∗∗∗ -0.0463
(0.3703) (0.3166) (0.4446) (0.2483)
Foreign Born Growth 0.0500∗∗∗ -0.1195∗∗∗ -0.1252∗∗∗ -0.0817∗∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0398) (0.0462) (0.0276)
African American -0.0503 -0.2020 -0.3737 0.1773
(0.2012) (0.3521) (0.5058) (0.1896)
Hispanic -0.2971 0.1410 0.4187 -0.0767
(0.1900) (0.2535) (0.4327) (0.1855)
Democratic Vote Share 0.0290 0.2751 0.3273 0.1856
(0.1079) (0.2018) (0.3017) (0.1224)
Unemployment 1.7573 -1.4930 -2.2908 -1.0070
(1.2729) (1.2786) (1.8888) (1.3029)
Highly Skilled Ratio -0.8132∗∗ 0.9388∗ 2.2346∗∗∗ 0.6885∗∗
(0.3934) (0.5441) (0.7128) (0.3363)
Unskilled Ratio -0.1527 1.6153∗∗ 3.1452∗∗∗ 1.4216∗∗∗
(0.3171) (0.6278) (1.0886) (0.3982)
Farm worker -1.0110 -2.2773∗∗∗ -4.1269∗∗∗ -2.0721∗∗
(1.1748) (0.8558) (1.2882) (0.8502)
Post 9/11 -0.5912∗∗∗ -0.0038 -0.1020 -0.0133
(0.0960) (0.0980) (0.2401) (0.1921)
N 369 325 260 734
Standard errors, clustered at the speaker level, in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All regressions control for state fixed effects and state interacted with Post 9/11 dummy fixed effects.
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(a) Speech concreteness in 1990
(b) Speech concreteness in 2006
Figure 3.A.1: Concreteness of immigration policy-related speeches across differ-
ent states in the U.S. in (a) 1990 and (b) 2006
(a) All regions (b) South and Northeast
Figure 3.A.2: Variation in concreteness of immigration policy-related speeches
over regions in the US. (a) shows concreteness over time for all regions (b) shows
concreteness over time for the southern and north-eastern states.
3.B List of words used to form the “Immigration Corpus”
Following is the list of words used to identify speeches related to immigration:
Note that, since all speeches were lemmatized, to reduce words to their base forms,
speeches containing any other variations of the words ‘immigrant’ and ‘refugee’
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(aside from the ones mentioned below) would have also been included in the cor-
pus.
immigrants, immigrant, immigration, immigrations, immigrate, immigrates, im-
migrated, immigrating, refugee, refugees
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Conclusion
This thesis contributes to the growing trend of using language analysis within
the Economic discipline by using text analysis tools in a novel evaluation of
three distinct forms of communication - small talk interaction, climate change
communication and political speeches.
The first chapter makes a novel contribution to literature using personality the-
ory to explain strategic decision making, by exploring the impact of personality
impressions or beliefs developed about others on strategic behaviour. In a labo-
ratory setting, it was observed that after engaging in a brief small talk chat with
a stranger, the subject developed beliefs about the stranger’s personality, partic-
ularly trait extraversion. Beliefs about the stranger’s extraversion were observed
to affect decision making in ensuing strategic interactions involving cooperation
and level-k reasoning. Analysis of the language used during the small talk chat
revealed that more talkative partners are believed to be more extraverted - a
mechanism which indeed provides a reliable measure of trait extraversion. Over-
all, as the first study of its kind, the findings of this research can pave the way
for further work exploring the link between personality impressions and strate-
gic behaviours, potentially involving longer communication times and real world
settings.
The second chapter contributes to research examining climate change communi-
cation strategies to promote a reduced meat diet. A comparative evaluation of
6 information interventions, formulated using six supporting theories, against a
control group with baseline scientific information, was conducted using an online
randomised control trial. It was observed that the most effective interventions in
reducing planned meat intake were centred on providing more scientific knowl-
edge and presenting the consequences of one’s actions in an easily understandable
unit i.e. efficacy salience. The study also found support for a targeted messaging
approach and evidence of motivated reasoning around meat intake. Evaluating
donations to a climate change charity and analysing the text in the evidence
recalled at the end of the study generated further insight into the interventions.
Overall, the findings of this study can offer guidance to future researchers and
policy-makers about effective strategies for large-scale communication campaigns
to promote a plant-based diet.
Finally, the third chapter contributes to research developing linguistic measures
of attitude or bias against vulnerable groups. The chapter compiled an “immi-
157
gration corpus” containing immigration policy-related speeches delivered in the
U.S. Congress between 1990 and 2015. The corpus was used to develop two
distinct measures of attitude towards immigrants - sentiment (or valence) and
concreteness. Of the two measures, sentiment, in addition to displaying system-
atic variation across time and states consistent with the history of immigrant
outcomes, was a significant predictor of the speaker’s voting behaviour on im-
migration bills. Applying a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic modelling
algorithm to the immigration corpus demonstrated trends in the different topics
related to immigration policy (such as national security) that have been debated
in the Congress over time. Moreover, a similar methodology to this study can
be adopted by future researchers to build linguistic measures of politicians’ atti-
tudes towards other key issues such as gender, race and climate change, to predict
legislative outcomes.
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